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 This collection fills an important gap in our understanding of the role of uncer-
tainty in the science– society nexus. It illustrates the growing awareness that, in 
this context, uncertainty is essentially a political concern to be addressed by better 
governance rather than a scientific problem to be solved by improved techniques. 
Scientific uncertainty will continue to be a challenge for contemporary societies 
as long as the legitimacy of policy decision- making and action is based on trust in 
science. 
 Professor Silvio Funtowicz, Centre for the Study of the Sciences 
and the Humanities, University of Bergen; formerly EU Joint 
Research Centre, Ispra 
 What should we do with uncertainty? Not abolish it with facts, this wide-ranging 
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Technology Studies at the Harvard Kennedy School
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 Professor Dipak Gyawali, Academician, Academy of Science and 
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 The Politics of Uncertainty questions the framing of uncertainty that has largely been 
transformed into calculable risks. Across a wide spectrum ranging from finance and 
banking to practices of modelling disease and climate change, the authors highlight 
the failings of institutions of illusionary control. Their urgent appeal deserves to be 
widely heard: by embracing uncertainty a culture of care can emerge, paving the 
way towards sustainability. 
 Emeritus Professor Dr Helga Nowotny, Chair of the 
ERA Council Forum, Austria; former President of the 
European Research Council 
 Our world is deeply uncertain. Yet the concept is barely understood. This extraor-
dinary volume brings together a cross- disciplinary, international group of thinkers 
on the leading edge of thinking about incertitude. The book’s essays challenge us 
to recognize the unique risks and, more radically, the emancipatory opportunities 
associated with what cannot be known or domesticated. 
 Professor Ilene Grabel, Distinguished Professor of International Finance, 
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver; author 
of multiple prize- winning book,  When Things Don’t Fall Apart (MIT Press) 
 That even the best of global scientific knowledge and attendant policy cultures 
are always beset with contingency and ignorance has been a long and unfinished 
learning struggle. That this recognition is vital for practical effect in the develop-
ment of sustainable and just human democratic futures has seen even stronger resist-
ance, or denial. This collection integrates leading insights on the diverse, evolving 
challenges presented by these persistent conditions – a truly unique resource. 
 Emeritus Professor Brian Wynne, Centre for the Study of Environment 
Change, University of Lancaster; former special advisor to the House of 
Lords and Royal Society on science in society 
 While risk and uncertainty are often described in technocratic ways that create 
fear or the feeling of being overwhelmed by complexity, this book offers us a new 
way to reimagine how society can engage with uncertainty in an open way that 
prioritises alternative visions, questions the sources of data and the direction of 
science, debates the distribution of benefits and opens the possibility of participa-
tion and experimentation along the way. It could not come at a better time. 
 Professor Mariana Mazzucato, Founding Director, Institute for Innovation 
and Public Purpose, University College London; winner of 2014 New 
Statesman SPERI Prize, 2015 Hans- Matth ö fer- Preis and 
2018 Leontief Prize 
 THE POLITICS OF UNCERTAINTY 
 Why is uncertainty so important to politics today? To explore the underlying 
reasons, issues and challenges, this book’s chapters address finance and banking, 
insurance, technology regulation and critical infrastructures, as well as climate 
change, infectious disease responses, natural disasters, migration, crime and security 
and spirituality and religion. 
 The book argues that uncertainties must be understood as complex constructions 
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issues, but depend deeply on political values and choices. What burgeoning 
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more collective, mutualistic and convivial – politics of responsibility and care. If 
hopes of much- needed progressive transformation are to be realised, then currently 
blinkered understandings of uncertainty need to be met with renewed democratic 
struggle. 
 Written in an accessible style and illustrated by multiple case studies from across 
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 PREFACE 
 Since its establishment in 2006, the ESRC STEPS Centre ( www.steps- centre.
org ) has been deeply concerned with the implications of uncertainty for our 
understandings of and responses to a complex, turbulent world. Countering the 
tendencies of a narrow, technocratic approach to sustainability, the ‘pathways 
approach’ has argued that considerations of a politics of uncertainty must be central. 
 As part of the Centre’s final phase, the focus of our activities in 2019 was on 
‘uncertainty’, and in particular the politics of uncertainty in transformations to sus-
tainability. It proved timely. In the midst of the Brexit crisis, uncertainties were on 
everyone’s lips across Europe. Disaster hit southern Africa as Cyclone Idai struck 
with ferocious force, while in the Democratic Republic of Congo another out-
break of Ebola occurred, killing many. While completing this book, the world was 
gripped by the uncertainties surrounding the spread of the coronavirus (COVID-
19) pandemic. Meanwhile, debates about the implications of climate change, the 
stability of the finance and banking system, the consequences of global migration, 
the impacts of new technologies and the threats from terrorism continuously filled 
the news. Uncertainties are everywhere and define our contemporary era. 
 But how to respond? What are the intellectual, political and practical resources 
that are needed? Throughout 2019 we convened seminars and talks, commissioned 
blogs, hosted a major symposium ( www.steps- centre.org/ uncertainty/ ) and also 
wrote a major review paper exploring the diverse literatures on uncertainty ( http:// 
bit.ly/ uncertainty- why- does- it- matter ). The aim was to encourage interactive 
debate and synthesis – which were captured in a series of podcasts ( http:// bit.ly/ 
uncertainty- podcasts ). 
 This book is a result of this process and draws in particular on the contributions 
to the symposium. The symposium’s themes were:  finance and banking; insur-
ance; experimental and adaptive governance; critical infrastructure; technology 
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regulation; cities; infectious diseases; climate change; disasters; migration; crime and 
terrorism and spirituality and religion. Quite a range! 
 Each of those leading symposium themes (and now (co- )authors of the chapters 
in this book) invited a small group to the symposium – mostly academics, but some 
practitioners and many hybrids – and each theme then joined with two others to 
debate how uncertainty is understood in different domains, and what we should do 
about it. We also received some amazing contributions from plenary panels, who 
explored the political implications of uncertainty, as well as the legacies of Ulrich 
Beck, in relation to current debates ( http:// bit.ly/ uncertainty- videos ). It was an 
inspiring, intense and productive few days. 
 The book offers short essays written following the symposium, each reflecting on 
a theme, while the longer introduction offers an overview that aims to bring some 
of the strands together, outlining what we mean by a new politics of uncertainty. 
Taking seriously the many faces of uncertainty – in relation to knowledge, materi-
ality, experience, embodiment and practice – highlights the multi- dimensionality of 
the concept. Opening up prefigurative spaces for innovation and experimentation, 
creating a politics of hope, offers a way forward. Yet this requires a form of politics 
that is rooted in mutuality, conviviality and collective solidarity in order to ensure 
that such spaces do not exclude the marginalised and are not captured by regressive, 
authoritarian players. 
 A focus on uncertainty, we argue, offers a profound challenge and productive 
focus for a transformational politics of sustainability and development. As a reader 
of this book, we hope you will reflect on these ideas, exploring areas of work that 
are unfamiliar and that challenge thinking in your own domain. Across the chapters, 
there is no unifying consensus either on framing the core ideas or on ways forward. 
The tensions between different perspectives offer a taste of a rich, ongoing debate. 
However, all contributors, from different standpoints and across diverse fields, agree 
that a focus on ‘uncertainty’ and its politics is essential for both understanding and 
transforming the contemporary world. In reading the book, we therefore hope 
that you will join in the practical and political challenges of embracing uncer-
tainty, and thus of rethinking mainstream approaches to addressing sustainability 
and development. 
 We would like to thank all those involved in the ongoing intellectual and pol-
itical project of the ESRC STEPS Centre, and the many people who contributed 
to the ideas put forward in this book. The introduction draws on discussions held 
throughout the symposium, both in parallel sessions and plenaries. Not all specific 
ideas are acknowledged as it was always a free- flowing, cumulative conversation, but 
certainly our thinking was massively enhanced. We would like to thank the theme 
leads for not only convening fantastic groups of such diverse and brilliant people – 
most of whom we had never met – but also leading/ facilitating the writing of the 
chapters. The nine blogposts that followed the symposium allowed for reflections 
from participants who were not part of the book project, and they are all definitely 
worth reading ( http:// bit.ly/ uncertainty- blog- posts ). The recordings of the plen-
aries and the overall communications work was ably led by Nathan Oxley, with 
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Sarah King, while brilliant organisational work was led by Becky Ayre and initial 
copyediting was undertaken by My Blue Pencil. 
 Last, but not least, we would like to thank the ESRC (UK Economic and Social 
Research Council) for its long- term support to the STEPS Centre (steps- centre.
org), which has allowed for the development of the ideas in this book over a long 
time. The symposium and open access publication of the book was co- sponsored 
by the European Research Council, through an Advanced Grant that supports 
the Pastoralism, Resilience and Uncertainty:  Global Lessons from the Margins 
(PASTRES) programme ( www.pastres.org ). 
 Ian Scoones and Andy Stirling 
 Co- directors, ESRC STEPS Centre, 
 IDS and SPRU at the University of Sussex 
 February 2020 
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 UNCERTAINTY AND THE POLITICS 
OF TRANSFORMATION 
 Ian Scoones and Andy Stirling 
 Opening up the politics of uncertainty 
 Why is the idea of uncertainty so important to politics today? 1 Why is it especially 
significant for crucial debates about transformations to sustainability? This book 
tackles these big questions by exploring the politics of uncertainty across a range of 
domains and diverse case studies. 
 The book argues that the embracing of uncertainties  – as constructions of 
knowledge, materiality, experience, embodiment and practice – means challenging 
singular notions of modernity and progress as a hard- wired ‘one- track’ ‘race to 
the future’. Ideas of development and sustainability are very often associated with 
a linear perspective on progress, dominated by narrow views of science and eco-
nomics (Folbre  et al .  2018 ). As a result of this, there is often a reliance on simplistic 
notions of innovation, focusing on those ‘lagging behind’, who must ‘catch up’ or 
‘leapfrog’ to where others have reached. In this way, the framing of innovation and 
progress is reduced to merely how much, how fast, who is ahead and what is the 
risk of proceeding along an assumed pathway. Such debates too often ignore more 
important political questions about which way, what direction and who wins and 
who loses, where issues of uncertainty are central (Stirling  2015 ). Given diverse 
uncertainties, there is no single assumed endpoint; no one version of modernity and 
progress, and so directions chosen in the pursuit of sustainability and development 
depend on political and social choice (Scoones  2016 ). 
 Too often, ideas of transformation and sustainability are framed around par-
ticular, expert- defined ‘solutions’, with uncertainties blanked out. Typically asserted 
with great confidence, burgeoning notions around, for example, ‘smart cities’, 
‘climate- smart agriculture’, ‘clean development’, ‘geo- engineering’, ‘green growth’ 
or ‘zero- carbon economies’ act to suppress appreciation of many forms of uncer-
tainty. Conceived in narrow, technical terms, informed by relatively homogeneous, 
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specialist views, these core organising ideas for high- level global policy- making 
typically emphasise aspiring control, asserting romantic visions of visionary lead-
ership, heroic expertise, deterministic systems, orderly values, convergent interests, 
compliant citizens and expediently predictable futures. 
 As a consequence, some highly uncertain issues that should remain open for 
political debate are imagined in circumscribed, biased and one- directional ways. 
The loudest voices and most powerful interests thus come to enjoy a dispropor-
tionate influence in defining what is meant by ‘progress’. The contrast could hardly 
be greater with the potentially open arena for political deliberation constituted by 
the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. Arguably, for the first time in 
history, these establish a globally- shared discourse enabling the exercise of agency 
not only over the possibility of progress but also with regard to its direction. The 
general orientation is clear – towards equality, well- being and ecological integrity; 
but the particularities of what these values might mean in practice – and how best 
to go about realising them – remain deeply uncertain. 
 Why this matters is that a rich and open- ended array of far wider, deeper and 
more plural kinds of possible societal, cultural and political transformations get 
obscured (Scoones  et al.  2015 ). These many closures of uncertainties in mainstream, 
global discourses around science, technology and social progress typically serve to 
suppress the interests of the most marginalised communities, cultures and environ-
ments. Such failures to embrace uncertainty can presage perhaps the gravest form 
of oppression in the world today: the invisible foreclosing of possible futures. As a 
result, we argue, the opening up of political space to confront radical uncertainty 
can become as crucial to emancipatory politics as many more direct assertions of 
neglected interests. 
 Uncertainties are inevitable in this negotiation of diverse, possible futures 
concerning different pathways and their consequences (Leach  et  al.  2010 ). 
Uncertainties should not be reduced to risk, framed as a zero- sum threat that is 
in need of taming, controlling and managing, lest innovation is somehow ‘held 
back’ (Kearnes and Wynne  2007 ). In today’s complex, turbulent, interconnected, 
globalised world, uncertainty must be embraced as perhaps more central than ever. 
We argue that opening up to uncertainty offers opportunity, diversity and a politics 
of hope. This in turn offers a more plural vision of progress, defined according to 
different standpoints, with multiple modernities at play. 
 The hegemonic ideas of linear progress and modernist development that so 
dominate Western cultures have been exported to the world through waves of colo-
nialism, trade and aid. This ‘globalising modernity’ (Ahuja  2009 ; Hobden  2002 ) is 
of course not fixed. Indeed, even in the West, past ideas of progress have been framed 
differently:  for example, around cycles of growth and renewal, rather than linear 
change (Cowen and Shenton  1996 ). In non- Western cultures, notions of devel-
opment, progress and modernity often have very different connotations, rooted in 
subaltern identities and cultural and religious perspectives (Oxley,  Chapter 12 ). This 
book argues that this globalising version of modernity and progress need not col-
onise the future in the ways it is presently doing. Instead, a more diverse, plural and 
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contingent perspective can be advocated, involving an appreciation of uncertainty 
and its diverse framings. 
 The book reflects on different cases in different settings, each offering narratives 
about the future, with uncertainty central to the storyline. The chapters focus 
on banking and finance; insurance systems; the regulation of technology; critical 
infrastructures; cities; climate change; disease outbreaks; natural disasters; migra-
tion flows; crime and terrorism and spirituality and religion. All suggest that 
the contemporary moment poses fundamental challenges to the  status quo . Old 
assumptions of linear, stable systems, amenable to technical risk management and 
control, do not hold. 
 This challenges the globalising modernity of (neo)liberal capitalism – with its 
pretence of stable environments and economies, and assertion of particular cultures 
of expertise and structures of appropriation and control. Futures are unknown: even 
when seen from any individual viewpoint, uncertainties are ubiquitous. Diverging 
interests and perspectives introduce further ambiguities. Underlying all this is 
the radical, ever- present potentiality of downright ignorance and surprise. Today, 
financial instability, pandemic disease, climate chaos, recurrent natural disasters and 
threats to liberal, ‘democratic’ orders across the world are refashioning the ways 
policy, politics and governance are thought about. Arguing that uncertainty in all 
its forms is central, this book suggests a new politics of uncertainty: one that offers 
opportunities, but also dangers. 
 The stakes could hardly be higher. On the one hand, the landscape of pos-
sible futures for globalising forms of modernity suggest trends towards narrow, 
technocratic, fearful, risk- focused intensifications of control. On the other hand, 
subaltern, ‘alternative’ (Kaup  2012 ; Gaonkar  1999 ) and ‘minoritarian’ modernities 
(Taraborrelli  2015 ) – as well as wider emerging ‘non- modernities’ (Ibarra- Colado 
 2006 ) – offer imaginings of new institutions and practices for embracing – even 
celebrating – uncertainty. It is arguably through more equal engagements between 
these diverse cultural, political and organisational forms that space can be found 
for a more plural, mutualistic and hopeful politics of care and conviviality (Stirling 
 2019b ; Arora  2019 ; cf. Illich  1973 ). 
 From framings to practices of uncertainty 
 Uncertainties are not merely about the absence of knowledge (Walker  et  al. 
 2003 ): they can be very concrete – and formatively diverse – in their manifestations. 
The literatures on uncertainty span many different disciplines, applied to a diver-
sity of domains (Scoones  2019 ), but a key distinction – highlighted long ago by 
Frank Knight ( 1921 ) – is that between risk and uncertainty. Risk is where we know 
what the possible outcomes are and can estimate their probabilities. Uncertainty is 
where we are unsure of the probabilities of particular outcomes. This is important, 
as there is too often a tendency to ‘close down’ towards risk (Stirling  2008 ), 
pretending to know the probabilities. Yet this is often not realistic in practice, as 
models and estimates are confounded by uncertainties. In cases where systems are 
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complex, interacting and non- linear, a narrow engineering risk- based approach is 
inappropriate. 
 A number of other dimensions of incertitude also arise. These include ambigu-
ities – where there are ongoing disputes about possible outcomes between different 
groups, reflecting contending social and political worlds (Stirling  1999 ). Here, 
for instance, it may be that debates do not mainly concern how likely different 
outcomes may be, but are about more fundamentally divergent notions of ‘benefit’ 
or ‘harm’, or their distribution across society, or what the alternative options for 
action may be. There is also the predicament of ignorance, where fundamental 
indeterminacies of the world and ‘non- knowledge’ mean we ‘don’t know what we 
don’t know’ (Wynne  1992 ). And here it is important to remember that surprises can 
of course be positive as well as negative, depending on who is affected. 
 Under routine conditions, narrow notions of risk can remain useful in the 
engineering of closed systems, or where high- frequency, unchanging processes gen-
erate long- run comparable statistics. Here, there is no need to throw away the baby 
with the bathwater. But even where all parameters are well- known, most conditions 
in the world are uncertain, with specific probabilities and/ or outcomes remaining 
not known or unknowable. And where there is even the possibility of unknown 
parameters, then ignorance is unavoidable. All these cumulative dilemmas have pro-
found consequences, as the chapters in this book explore. The bottom line, in many 
circumstances, is that the assumptions of a risk- based approach can be inappro-
priate, misleading – and even dangerous. 
 Uncertainties therefore are conditions of knowledge itself – how we understand, 
frame and construct possible futures – and are not just hard- wired into ‘objective’ 
situations. But uncertainties also have other features, beyond these epistemological 
and ontological implications. Across the chapters of this book, four additional 
dimensions are discussed: 
•  Uncertainties have concrete, material features. They are produced from com-
plex, non- linear unpredictable systems (Driebe and McDaniel  2005 ). They 
have material origins and effects. For example, the environmental variability 
of rangelands may be a source of productive advantage for pastoralists as they 
move across landscapes harvesting nutrients – living with and from uncertainty 
(Kr ä tli and Schareika  2010 ). In complex systems, surprises  – sudden ‘black 
swan’ events – may arise that were never expected (Taleb  2007 ). Taming and 
controlling such systems is impossible, but understanding and responding to 
unpredictable variability is vital (Funtowicz and Ravetz  1990 ), requiring inven-
tion of new forms of science, regulation and management (van Zwanenberg, 
 Chapter 4 ; Roe,  Chapter 5 ). 
•  Uncertainties are not experienced in the same way by different people. 
Knowledges about the present and perspectives on the future are all 
constructed in particular contexts. Depending on one’s situation, uncertain-
ties may be embraced as an opportunity or encountered as a source of dread, 
fear and anxiety. An experiential, affective stance on uncertainty is therefore 
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unavoidable. Emotions and feelings matter, as they affect understanding and 
action. Religious and spiritual beliefs about – and enactment of – relationships 
between humans and the world may also impinge (Skrimshire  2014 ; Oxley, 
 Chapter 12 ), as in Samkhya Hindu philosophy, which offers a plural perspec-
tive on understanding, influenced by consciousness, perception and experi-
ence. 2 And, in turn, uncertainties are influenced by histories, cultures and 
identities, as social worlds and historical experiences filter perspectives and 
condition action (Da Col and Humphrey  2012 ). Thus, marginalised commu-
nities in the global South will experience climate shocks in very different ways 
to privileged groups in the North, as histories of colonialism and dispossession 
influence what is possible and how pasts, presents and futures are viewed (Watts 
and Bohle  1993 ). 
•  Perspectives on uncertainties are also embodied, becoming part of who we 
are, as well as how we think and feel (Csordas and Harwod  1994 ). Sometimes 
this is physically reflected in our bodies. For example, men and women, and 
young and old people, may respond to the uncertainties of climatic or other 
disasters quite differently, as a result of the consequences of events in their 
day- to- day lives (Sword- Daniels  et al.  2018 ). School children may find debates 
about climate change unsettling and anxiety- inducing, especially when ‘facts’ 
are unclear, 3 while living with a chronic illness may result in a very different 
outlook to those of medical professionals and even family members, as both 
the condition and its treatment are enacted through the body (Mol and Law 
 2004 ). Drawing on feminist and queer theory, Wendy Harcourt ( 2013 ) argues 
that the body plays an important – often hidden and contested – role in the 
ways we encounter the world, and conduct ‘development’. As with ‘tacit 
knowledge’, embodied uncertainties remain entirely undocumented and even 
not consciously apprehended by those most intimately affected, making them 
especially significant when addressing responses to incertitude. 
•  Finally, our understandings of uncertainty are reflected in practices: how we 
act, and the type of social imaginaries we construct – or which emerge unin-
tentionally  – serve to guide our lives and politics (Arora and Glover  2017 ; 
Shove  et  al.  2012 ). In response, emerging practices include both controlling 
forms of ‘audit culture’ (Power  2004 ), as well as more flexible, adaptive forms 
of ‘reliability management’ (Roe  2013 ; Roe,  Chapter  5 ). During the finan-
cial crisis, it was the practical responses of financial regulators, supervisors and 
traders that helped avoid total collapse. According to Ilene Grabel, this was due 
to features of ‘productive incoherence’ and ‘pragmatic innovation’ in the finan-
cial system (Grabel  2017 ). A focus on agency, and more distributed possibilities 
for action, directs attention towards relations of power in responding to uncer-
tainty. Michael Thompson and Michael Warburton, for example, explored 
power dynamics around deep uncertainties over deforestation and river man-
agement in the Himalayas – tracking moves within discourse away from ‘what 
the facts are’ towards a focus on what powerful interests ‘would like the facts to 
be’. In this way, the agency of incumbent interests behind major infrastructure 
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proposals was reinforced, while that of less powerful actors – like mountain- 
dwelling subsistence farmers – was denigrated (Thompson and Gyawali  2007 ; 
Thompson and Warburton  1985 ). 
 A diverse appreciation of these five dimensions of uncertainty suggests a challenge 
to the controlling, managerial policy responses that have been the hallmark of techno-
cratic modernity – and, for some, diagnostic of progress. However, as a number of 
this book’s chapters discuss, alternative policy and management approaches have 
been proposed, ranging from adaptive management (Tompkins and Adger  2004 ) 
to experimentalist approaches (Sabel and Zeitlin  2010 ) to deliberative governance 
(Dryzek  2012 ). Central to these are the principles of incremental learning and the 
negotiation of outcomes along complex, plural pathways. Deliberation, negotiation 
and inclusive engagement across diverse knowledges and experiences is essential. As 
the following chapters show through varied examples, this requires an opening up 
to options and knowledges, and across all aspects of incertitude – including uncer-
tainties in the strict sense, as well as ignorance and ambiguities following our earlier 
categorisation. Incertitude must therefore be embraced equally in relation to know-
ledge, materialities, experiences, embodiment and practice. 
 Yet, as Mary Douglas famously identified, the same apparent ‘objective’ 
conditions of uncertainty can be lived in and worked with in very different ways 
by different people (Douglas  1986 ). Uncertainties, she argued, are constituted very 
differently – for instance – in hierarchical or egalitarian social orders, or collect-
ivist or individualist institutional cultures (Thompson  et al.  1990 ). Likewise, for the 
influential German sociologist Niklas Luhmann ( 1993 ), it is contrasting practical 
systems of communication that bring uncertainties to material life. Rather than 
being seen as external ‘states of the world’, uncertainties are therefore better under-
stood as the messy gaps, wrinkles and tangles that serve to make societies aware of – 
and reflexive in relation to – their own conditions of being. And, for the leading 
theorist of the ‘risk society’, Ulrich Beck, it is through uncertainties – more than 
professed knowledge – that contemporary societies most concretely encounter the 
cumulative contradictions of modernity in which they are embedded (Adam  et al. 
 2000 ; Beck  et al.  1994 ; Beck  1992 ). 
 Like Beck, the contributors to this book see risk and uncertainty as formative 
of contemporary politics (Mythen  et al.  2018 ). Indeterminacy and non- knowledge 
fundamentally shape political and managerial possibilities. As discussed further below, 
the premises of many favoured policy frameworks – from equilibrium economics 
(Raworth  2017 ) to audit- based management (Power  2004 ) to economic regula-
tion (Bronk and Jacoby  2016 ) to security regimes (Amoore  2013 ; Dillon  2007 ) to 
insurance provision (Ewald  1991 ) – become incompatible with embracing the full 
implications of uncertainty. Challenges to such frameworks emerge especially when 
looking at issues and geographies beyond Beck’s original concern with individualised 
risks associated with accelerating industrial modernity in northern Europe (Caplan 
 2000 ). While uncertainties certainly reconfigure politics, they do so in diverse ways. 
As the various chapters show, class, gender, ethnicity, age and location matter in 
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how uncertainties are understood and responded to (Curran  2018 ). A  focus on 
uncertainty should therefore not divert attention from long- standing perspectives 
on social change, but instead highlight new dynamics (Carrapico  et al. ,  Chapter 11 ) 
 As a challenge to a control- oriented technocratic order of globalising modernity, 
we argue that a focus on the politics of uncertainty is essential. This confronts the 
linear assumption that a universalised science creates technologies for singular pro-
gress, suggesting instead a more diverse, plural vision, implicating multiple modern-
ities. Indeed, as uncertainties reconfigure politics, we can observe different effects. 
Uncertainty can create anxiety and fear, and open spaces for rent- seeking, profit- 
making and forms of populist authoritarianism (Scoones  et al.  2018 ), while at the 
same time it can offer hope – and spaces for experimentation and learning that 
can lead to an emancipatory politics for the future (Solnit  2016 ). As the chapters 
discuss  – across a diversity of domains  – which directions are taken, and how 
institutions of science, law and the state respond, are crucial issues for our times 
(Nowotny  2015 ). 
 Topologies of uncertainty 
 Interweaving through these wider currents are the more specific dimensions of 
uncertainty explored in the chapters of this book. Just as quantification of any kind is 
always underlain by qualitative dimensions, so all the different arcane geometries of 
‘risk’ and ‘probability’ are always shaped by the topologies of uncertainty on which 
they are built. So, the structures of possibility underpinning commerce, banking and 
finance are potentially formative of entire wider economies, and deeply influenced 
by the narratives of economics and the forms of modelling of uncertainty that are 
deployed (Walter and Wansleben,  Chapter 2 ). Beyond the particular actuarial expe-
diencies, it is the imagined relationships between presents and futures that make 
insurance so generative of everyday life, and that explain why regarding rigid forms 
of insurance as routes to social protection becomes problematic under conditions 
of uncertainty and ignorance (Johnson,  Chapter 3 ; Taylor  2019 ). 
 Infrastructures and regulatory orders assert their own materialisations of polit-
ical imaginations around technology regulation (van Zwanenberg,  Chapter 4 ), the 
management of critical infrastructures (Roe,  Chapter 5 ) and city planning (Kaker 
 et al. ,  Chapter 6 ). These chapters highlight how the practices of scientists, regulators 
and civil society actors can help open up indeterminacies in everything from gen-
etically modified crop technologies to ‘smart’ cars; they emphasise the importance 
of everyday practice and network- building in generating reliability in complex 
critical infrastructures, such as energy systems; and they explore how more effective 
responses to diverse uncertainties can be nurtured through creating ‘experimental 
spaces’ for innovation in urban governance (Evans  et al.  2016 ). 
 Deepening global vulnerabilities around climate (Mehta and Srivastava, 
 Chapter  7 ), disease (MacGregor  et  al. ,  Chapter  8 ) and ‘natural disasters’ (Pelling 
 et al. ,  Chapter 9 ) create major political challenges for addressing uncertainties. Too 
often, there is a closing down towards narrow risk management and securitisation 
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in approaches to early warning, emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction. 
Yet, as these chapters show, locating understandings in a more complex appreciation 
of class, gender, ethnicity and age is essential if those directly affected by outbreaks, 
emergencies and disasters are to be involved. 
 The politics of uncertainty in debates over migration (Thorsen,  Chapter 10 ), 
crime and terrorism (Carrapico  et  al. ,  Chapter 11 ) also reflect highly politicised 
institutional constructions of risk, danger and threat. These may obscure more posi-
tive approaches by ignoring alternative framings centred on hope and possibility 
(Kleist and Thorsen  2016 ). The knee- jerk, authoritarian response is to control, 
instil fear, construct borders and subject people to intrusive surveillance. A more 
encompassing view, on the other hand, would suggest alternatives; for example, 
focusing on the agency, networks and capacities of migrants themselves in facing 
uncertainties. How then are the contested meanings and implications of uncer-
tainty negotiated? Underlying cultural, religious and spiritual framings may be 
underestimated in our rush to assert technocratic orders, as discussed in our final 
chapter (Oxley,  Chapter 12 ). Religious beliefs involve competing views on destiny, 
renewal and apocalypse, for instance, and so must continuously grapple with issues 
of uncertainty as framing human existence, suggesting the need for a wider, more 
encompassing view. 
 From calculative control to creative care 
 A classic insight that arises from non- linear systems understandings – that minor 
changes can make a big difference – means that simple notions of prediction and 
control are a myth. Yet even with this acknowledgement widely accepted (if only 
rhetorically), indeterminacies are too often represented in a controlling, calculative 
and aggregative register. How often, for example, does discussion of ‘tipping points’ 
move from humility in the face of their possibility to hubris in regard to their pre-
cise prediction, or misplaced confidence that such complex systems can be subject 
to ‘risk management’? (Lenton  et al.  2019 ). As a result, the crucial point about the 
uncontrollability of uncertainty may paradoxically be most lost when it is appar-
ently most acknowledged. 
 A number of the book’s chapters reflect on a wide range of models. These include 
the economic forecasting models used by banks (Wansleben  2014 ); the actuarial 
and parametric models central to the (re)insurance industry (Johnson  2013 ); the 
infectious disease models that predict patterns of spread and impact and the many 
models that aim to predict the impacts of natural hazards – from floods to volcanoes 
to earthquakes (Hough  2002 ). Here as elsewhere, modelling struggles to make sense 
of uncertain, complex systems, often aiming to predict future patterns. Yet again, 
these calculative mathematical devices and aggregative practices too often involve 
attempted reductions of uncertainties to risk (Hastrup and Skrydstrup  2013 ). 
 In all these areas, non- linear interactions and disequilibrium dynamics at the 
heart of complex systems make the necessary simplifications and assumptions of 
modelling approaches problematic. Offering a sense of certainty where there is 
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none misleads. It may help raise awareness about a particular potential disaster 
and raise funds for agencies aiming to respond. But this itself may divert attention 
from diverse lived- with, grounded circumstances, offering instead a headline figure 
projecting one impending crisis. And these imperatives may also blinker key players 
against surprise, entrenching ideas that a risk- managed  status quo will result in sta-
bility. Reflecting on the financial crash of 2008, Andy Haldane, chief economist at 
the Bank of England, observed:
 Securitisation increased the dimensionality, and thus complexity, of the 
financial network. Nodes grew in size and interconnections between them 
multiplied. The financial cat’s- cradle became dense and opaque. As a result, 
the precise source and location of underlying claims became anyone’s guess 
( 2009 : 7). 
 The resulting crisis, Haldane ( 2010 : 12) argues, was rooted in ‘an exaggerated sense 
of knowledge and control’. 
 Of course, all models come with lists of provisos, caveats and qualifications, but, 
even with accuracy thus qualified, a key role persists in governing action. Here, the 
silences of models are as important as their proclamations. So in the end models 
are – albeit often quite elaborate – vehicles for telling stories. They equally embody 
and construct narratives about both present- futures and future- presents, often 
dressed up with arcane equations and mathematical formulations (Beckert and 
Bronk  2018 ). The narratives they relate are socially constructed, becoming accepted 
through often quite homogenous, uncritical networks of actors (Bronk  2019 ). 
Members of such networks all have a vested interest in maintaining an impression 
of control and giving a sense that collectively they have a capacity to manage com-
plexity and define the future. 
 While such stories often unravel in the face of real- world events, the incumbent 
power of professions and their institutions – not surprisingly – soon reinstate the 
 status quo . The last crisis is deemed an outlier, models are improved and the fragile 
performance of control continues in the face of uncertainty. Studies of financiers 
during and following the 2008 crash are instructive. The psychological impera-
tive to construct ‘conviction narratives’ and deny uncertainty was evident, as the 
incentives for promoting positive imaginaries around fictional expectations were 
huge (Tuckett  2018 ). In the same way, misplaced concreteness in models at the 
centre of decision- making can be seen as a defensive mechanism used to displace 
anxieties around uncertain outcomes (Fenton- O’Creavy  2019 ). 
 Exercising huge power in policy processes, this process of storytelling through 
models is about presenting clear storylines, but also often involves moves to con-
ceal and divert attention. Embedded assumptions typically hide normative, ethical 
and political positions, but because of the story’s form, these appear only obliquely, 
or are hidden in the footnotes, acknowledgements, sensitivity analyses, funding 
sources and additional materials. Since models afford less audience interaction than 
in live storytelling, there is less accountability for the associated fictions and fallacies. 
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This raises questions about who grants authority to the narrative and how this is 
mediated; for instance with the media filtering out the headline story and ignoring 
the detail (Beckert and Bronk  2018 ). 
 This combination of rhetorical and market power helps entrench institutional 
and policy monocultures that in their turn further reinforce the authority given to 
such partial knowledge (Bronk and Jacoby  2016 ). Banks, risk management author-
ities, insurance firms, civil contingency agencies, humanitarian organisations and 
others require such knowledge that excludes significant dimensions of uncer-
tainty in order to function (Walter and Wansleben,  Chapter 2 ; Johnson,  Chapter 3 ; 
MacGregor  et  al. ,  Chapter  8 ). They have the power to control narratives, sta-
bilise expectations and define the future on their terms. These are classic hege-
monic constellations that offer an illusion of control. In economics and finance, 
for example, commitments to the gold standard, the sanctity of the money supply 
and the power of equilibrium economics have, at different times, been core to 
belief systems, each with wide institutional and political commitments. Yet in each 
case, supported by powerful models with fragile assumptions, they have all been 
challenged and overturned (Mazzucato  2018 ). 
 In order to understand how models – and associated narratives – act to construct 
and colonise futures in ways that link to a wider political economy of incumbent 
power, we must understand their social and political lives (Appadurai  1988 ). This, in 
particular, means understanding the actors involved and their links across networks 
(Barthe  et  al.  2009 ). Insights from science and technology studies show processes 
through which particular equations and parameters become core to a model, which in 
turn becomes central to policy thinking. Whether these concern the epidemiologies 
of disease control (Leach and Scoones  2013 ) or constructions of financial derivatives 
(MacKenzie and Spears  2014 ), the models are not just strings of equations, but are 
linked to real people, places and problems – and so have social and political origins 
and consequences. The ways in which complex economies, climate dynamics or dis-
ease ecologies are modelled involves deliberate approaches to creating a calculative 
order ( Ç al ı ş kan and Callon  2009 ), part of a performative process of model construc-
tion. That models are always tentative and provisional should not be a surprise, but 
their political role must be interrogated (Morgan  2012 ). As several chapters in the 
book show, the hegemonic acceptance of particular models – whether by bankers, 
auditors, actuaries, corporate risk managers or early warning administrators – remains 
a political act, even if it is inadvertent and normalised in everyday practice. 
 Whether in relation to economic or financial collapse, pandemic outbreaks, 
regulatory responsibilities, earthquake vulnerabilities or climate catastrophe, the 
dilemmas are highly pressing. How then to go beyond dominant forms of pol-
itical and market closure – and the ubiquitous analytical monocultures that these 
engender? This is particularly difficult because prevailing cultures and practices 
around ever- more- powerful modelling can – through the brittle hubris of their 
technical disciplines, performative scope and normative sincerity – actually become 
a core part of the problem, as deadlines are specified, limits and boundaries defined 
and emergencies declared (Asayama  et al.  2019 ; Hulme  2019 ). 
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 The value of modelling must therefore be recognised as conditional and partial – 
thus requiring attention to dialogue, deliberation and the practical politics both 
of conception and application (Christley  et al.  2013 ). Models are about different 
ways of making sense, not definitive ways of asserting precise predictions. Beyond 
the narrow models that often define a predictive risk paradigm, there are of course 
alternative cultures of modelling (Lahsen  2005 ). Here plurality is central – different 
models tell contrasting stories, and the key for policy is the conversation between 
them. Models may be derived from different sources of knowledge – from high- end 
science to more grounded, participatory insights – and so the story must be told as 
part of an interactive translation between idioms and explanations. 
 For example, in infectious disease management, analysts may confront uncer-
tainties emerging from process models that examine the underlying population 
dynamics, from pattern models that explore the spatial dimensions of disease and 
from participatory models rooted in local people’s perspectives, as differentiated 
by class, age and gender. Only by developing a narrative across all three can a 
more integrated and effective perspective on disease control emerge (Scoones  et al. 
 2017 ). Similarly, understandings of uncertainties around climate change that are 
obtained ‘from above’ – from global circulation models, for  example – and ‘from 
below’ – such as from those living in flood- prone cities – can encourage a conver-
sation about how to address climate change collectively (Mehta  et al.  2019 ). The 
co- production of knowledge, power and social order (Jasanoff  2004 ) generates a 
politics of engagement that is more suited to conditions of uncertainty (Mehta 
and Srivastava,  Chapter 7 ). An open epistemology is therefore called for, one that 
follows the well- established traditions of feminist methodology, where plural, par-
tial, situated knowledges are central to emergent understandings and responses 
(Haraway  1988 ; Harding  1987 ). 
 In embracing uncertainty in modelling practice, the emphasis must therefore 
shift towards active advocacy of qualities of doubt (rather than certainty), scepticism 
(rather than credulity) and dissent (rather than conformity) – and so towards cre-
ative care rather than calculative control. With indeterminacy thus embraced and 
irreducible plurality accepted, non- control and ignorance emerge as positive values 
in any attempt to create narratives for policy under conditions of uncertainty. 
 Modernities in the mirror 
 Amid all this complexity, a rather straightforward lesson repeatedly asserts 
itself: uncertainty (of whatever kind) is by definition not a condition that is simply 
‘out there’ in the world; uncertainty is a property of  relations between what is 
known and who is doing the knowing. Uncertainty therefore has at least as much 
to do with subjective dynamics within processes of knowledge production as the 
supposedly objective phenomena that are being represented. Whichever view is 
taken of knowledge itself (from ‘objective’ to ‘subjective’), after all, all uncertain-
ties are always at least to some degree ‘subjective’ (Kahneman and Tversky  1981 ). 
Uncertainties of all kinds are therefore deeply conditioned by the contexts of the 
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subjects of knowledge, and are less reflective of the external objects on which these 
focus. In short, with uncertainty more a mode of action than a static condition, the 
phenomenon of being uncertain is perhaps better understood as a relational verb 
than as a categorical noun (Stirling  2019a ). 
 Why this lesson is inconvenient is that it counters the expedient idea that uncer-
tainties are readily subject to control. And  – in the everyday life of institutions 
around the world – it is claims to be ‘in control’ of uncertainty that are (as we 
have discussed) crucial practical political resources for arguments and commitments 
around modernity and progress (Stirling  2019b ). Therefore, for agencies involved in 
world trade regimes, intergovernmental science assessments, global environmental 
instruments, (inter)national regulatory standards and corporate risk assessments, for 
instance, it is claims to be able to control uncertainty that underpin the securing of 
authority, justification, legitimacy, trust and wider public acceptance (Pielke  2019 ; 
Anderson and Jewell  2019 ). If it were admitted that key uncertainties are not under 
control, then the roles, identities – as well as legitimacy and authority – of these 
agencies would be seriously eroded, and their claimed functions of planning, pre-
diction, management and regulation undermined. 
 Across different kinds of governance structure, then, efforts frequently centre 
on pretending that uncertainty has been subdued by a series of control measures 
(Katzenstein and Seybert  2108 ). This is done in a number of ways. First, as already 
discussed, many messy, complex, open- ended dimensions of uncertainty are forced 
into a restrictive straight- jacket of ‘risk’. Here, what are held to count as the relevant 
parameters are simply assumed to take a very few conveniently measurable forms. 
Values obtained on this basis for ‘probabilities’ and ‘magnitudes’ are presumed – as a 
matter of faith – to take the form of single precise, scalar numbers. And the results 
of all these highly subjectively situated procedures (often involving various forms 
of modelling) are then asserted as if they were precisely fixed ‘out there’ in a sup-
posedly objective world. None of these rhetorics of control are grounded in the 
more complex and intractable realities of uncertainty, but the resulting performance 
remains immune to the profound mismatch, because the pretence is so essential to 
organisational and political functioning. 
 Hinging on this fallacy of control there emerges a further significant – but often 
neglected – implication. Reflecting similar confusions between what is ‘objective’ 
and what is ‘subjective’ in the compressions of uncertainty into risk, this concerns 
modernity itself. For, despite the many flows of creolising diversity discussed earlier, 
hegemonic forms of modernity also centrally revolve around control. This has been 
expressed, for example, in processes of individualisation, industrialisation, capitalisa-
tion, commoditisation, rationalisation and bureaucratisation, as well as the consoli-
dation of the nation state, the assertive hegemony around science and notions of 
‘democracy’ and – of course – the emergence of European colonialism. All involve 
their own varieties of fictions, fallacies or fantasies of control (Stirling  2019c ). 
 What is common across the institutions, practices and cultures of globalising 
modernity, then, is the compulsion to offer performances of control, even if these 
are a pretence. In this light, the pervasive experience of uncertainty is not so much 
telling us about the world itself: what we are seeing in anxieties about uncertainty 
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across so many areas are reflections of particular versions of modernity. In this sense, 
the predicaments of uncertainty are modernities in the mirror. 
 Yet the modernist institutions of control are patently failing. The perform-
ance of ‘seeing like a state’ (Scott  1998 ) or ‘enclave capital’ (Ferguson  2005 ) is no 
longer convincing. Challenges to mainstream conceptions of development – and 
its scientific, bureaucratic and institutional underpinnings – are coming from all 
directions. The climate crisis, turbulence in global financial institutions, infectious 
diseases that spread rapidly across continents and migration between nations on a 
massive scale – to name but a few – all challenge the conventional order. The post- 
World War II settlement that was overseen by the United Nations and the Bretton 
Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), and 
later the World Trade Organisation, all underpinned by Western science and tech-
nology, is not up to contemporary, intersecting challenges. Visions of modernity 
and constructions of ‘development’, established over the last 75 years in the West 
in particular, are unravelling (Hilgartner  et  al.  2015 ). Once- accepted parameters 
of progress – for example, permanent economic growth, an environment without 
limits, the provision of a welfare state, even parliamentary democracy – are being 
challenged (Kallis  2019 ; Mouffe  2018 ). These are of course not new observations, 
but it is much less recognised that the deficits of contemporary governance are 
intimately linked to the cumulative failings on the part of globalising modernities 
to face up to uncertainty in a complex, turbulent world. 
 In the face of such challenges, new versions of modernity are in the making. The 
implications of uncertainty are so profound that they challenge existing hegemonic 
frameworks and institutions, and drive imaginations of a post- capitalist, sustainable 
future, rooted in a new politics (Mason  2016 ; Gibson- Graham  2008 ). Some may 
reach out to utopian futures (Levitas  2013 ) in order to prefigure alternatives and 
define a new ‘common sense’, aimed at overturning existing hegemonic forces 
(Mason  2019 ). Others may focus on the many experiments in alternative econ-
omies, technology prototyping, architecture and design, based on the principles of 
the commons, community, conviviality and collectivity. While these rarely expli-
citly emphasise responses to conditions of uncertainty, they certainly reject the 
dominant modes of control, encouraging creative responses that are rooted in place 
(Braybrooke and Smith  2018 ). In turn, through attempting to decolonise the future, 
a prefigurative politics is imagined (Feola  2019 ), which defines how a world that 
embraced uncertainty might look. In  The Way of Ignorance , the novelist, poet and 
farmer Wendell Berry ( 2008 : ix– x) makes the case for such an approach:
 Because ignorance is … a part of our creaturely definition, we need an appro-
priate way: a way of ignorance, which is the way of neighborly love, kindness, 
caution, care, appropriate scale, thrift, good work, right livelihood … The way 
of ignorance, therefore, is to be careful, to know the limits and the efficacy 
of our knowledge. It is to be humble and to work on an appropriate scale. 
 As Brian Wynne elaborates, 4 to embrace ignorance is to celebrate the pervasive 
presence of ‘the epistemic other’ – affirming that there is always space for different 
14 Ian Scoones and Andy Stirling
ways of knowing any object, no matter how familiar. Surprise is thus not a threat to 
identity, status or authority, but a source of enriching, unrealised epistemic plural-
ities. But, rather than nurturing Berry’s positive ‘way of neighborly love’, reactions 
can instead emphasise existential threats to a supposed ‘natural other’, resulting in 
sometimes brutal reinforcements of control. The challenge then lies in reframing 
ignorance as an invitation to plural hopes, and respectful recognition of difference, 
rather than singular fears. 
 However, as several chapters in the book point out, this more positive vision of 
the potential of alternative modernities is not without its own challenges. While 
abandoning the pretence of control can open up space for progressive alternatives, 
this too can itself also create opportunities for more regressive forces to exploit spaces 
of uncertainty. Without deliberate efforts at fundamental reinvention of economy, 
society and politics – in diverse forms, in different contexts – older, regressive tropes 
and practices can re- emerge. Insecurities and vulnerabilities generated by uncer-
tainties can create a politics of fear and blame (Linke and Smith  2009 ). Epistemic 
diversity and a lack of understanding between different races and ethnic groups 
result in xenophobic exclusions of migrants and fortress mentalities. This entrenches 
borders, with further erosions of appreciations for diversity resulting in racist attacks 
and discrimination based on sexualities and identities. Struggles between caring 
hopes and controlling fears are turbulent. 
 For across the world today, these political spaces are being encroached on by 
many forms of populist, nationalist discourse, steeped in authoritarianism and vio-
lence – promising reassertions of control in the face of uncertainty (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser  2018 ; Scoones  et  al.  2018 ). 5 The perceived chaos and lack of control 
that results from the collapse of the mainstream institutions of modernity are there-
fore breeding grounds for hate and violence and impositions of authoritarian rule. 
They also open up opportunities for exploitation and profit, in an unregulated, 
chaos- infused capitalism. Those with privileged positions in structures of appro-
priation – from national political- military elites to hedge fund managers to land 
speculators  – can make money and gain power from capitalising on expanding 
conditions of uncertainty. 
 Across the chapters in this book, we explore how to foster the possibilities of 
alternative, emancipatory futures, while recognising the perils of embracing uncer-
tainty. We argue that, in a complex, interconnected world, uncertainties are central 
to our common futures – and to normative ideas of sustainability and develop-
ment. Through looking in the mirror, we have learned that a globalising, modernist 
framing of progress will not work, and has failed fundamentally. But how to usher 
in a more caring, collective, convivial, emancipatory alternative, without opening 
up to the clear, and sometimes present, dangers? 
 Uncertainty, vulnerability and precarity 
 This challenge is especially acute in contexts where people are living in highly vul-
nerable, uncertain settings. Here, people are necessarily focused on local, immediate, 
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time- dependent life/ body challenges, not the long- term future. Vernacular, 
grounded, everyday uncertainties reflect class, race, age, gender and other 
dimensions of difference. Therefore, addressing uncertainty means confronting 
inequality, vulnerability, precarity and the deeply embedded inheritances of history 
head- on. Uncertainty is never just a technical issue. 
 As has long been known, there is no such thing as a ‘natural’ hazard: hazards, 
and the vulnerabilities arising, are always co- constituted with social, ecological, 
political and economic contexts (Watts  2015 ; Blaikie  et  al.  1994 ). Uncertainties 
therefore generate place- based political ecologies and economies of vulnerability, 
raising questions of causal explanation and ethical responsibility (Ribot  2014 ). For 
example, the experience of flooding in the outer suburbs of New York City is 
unavoidably entwined with issues of poverty, housing quality and racial disloca-
tion (Maantay and Maroko  2009 ). How people approach flood insurance is there-
fore refracted through these positionalities (Elliot  2018 ). In the same way, climate 
change in coastal Bangladesh is very real for those experiencing repeated flooding, 
yet externally- driven ‘adaptation’ responses may facilitate dispossession through the 
creation of alternative, ‘modern’ livelihoods (Paprocki  2018 ). The cyclone that struck 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 2019 was one of the most severe on record, but, 
again, its consequences have to be read politically, just as with Hurricane Katrina, 
which devastated parts of New Orleans in 2005 (Braun and McCarthy  2005 ). 
 Vernacular understandings of those confronting uncertainties and disasters must 
be the starting point for any analysis (Wynne  1996 ). For example, as in Mozambique 
in 2019, the complex effects of a flood – on housing, farming, health, mobility – are 
often poorly understood by humanitarian agencies and those providing protec-
tion (Hope  2019 ). The logics of local practice are complex, informed by diverse 
framings of what the risk is and to whom. Thus, in the context of the response 
to Ebola in West Africa, it was the local people who turned around the epidemic, 
linked to their located understanding of who was infected and how the disease 
spread. Interventions in burial ceremonies and movements to markets and between 
villages were key (Richards  2016 ). In the case of New York City, residents of the 
poor, outer suburbs  – mostly non- white  – reflected not on a technical hazard, 
nor on uncertainty  per se , but on ‘trouble’:  a summing up of the challenges of 
livelihoods linked to debt, poor housing, homelessness, disenfranchisement and lack 
of faith in the state (Elliot  2018 ). 
 Such practical logics and vernacular understandings emerge from place- based 
experience, as well as histories. People in rural Mozambique, just as suburban 
New York City, know they are largely on their own. The measures designed to 
help are palliative and limited. People must therefore respond in ways that are 
rooted in networked solidarities that get them through a crisis. This draws on deep 
associations – of religious, racial and ethnic connection – often wrapped up with 
longer histories and memories. Identity and place are thus inevitably entwined 
with how responses to uncertainty emerge. For those marginalised in relation to 
race, for example, people may draw on deep memories of slavery and colonialism 
where, on the slave ship or in the plantation or in settings subject to colonial rule, 
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ancestors had suffered other uncertainties that resonate with today’s experiences 
(McKittrick  2011 ). The ‘slow violence’ of sustained exploitation and recurrent 
uncertainty (Nixon  2011 ) contrasts dramatically with a liberal, ‘white’ vision of 
open- ended, imagined futures – a luxury created in many respects on the back of 
sustained exploitation (Anderson  et al.  2019 ; Anderson  2012 ). In thinking about 
the constructions of and responses to uncertainty, particularly in contexts with long 
histories of marginalisation and structural inequality, the framing of ethical choice, 
issues of temporality and what constitutes the future for whom become critical 
considerations. 
 Yet the contemporary institutional paraphernalia of disaster intervention strat-
egies around emergency response, preparedness planning, early warning, civil con-
tingency, disaster risk reduction and so on, frequently fails to take such contexts into 
account (MacGregor  et al. ,  Chapter 8 ). The risk is tangible, the response is specific 
and a veritable industry is mobilised around it. The burgeoning institutionalisation 
of the disaster industry – from the global Sendai framework to local municipal con-
tingency plans – act too often to construct narrow, manageable, technical responses 
(Cannon and M ü ller- Mahn  2010 ; Pelling  et al. ,  Chapter 9 ). Global infectious dis-
ease responses, for example, are often medicalised (focusing on a single pathogen, 
linked to a drugs and vaccine response) and frequently securitised (urging control 
at source, militarised emergency planning and draconian intervention if needed) 
(Lakoff  2017 ; Elbe  2010 ; MacGregor  et al. ,  Chapter 8 ). 
 The narratives of ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’ encourage urgency and help mobilise 
funds, but may act to divert attention from the local and particular, where responses 
in different forms are being constructed. Emergencies are declared in order that 
normal democratic rules do not apply, bureaucratic hurdles are jumped and a 
securitised, post- political technocratic order is imposed (Calhoun  2010 ). However, 
the language of crisis can blind those involved to the uncertainties at play, no matter 
what the urgency. In the complex of responses around disasters and emergen-
cies – from climate change (Mehta and Srivastava,  Chapter 7 ) to disease outbreaks 
(MacGregor  et al. ,  Chapter 8 ) to terrorism (Carrapico  et al. ,  Chapter 11 ) – a set of 
technologies and practices act to govern the future. 
 This style of ‘biopolitical’ governmentality (Lentzos and Rose  2009 ) creates 
forms of control, exerted through a complex of discourse and practice. This in turn 
results in subjectification of key actors as victims and the reification of particular 
forms of technical expertise, sometimes resulting in securitised responses. Thus, the 
uncertainties around, say, biodiversity loss and extinction rates have been fuelling 
forms of ‘militarised conservation’ in response to ‘emergency’ conditions (Duffy 
 et al.  2019 ). In this and other cases, intersecting modalities of emergency response 
in turn generate new uncertainties and inequalities, sometimes perpetuating the 
problem (Samimian- Darash and Rabinow  2015 ). As the chapters in this book show, 
such styles of expert- led, technocratic, securitised response are problematic, both 
practically and politically. 
 Take infectious disease control responses. From Ebola to avian influenza to 
COVID-19, a range of agencies have taken on responsibility for disease control within 
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global health bureaucracies. Yet too often, risk is again instrumentalised, resulting in 
medicalised, securitised responses. This cannot address more complex disease ecologies, 
or how ill- health is generated through multiple, interacting factors, such as malnu-
trition, immunodeficiency and marginalisation. Ill- health often emerges from struc-
tural inequalities (Farmer  1996 ), and is lived with, and experienced, by those exposed, 
generating often quite individualised emotions and bodily responses (Nguyen and 
Peschard  2003 ). In such cases, knowledge about outcomes is complex and indeter-
minate, and so not amenable to a conventional risk response. Instead, responses must be 
assembled locally by multiple actors (more than singular authorities), be constituted in 
social relations (more than categories of institutions), be rooted in context (more than 
universal standards) and deploy practical knowledges from diverse sources (more than 
elite disciplinary expertise). Effective responses to uncertainties around ill- health are 
therefore emergent, based on contestation and deliberation, and grounded in everyday 
practical and emotional experience (MacGregor  et al.  Chapter 8 ). 
 However, we must ask: can those living with ill- health or confronting climate 
change or disasters devote the time and energy to assemble responses in the face of 
such bewildering, overwhelming uncertainty? Being income- and time- poor, the 
marginalised are often the last to engage with inclusive, deliberative processes, even 
if these are offered. Living in conditions of precarity means people do not have 
the luxury of responding to unknown futures: daily survival is the focus, and stress, 
anxiety and trauma are common. In such circumstances, time becomes compressed, 
and it is impossible to contemplate long- term future horizons. It is perhaps such 
people who most require state protections that are informed by expert judgement. 
Does passing on the responsibility for managing uncertainties to those experien-
cing already precarious lives only add to their burden? Who can they trust and rely 
on to care for their welfare? 
 Forms of local collective action and mutualism through traditional kin networks, 
religious congregations, charities, friendly societies or other collectivities have long 
provided this function, combined with various forms of coping, making- do and 
improvised resourcefulness. 6 Modern welfare states took this over but have been ravaged 
by the hollowing out of state functions through neoliberal policies. Meanwhile, social 
and disaster insurance has recently become a preferred solution, addressing welfare at 
a distance through the market. Yet none of these models – whether through volun-
tary association, the state or the market – can easily address the radical uncertainties 
that people face. Instead, a consideration of uncertainty under conditions of precarity 
requires a radical rethink of notions of welfare and livelihood support. 
 As several chapters in this book argue, this suggests the need for a more sensi-
tive, co- produced response that does not impose a technocratic, standardised plan, 
but at the same time does not load responsibilities wholly onto local people to 
work out on their own. For example, can insurance approaches be refashioned 
such that local forms of moral economy and mutual help become supported, rather 
than side- lined by technocratic, top- down approaches (Johnson,  Chapter 3 )? Such 
approaches must encourage ‘communities of fate’  – those confronting the same 
uncertainties with the same degree of challenge rooted in historical marginalisation 
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(Marske  1991 ) – to come together around shared solidarities and mobilise around 
demanding new terms, and different approaches to insurance provision and welfare 
support (Elliot  2018 ). 
 Alongside welfare and livelihood support, a focus on uncertainty also requires 
us to re- imagine the institutions surrounding preparedness planning, contingency 
measures and early warning systems. As discussed above, expert- led, technocratic 
impositions premised on risk do not work. But what might? Can an inclusive early 
warning system for, say, drought or disease outbreaks be imagined, where burdens 
are shared, multiple knowledges brought together, networks of trust built and nego-
tiation around interpretations facilitated? Could this be based around an improvised, 
experimental approach across sites, but linked to and informed by climate data, 
disease monitoring or disaster/ hazard mapping? As  Chapters 7 and  8 show, know-
ledge intermediaries and brokers become crucial for such initiatives, facilitating 
deliberation and negotiation, and offsetting rumour, speculation and concealment, 
which often result in expert- led systems being rejected. Who such intermediaries 
are would depend on the context, but trust across social differences and hierarchies 
is essential. Such an approach would move beyond assignations of risk and cultures 
of blame to a common, shared goal of navigating uncertainty together. 
 In sum, a new politics of uncertainty must challenge the biopolitical framings and 
governmentalities of conventional technocratic approaches that define populations 
or geographic areas as ‘at risk’. Instead, the intersections of uncertainty, vulnerability, 
precarity and marginalisation must be taken seriously, alongside a commitment 
to ‘cognitive justice’ (Visvanathan  2005 ). This suggests a very different type of 
approach, centred on shared understandings, negotiation of outcomes and collective 
solidarity and mobilisation. It must be rooted in what we have earlier identified as 
a politics of care and conviviality, rejecting a simple reliance on state protection, 
standardised welfare and market- based insurance. 
 Asking questions about whose crisis, catastrophe or emergency it is, and how 
it is experienced, is not a denial of the importance of the event, or the roles for 
expertise in defining key aspects. Instead, it is a recognition that climate change, 
disease, earthquakes  – or other uncertain events  – will look different from the 
standpoint of those living in conditions of precarity and vulnerability. This means 
recasting responses, moving away from ones that are forged through externally- 
imposed, expert- led governmentality towards forms of ‘response- ability’ (Haraway 
 1997 ), with located capabilities and horizontal accountabilities at the core. As we 
discuss further in the next section, this has profound implications, including a need 
to reject all kinds of authoritarian control – technocratic as much as autocratic – in 
order to foster opportunities for more caring forms of political relations and action 
under conditions of uncertainty. 
 Uncertainty and the politics of responsibility 
 Uncertainties create cultures of blame, but also a politics of responsibility and 
accountability. Who is in charge? Who owns what risk? Who is responsible for 
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mitigation? Where does epistemic, cognitive justice lie? The rise of a marketised 
form of risk governmentality, typified by the promotion of various forms of insur-
ance (Johnson,  Chapter 3 ), has generated a particular style of politics, where risks 
are redistributed through market mechanisms. These approaches often overshadow 
other approaches to the redistribution of risk and the allocation of responsibility. 
 In particular, the less obvious forms of social solidarity and mutualism, based on 
collective forms of protection against risk and uncertainty, are too often ignored. 
But, if uncertainties are indeterminate and non- knowledge is central, then ways 
of life are simply not insurable in any conventional sense, and alternative, ‘moral 
economy’ responses are required. As a result, very different types of governance must 
emerge, associated with new roles for citizens confronting uncertainty. To respond 
to complex uncertainties, citizens cannot just be customers of standardised insur-
ance products, nor passive citizens of supposedly benevolent technocratic states – 
they must take on new roles, as part of collectivities that are based on the principle 
of solidarity, where care and collaboration are central (Bollier and Helfrich  2014 ; 
Gibson- Graham  2008 ). 
 If openness is encouraged, challenges will necessarily arise around ‘regulatory 
arbitrage’ – deciding which version counts in commitments to negotiated outcomes. 
We must ask: who is the bearer of risk and uncertainty of last resort, and what is 
the role of the state in the context of a less hierarchical, more citizen- led approach 
to governance? Responsibilities must be shared, fostering horizontal and vertical 
accountabilities as embedded politically vibrant relationships, not as part of simple 
auditable accounting (Gaventa  2002 ). And such relationships need to be sustained 
over time, since the addressing of one source of uncertainty inevitably raises new ones. 
Processes must be continuous and recursive, based on experimentation, learning, 
evaluation and adaptation (Guijt  2019 ). This requires new styles of expertise, legal 
mediation and state regulation that are more flexible and open, requiring a radical 
reconfiguration of professional and institutional approaches in planning and regula-
tion (van Zwanenberg,  Chapter 4 ; Kaker  et al.,  Chapter 6 ). 
 The sort of deliberative, adaptive, experimental forms of governance that 
accepting uncertainty demands already happen, of course – but often without rec-
ognition. So, for example, in relation to the governance of energy infrastructure in 
Europe, experiments have taken place around the transport and supply of electri-
city, allowed for by the European Union’s decentralised policy regime, and guided 
by the principle of subsidiarity (Rangoni  2019 ). Learning among companies and 
regulators has taken place, and substantial shifts have occurred in regimes over time, 
without directed intervention. Similarly, in complex, dispersed supply chains for 
high- tech manufacturing, where networks spread across the world between large 
and small companies, collaborative negotiations around contracts occur incremen-
tally. No one player is in a position to impose, and the technological and market 
conditions are highly uncertain, but cooperation is essential if the products are to 
be delivered (Dodgson  2018 ). This is not just  ad hoc ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom 
 1959 ), but a form of networked collective action based on inclusion, conversation 
and collaboration. 
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 These ‘new commons’, frequently facilitated by easy digital connection, allow 
for a whole range of collaborative approaches to inclusive innovation and shared 
economic activity – from hacker and maker spaces to urban gardening and food 
sovereignty to community energy supply systems to urban development in ‘tran-
sition towns’ (Kirwan  et al.  2016 ). In different ways, these create both a new form 
of community- based wealth- building, but also  – crucially  – a different route to 
addressing uncertainty through a more collective, shared approach. A key feature 
of all these initiatives – from global technology supply chains to small community 
gardens – is the movement towards an expected norm of permanent adaptability, 
as part of a process shared within a collective or network. Thus, equality and dem-
ocracy – locally and across networks – become intrinsic to addressing uncertainties 
(Rayner and Cantor  1987 ). 
 Debates about the governance of risk and uncertainty must therefore go beyond 
the rigidities of the allocation and distribution of responsibility through insurance 
liability, legal claims or regulatory fiat, and move to a more open, co- produced, 
negotiated approach, where relationships and trust are central. Some profound 
challenges are presented to discourses on trust itself. By contrast to conventional 
emphases on relations of trust flowing up power gradients (from those who are 
governed to those doing the governing), trust becomes recognisable as an intrin-
sically reciprocal and symmetrical social process (Stirling  2015 ). And, of course, 
the political implications here concern not just relations within structures, but the 
constituting of such structures themselves. In moving beyond cultures of control 
to ones of care and conviviality, hierarchy, inequality and appropriation are seen as 
problematic as the modes of calculation, standardisation and aggregation discussed 
earlier. 
 As we have already observed, this creates a momentum for a fundamental 
rethinking of existing relationships between state protection, technical expertise 
and deliberative citizenship under uncertainty. And this, in turn, requires a newly 
pluralised, inclusive politics of responsibility, where states, corporations, legal systems 
and science all have different, new roles. In moving from control to care and con-
viviality, the only meaningful ways to achieve robustness and reconciliation in the 
face of burgeoning uncertainties involve justice, equality and plurality. 
 Rethinking the politics of uncertainty: the challenges of 
transformation 
 As we have seen, uncertainties can create fear, anxiety and closure, and can be 
linked to the rise of regressive, authoritarian populisms, profit- and rent- seeking 
capital and capture by elites. But uncertainties can also generate hope, creativity, 
curiosity, entrepreneurship, discovery, innovation and epistemic humility – and so 
possibilities for emancipatory democratic transformation. Diverse questions there-
fore emerge around facilitating these progressive transformations. What methods, 
processes and mobilisations can tilt the balance towards more positive outcomes? 
How can alternatives be prefigured to reinforce this new politics? Who is centred 
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in transformatory spaces, and who is to the side? And what solidarities, ethics and 
styles of reflexivity are required for this new politics of uncertainty? 
 It is in relation to such questions that the balance between control and care/ 
conviviality comes to the fore. As we have suggested, open discussion of contrasts 
between risk and uncertainty can profoundly challenge the failures, fallacies and 
fictions of control. By interrogating what uncertainties are – and how we under-
stand, feel and respond to them – we can both help to destabilise, but also rebalance 
and reinvent, the institutions and practices of globalising modernity. This helps resist 
the ‘closing down’ effects of individualisation, commodification, financialisation, 
bureaucratisation, audit and securitisation. And beyond this deconstruction, this 
book attempts a reflection on the politics of uncertainty across different areas of 
political life – highlighting both possibilities and limits for the opening up of new 
forms of transformation. 
 Again, uncertainties can be generative of diverse, imagined alternatives. By 
opening up spaces to re- imagine futures, to dream and to construct alternatives, 
uncertainties can be confronted in positive ways: not as threats or sources of fear, 
but as sources of hope and possibility. As Rebecca Solnit ( 2016 : xii) argues:
 Hope locates itself in the premises that we don’t know what will happen and 
that in the spaciousness of uncertainty is room to act. When you recognize 
uncertainty, you recognize that you may be able to influence the outcomes – 
you alone or you in concert with a few dozen or several million others. Hope 
is an embrace of the unknown and knowable, an alternative to the certainty 
of both optimists and pessimists. 
 As she says, this requires a mobilisation of future- making among different actors. 
Eschewing grand visions and stylised expert scenarios, these unofficial futures 
emerge in intersecting uncertainties from the ground up, in everyday, ‘quotidian 
utopias of experience’ (Mahony and Beck  2019 ). In relation to climate change, 
this is perhaps already happening through the arguments of the youth climate 
strikers addressing ‘system change’ not just climate change, or the demand from 
Extinction Rebellion for ‘citizens’ assemblies’ to deliberate on alternatives (Bain and 
Bongiorno  2019 ). While often framed problematically in sometimes authoritarian 
and controlling terms of ‘urgent action’ and ‘impending emergency’, and with fre-
quently misplaced deference to narrow forms of expert science and singular targets 
(Asayama  et al.  2019 ), these mobilisations can nevertheless help to open up spaces 
that demonstrate, explore and experiment with alternatives. 
 It is essential to bring into these conversations, the diverse implications of uncer-
tainty. One recurrent theme running through this book is that open and account-
able engagements with the politics of uncertainty are more imperative now than 
ever. For it is through such politics that the mainstream science and institutions of 
climate change must grapple with issues such as intergenerational justice and alter-
native perspectives on ‘limits’ or ‘growth’ (Kallis  2019 ), and so challenge the standard 
integrated assessment models that have guided the work of the International Panel 
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on Climate Change and others to date (Beck and Mahony  2017 ). All this requires 
uncertain futures to be central to debates about climate change, environmental 
justice and sustainability. 
 Yet we must recognise that the socio- technical imaginaries that guide policy and 
politics are deeply resistant to change (Jasanoff and Kim  2015 ). Policy narratives 
routinely get stuck because they serve professional and institutional interests, and 
become convenient myths that are taken for granted (Keeley and Scoones  2003 ). 
Disrupting the comfortable  status quo and confronting incumbent privilege and 
hegemonic power can be difficult. Mobilisations, such as those we are seeing 
around climate change, are important, but must extend across domains, as the 
chapters that follow argue. As with climate change, rethinking migration policy, city 
planning, infectious disease responses, critical infrastructure design, the regulation 
of technology, and finance and banking practice, among others, is hugely challen-
ging, given the power and authority of incumbent regimes. The argument of this 
book is that appreciations of uncertainty provide the golden thread that connects 
these issues. Given the consistent failures of mainstream modernist, technocratic 
institutions, it is vital to embed the imagining of transformative change in a vibrant 
politics of uncertainty. 
 This is not going to happen by itself. The lesson of the emergent, networked cli-
mate movement – as with others around food sovereignty, housing and land rights, 
energy poverty or commoning approaches – is that new solidarities are essential. 
Confronting uncertainty becomes central; not as separate and additional to resist-
ance to inequality, injustice and poverty, but as simultaneous and inseparable from 
it. This requires imagining very different futures that challenge deeply entrenched 
power and authority. In forging progressive alliances for re- imagining the future, 
the potential exclusions of both knowledges and people must be acknowledged, as 
we have discussed. Who has the luxury to create such alternatives? Whose jobs and 
livelihoods are threatened by alternative pathways? How can contingent privileges 
be harnessed to flatten encompassing gradients of power that restrict inclusion? 
 For many living precarious lives, uncertainties that threaten existence on a daily 
basis are created through histories of oppression and marginalisation. While the 
uncertainties of climate change may be affecting us all, the fossil fuel dependency of 
the global economy only emerged through unequal patterns of development linked 
to historical processes of exploitation. Those digging coal in hazardous working 
conditions, perhaps in the global South, are also facing uncertainties of a more 
immediate kind. The debate about uncertainty and transformations to sustainability 
therefore must create forms of solidarity and alternative pathways that appreciate 
longer histories in the politics of uncertainty. 
 All this involves actively supporting alternatives emerging in experimentation 
and action, especially in marginalised settings. And, in this way, these new politics of 
uncertainty chime with the long- standing politics of emancipation and decolonisa-
tion. For the resulting transformative aspirations are essentially the same: in moving 
from institutions of control to cultures of care and conviviality, familiar values come 
to the fore – of equality, solidarity, collectivity and mutuality. Each draws on moral 
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economies of hope, rather than fear. And it is through embracing uncertainties in 
their many forms – and challenging the pervasive kinds of controlling apparatus 
that work to deny and obscure them – that a positive, progressive potential emerges 
at a time of crisis for democratic struggle. Now is therefore the moment for such 
pluralised, diversified, distributed and egalitarian processes of action and transform-
ation. Just as knowledges are co- produced with social orders, so may the more 
explicit embracing of uncertainties help to open up recalcitrant political structures 
and decolonise our unfolding futures. 
 Notes 
 1  The global COVID-19 pandemic was unfolding as this book went to press. Whilst this 
chapter therefore does not address this issue directly, the discussion is nonetheless relevant 
throughout. 
 2  See comments by Dipak Gyawali at  The Politics of Uncertainty symposium, July 2019,  www.
buff.ly/ 35D5RSI (accessed, 7 February 2020). 
 3  See podcast, ‘Youth Transformations and Global Warming’, November 2019,  www.
transformineducation.org/ podcasts/ youth- transformations- global- warming (accessed 7 
February 2020). 
 4  In comments by Brian Wynne at  The Politics of Uncertainty symposium, July 2019, and 
elaborated in subsequent very helpful personal communications. 
 5  See materials from the Emancipatory Rural Politics Initiative,  www.opendemocracy.net/ 
en/ authoritarian- populism- and- rural- world/ (accessed 7 February 2020). 
 6  In the Democratic Republic of Congo this is referred to as ‘ d é brouillardise ’, which is seen 
as a national trait that is vital for survival under conditions of war and economic collapse 
(Jourdan  2013 ). 
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 THE ASSAULT OF FINANCIAL 
FUTURES ON THE REST OF TIME 
 Timo Walter and Leon Wansleben 
 Introduction 
 In Alexander Kluge’s movie  Der Angriff der Gegenwart auf die  ü brige Zeit (The Assault 
of the Present on the Rest of Time), people live in a ‘distended present’ (Kluge 
 et al.  1990 : passim): faced with uncertain – personal and societal – futures, they are 
unable to make lasting decisions and remain trapped in an unending present. In 
this contribution, we discuss another ‘assault on the rest of time’ that was just in the 
making when Kluge’s film appeared in 1985 – namely, the ways in which finance 
shapes and formats the politics of the future. Our central tenet is that, far from pro-
viding an engine for imagining substantive futures that guide (collective) actions, 
finance ‘consumes’ forecasts, plans or visions. They serve as mere signals (Langenohl 
and Wetzel  2011 ), fuelling an increasingly short- term (Montagne  2009 ), febrile 
hunt for novelties from which profit can be generated by beating others to it. 
 In (economic) theory, prices will oscillate – more or less – evenly around the 
expected ‘intrinsic’ value in response to incoming signals, so that ‘the time average 
of an observable [is] equal to its expectation value’ (Peters  2019 : 1216). Based on 
this statistical premise of ‘ergodicity’, there can be no fundamental discontinuity 
between future, on the one hand, and past and present, on the other  – so that 
 rational inter- temporal calculation and expectations become possible (Beckert and 
Bronk  2018 : 18– 20). 1 As the formal models and calculative devices through which 
economic agents project and imagine the future are built on these assumptions, 
the ergodic continuity between past, present and future effectively becomes part 
of the background frame within which signals  about the future are given meaning 
and translated  in the present . We thus suggest that the temporality of contemporary 
finance is at odds with modernist conceptions of futurity as involving an epi-
stemic ‘back and forth’ between a given present and an open future, out of which 
emerge contingency, freedom and choice (Esposito  2004 ; Luhmann  1976 ). The 
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‘future’ towards which finance is oriented (Arrow  1978 ) is constantly collapsed into 
the present through an ongoing process of ‘pricing in’ the future and rendering it 
calculable according to an a- temporal space of possibilities. For modern finance, 
the future has become a useful means of acting  in the present , rather than an onto-
logically distinct state that we imagine and construct based on joint imaginations as 
we proceed towards it  from the present . We develop this point by discussing the case 
of derivatives markets. We show how derivatives markets depend directly on the 
assumption of a ‘synchronicity’ of present and future, built directly into the central 
valuation device on which the functioning of these markets depends – the so- called 
Black- Scholes- Merton formula. We extend this argument in the second part of 
our contribution, where we describe how central banks have developed a finance- 
oriented and finance- based ‘governmentality’ (Foucault  2007 [1978]). Under this 
regime, central banks really do  not govern future inflation, but present  expectations 
of future inflation as expressed in the ‘yield curve’ and built into interest rate 
derivatives. We suggest that the use of rational expectations models that construe 
the future as ‘conserved’ within an ergodic, a- temporal world allows central banks 
to ignore possible ‘random’ fluctuations in  actual inflation and concentrate on the 
internal calibration of present expectations of future inflation as the sole criterion 
for monetary policy success. We show that this ‘assault’ of present expectations on a 
future that never becomes actualised was an important factor in the run- up to the 
crisis of 2007– 2009. Central banks have facilitated forms of financial valuation that 
rely on key fictions of an ergodic world (in particular the ‘natural’ interest rate), by 
stabilising the expectational parameters which manifest these fictions, and have thus 
helped to black- box uncertainties. The crisis itself, and post- crisis interventions, 
have not led to a ‘reckoning’ with a different temporality, but have activated various 
support mechanisms and new policy tools (e.g. ‘forward guidance’) that shield and 
maintain this ‘practical fiction’ and the ‘infrastructure’ (Star and Ruhleder  1996 ) of 
an ergodic world for contemporary finance. What has become clearer, though, is 
that the particular constellations of policy institutions and financial markets found 
in contemporary capitalism do not support economic prosperity and sustainability 
for society as a whole. 
 The ergodic world of ‘quantitative’ finance 
 Compared to the embedded, ‘boring finance’ of the period from the 1950s to the 
1980s, in the contemporary financial system the contingency of all financial activity 
with regard to the future has become much more visible. In particular, the ‘openness 
of the future’ (Beckert  2015 : 35ff), and the problem that an open future is neces-
sarily contingent and therefore ‘fundamentally uncertain’ (Knight  1921 ) has moved 
centre- stage in discussions about contemporary finance. Whereas, in the ‘golden 
age of capitalism’ (Marglin and Schor  2000 ), finance lived well by the ‘3- 6- 3’ rule 
(charge a 3 per cent mark- up on credit over the 3 per cent interest paid out on 
deposits and be off to the golf course at 3pm) (Walter  2006 ), the de- regulation and 
financial innovation that started in the 1970s (Helleiner  1994 ) has turned the future 
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into an explicit epistemic problem. As a result, financial (and economic) activity has 
become much more directly dependent on the elaboration of ‘imagined futures’ 
and calculative ‘instruments of imagination’ for the coordination of expectations 
(Beckert  2016 : 216ff.). Since the liquidity and stability of markets hinge directly on 
the continuity of valuations (and the knowledge underpinning them) (Carruthers 
and Stinchcombe  1999 ) this means that these epistemic practices and calculative 
instruments – and the joint expectations of the futures that they help construct – 
have become central to the functioning of contemporary finance. 
 It has therefore become common for both practitioners and observers to under-
stand contemporary finance as revolving around the problem of mitigating the fun-
damental epistemic uncertainty of a future that is open and contingent. In this view, 
finance has become a primary site for ‘acting in an uncertain world’ (Callon  et al. 
 2009 ), where market participants learn to forecast and imagine such futures through 
calculative devices and/ or hedge against uncertainties using various financial tools. 
The crucial significance of finance in modern society thus stems from its role as 
an institution that allows social actors to cope, manage and live with an uncertain 
future, and to render this open future as a space of possibilities – for speculation, 
investment, hedging, insurance, betting etc. 
 There is, however, some reason to be cautious about the notion that uncertainty 
in finance is – primarily – a function of the irreducible gap between  present futures 
and actual  future presents . The historian Reinhart Koselleck ( 1989 ) has theorised this 
gap as being a result of historical experiences that have led actors to distinguish 
these two distinct forms of ‘future’ : the future as imagined in the present (‘present 
future’) and future presents, i.e . future states of the world when they (have) become 
present, or actualised. However, this decidedly modern form of temporality is not 
the one that reigns in contemporary finance. 
 To argue this point, we need to look at precisely how epistemic accuracy of 
expectations about the future present matters in finance. As John Maynard Keynes 
and Hyman Minsky pointed out long ago, the openness of the future manifests itself 
as an ‘economic survival constraint’: false or inaccurate present futures are costly, or 
even life- threatening, to economic units, if investments fail. For that reason, Keynes 
and Minsky thought that as uncertainty is more directly and intensively felt, eco-
nomic units will avoid tying down their wealth in risky investments and will pro-
tect themselves against adverse risks by stocking up on liquid reserves. 
 The key characteristic of this uncertainty – the uncertainty of having enough 
liquid means to meet upcoming obligations – is that it cannot readily be made 
measurable:  it depends on the behaviour of various other actors (e.g. money 
market lenders) and the various feedback processes by which one’s own and others’ 
decisions (e.g. asset sales) affect the state of the financial system as a whole. However, 
as central banks have encouraged and supported financial markets’ reliance on ‘erg-
odic fictions’ for valuation and risk management, this uncertainty has ceased to fea-
ture in the regular calculations and strategies of financial actors and in the structures 
of the financial system, giving way to a world in which actors act most of the 
time as if market liquidity and stable asset prices will be maintained indefinitely. 
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To understand how and why, we need to decipher the role played by rational 
expectations (as both a category of practice and a theory) in contemporary finance. 
Discounting expected future returns to calculate an asset’s present value requires 
knowledge of the future development of macroeconomic variables (such as growth, 
interest rates or inflation, etc.) which, in models and formulas derived from rational 
expectations economics, shape this present value, as joint expectations about such 
parameters become widely embedded in valuations (Bryan and Rafferty  2006 ). 
Such parameters come to define a ‘normality’ as background to and a condition 
of asset valuations, with market actors closely tracking any anomalies that might 
affect asset values (Christophers  2017 ; Zaloom  2009 ). This ‘normality’ has become 
an intrinsic background for the joint structures of knowledge that secure the con-
tinuity of valuations and market transactions, and thus undergird the liquidity and 
stability of ‘market- based finance’ (Hardie and Howarth  2013 ). This background 
establishes a (calculative and epistemic) continuity between the present and the 
future, built directly into the fabric of financial markets, against which more narrow 
present futures can be elaborated, processed, adopted or discarded. The intense 
concern with the future in contemporary finance is thus made possible by this 
‘synchronist’ (Langenohl  2018 ) background, which anchors the impressive array 
of instruments of imagination in an a- temporal skeletal structure upon which the 
validity of any calculation of present futures depends. 
 This ergodic conception of time (Kirstein  2015 ) is important for contemporary 
finance particularly in those contexts in which the respective parameters are directly 
incorporated into the markets’ valuation devices. A case in point are the derivatives 
markets, which do not value and trade normal financial assets (such as stocks or 
currencies) but which are based on contracts through which parties directly wager on 
future prices of underlying assets in relation to specific future events. Derivatives thus 
express imagined futures and the valuations they imply (through discounting), without 
the need to possess or actually trade underlying assets. This might suggest that, if any-
where, it is in the derivatives markets that actors care about whether their present futures 
actually become future presents at some point in time. But this is not how valuation 
and pricing works in these markets, which are based on the common valuation infra-
structure that relies on the Black- Scholes- Merton formula (Watson  2007 ; MacKenzie 
and Millo  2003 ; Black and Scholes  1973 ). With this formula, traders no longer focus 
on particular events and future presents as they arrive but instead trade what is called 
‘volatility’ – a measure of the variability of prices over time that is dependent on such 
variation remaining ergodic (Davidson  1982 ). Using this calculative tool, participants 
thus engage in a market process in which particular events and risks are subsumed with 
regards to a ‘synchronic’ background system of valuation and pricing. 
 The validity and applicability of the Black- Scholes- Merton formula is thus 
premised on this assumption of a fundamentally static and continuous world that does 
not undergo any fundamental substantive changes. In this world, present futures are 
nothing but short- lived inputs or signals that generate possibilities for arbitrage, but 
do  not affect the static background continuity that undergirds the system. However, 
in the case of ‘black swan’ events (Taleb  2007 ) – that is, when highly improbable 
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‘tail- end’ events in a probability distribution occur – a system of valuations premised 
on ergodicity becomes incoherent, leading markets to freeze. As Donald MacKenzie 
( 2004 ; MacKenzie and Millo  2003 ) has shown, the 1987 stock market crash drove 
home the limits of this ergodic depiction of temporality, and practitioners adjusted 
their Black- Scholes- Merton pricing  ad hoc and modified the price curve for options 
so that longer- termed options now include an uncertainty premium (the so- called 
‘volatility smile’ or ‘skew’) on top of their ‘ergodic’ price. 
 Derivatives markets thus highlight particularly clearly how the synchronist back-
ground against which financial valuation operates mitigates uncertainty, not by 
encouraging actors to reckon with an uncertain future but by excluding the possi-
bility that the future might be discontinuous with the present (in aggregate terms) 
in any radical sense. For the continuous functioning of financial markets, it is more 
important to uphold a stable background of expectations than to know the future 
accurately. The synchronist frame operatively decouples actions taken in reaction to 
and in terms of present futures from the actual future present(s) that come to pass. 
 Many observers and practitioners have noted how this separation from this cal-
culative background has made the sequential processing of transitory present futures 
at the ‘surface’ of the market  almost ritualistic (e.g. LiPuma  2017 ; Ayache  2016 ). 
The unfolding of present futures is largely irrelevant to, and does not feed into, 
the static expectations about the future encoded in this background, which are re- 
asserted or ‘performed’ anew with every transaction that makes use of instruments 
of valuation or calculation derived from rational expectations models (cf. LiPuma 
 2017 ). Derivatives markets thus form the extreme end of a continuum but high-
light the logical conditions of why the liquidity and stability of modern financial 
markets depends on this calculative background. They illustrate why the  accuracy of 
expectations is not actually put to the test (or at least only idiosyncratically, for indi-
vidual traders) as long as markets can  operatively hold on to this ‘useful’ fiction of a 
continuous, normal and ergodic world. As a result, for modern finance the future 
itself is continuously ‘ontologically absent’ (Law and Urry  2004 ): it is a horizon of 
possibilities that provides inputs for arbitrage, but must remain invisible at the level of 
the constitutive fiction of the never- changing future on which market stability rests. 
 The modern financial system is thus based on ‘wilful’ or ‘strategic ignorance’ 
(McGoey  2012 ) of the future present as a constitutive principle: excluding the pos-
sibility of substantive discontinuities between present and future is what enables the 
‘transformation of uncertainty into risk’ (Carruthers 2013) and secures the possibility 
of rational calculation and action in markets in the present. As market coordination 
increasingly depends on the construction, projection and diffusion of ‘commen-
surable’ (Espeland and Stevens 1998) present futures, this common background has 
gained in importance. It allows translating present futures into numeric prices, and 
thus is central to securing the congruence of expectations (about present and future 
prices) in markets. The financial system’s ability to process information about the future 
thus depends on the continuous operative denial of the openness of this very future. 
Whatever individual actors might think privately, at the level of the market public, 
uncertainty must not be allowed to manifest itself, but must continuously be absorbed 
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and neutralised – as a precondition for the system’s ability to process any signals about 
the future that might entail (limited) re- valuations and price changes at all. 
 Evidently, excluding the possibility of a fundamental discontinuity of the eco-
nomic present and future mathematically does not protect financial actors from 
suffering the consequences of being (collectively) wrong. However, Minsky has 
shown, with his now famous ‘financial instability hypothesis’ (Minsky  1980 ), that 
if central banks are actively working to protect markets from a breakdown of the 
fictional continuity and the ‘normal market conditions’ it enables, they are effect-
ively removing the survival constraint on financial institutions. In other words, they 
protect market actors from ever having to face fundamental discontinuity, allowing 
them instead to continue processing present futures without concerning themselves 
with their accuracy. As Minsky pointed out, by continuously neutralising the effects 
of fundamental dissonances about the future, and shoring up ‘normal’ assumptions 
about the future in order to secure the ‘normal’ operations of the system, one also 
abolishes any incentives to look out for, and be prepared for, the possibility of fun-
damentally different futures, blanking out underlying systemic uncertainties. 
 The more market actors are assured that normal market conditions will continue 
(indefinitely) into the future, the more the future becomes a ‘useful fiction’, that 
is continuously presupposed but must never actually affect the normal operations 
of the system. As we shall see in the next section, central banks’ efforts to gain 
‘infrastructural power’ (Walter and Wansleben  2019 ; Braun and Gabor  2019 ; Braun 
 2018a ), by seeking to develop technologies for influencing financial markets (and 
the economy) by ‘governing through expectations’ (Wansleben  2018 ; Braun  2015 ), 
have become directly complicit with this specific temporality of modern finance. 
 Hegemonic futures in financialised capitalism 
 The role of an ergodic world as a calculative background for market coordination 
has gained increased general societal and economic importance through processes 
of financialisation. Financialisation can be used as a descriptive term to depict how 
the size of finance has grown compared to the rest of the economy (Stockhammer 
 2008 ), how corporations shift their sources of profit from production to finan-
cial activities (Krippner  2005 ) and/ or how households in Western economies have 
become increasingly entangled in financial markets, as mortgage holders, employees 
with private pension plans, owners of life insurance products and the like (van 
der Zwan  2014 ; Davis  2009 ). We use the concept here in a related but somewhat 
different sense. Our interest is in how the logics of coordination that are reliant 
on particular conceptions of futurity become dominant in regard to the ways in 
which capitalist democracies are rendered governable. We are thus interested in 
reconstructing a particular ‘governmentality’ that is not exhaustively described 
with regards to shareholder value, speculative identities or even particularistic elite 
interests, but that concerns the fundamental ways in which capitalism is stabilised 
as a social system. This sounds like a rather grand claim but we believe there is 
strong evidence for the rise of finance as a new governmentality, which is closely 
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associated with the emergence of central banks as the most powerful governors in 
advanced capitalist states. 
 The specific proposition that we make is that central banks have contributed 
to transcending the role of contemporary finance by tying their own practices of 
macroeconomic policy- making to this particular realm (Krippner  2011 ). We will 
here limit this discussion to the symbolic- communicative dimension of central 
banks’ governing – a topic that has raised much interest in sociological (Braun  2015 ) 
and anthropological (Holmes  2013 ) research. The innovation identified by these 
scholars is that central bankers have learned to govern monetary developments by 
communicating their intentions and planned interventions; the markets, reacting to 
such signals, then are thought to adapt accordingly, performatively bringing about 
the effects that the central banks intended to obtain. The point that we want to elab-
orate on here is that such ‘performative’ central banking should not be considered 
as a neutral strategy for achieving legitimate political objectives like low inflation 
and stable growth. The respective practices of governing rather require that central 
banks align their interventions with the structure of financial markets, and with the 
particular mechanisms through which these markets project their ‘present futures’. 
 This firstly entails a subtle, but important, shift in the very object of governing. 
The sociological argument underlying the idea of ‘expectational governance’ is 
that central banks can control price- setting in the economy by influencing the 
expectations that economic actors have with regard to changes in the inflation 
rate (Beckert  2016 ). When these actors – like wage bargainers – expect inflation to 
remain stable, they will be more moderate with their wage claims and their mark- 
up pricing, and thereby  produce the low inflation rates that they assume will prevail. 
This self- confirmatory logic is intuitive. But surveys have shown time and again 
that the general public’s expectations are relatively fickle and that inflation rates can 
be influenced by various factors, not all of which are expectational (Lombardelli 
and Saleheen  2003 ). Central bankers have resolved these uncertainties and problems 
by redefining what they actually control:  not inflation itself but inflation expectations, as 
incorporated into financial markets’ calculations and operations . The assumption is that, as 
long as these specific expectations remain stable, it does not matter that prices actu-
ally fluctuate somewhat, or that most people do not have a good understanding of 
how inflation will evolve. As a consequence, cognitive and normative expectations 
inherent in markets, rather than the demands, claims and ideas from the broader 
economy, become the linchpin for assessing central bankers’ success, and for 
orienting their macroeconomic policies. Financial market expectations thus have 
become central banks’ primary objects of governing: all that matters is that financial 
market prices – primarily long- term interest rates – reflect expectations that infla-
tion will remain stable and low. 
 This reorientation to markets was well articulated by Ben Bernanke – an archi-
tect of inflation targeting – who claimed that ‘monetary policy is a cooperative 
game.  The whole point is to get financial markets on our side and for them to do some 
of our work for us’ (cited in Mallaby  2017 : 612, our emphasis). In other words, 
central banks rely on financial markets to assume a hegemonic role in defining 
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economic futures more generally, and they reinforce this hegemony by aligning 
their communications with the specific logics of these markets. 
 This brings us to a second dimension of such finance- oriented expectation 
coordination – the fictitious elimination of radical uncertainty and the simulation 
of an ergodic socio- economic system with stable parameters within which finan-
cial expansion can unfold. To illustrate this point, let us imagine a central bank 
that has some expertise in finance and the economy, but that only imprecisely and 
‘with uncertainty’ knows how the economy will evolve going forward – what the 
level of employment will be, how much output is going to be produced, how the 
employment level and output are going to relate to the productive capacities of 
the economy, how such interactions will affect the price level – not to speak of 
the uncertainties arising from developments in asset and credit markets that affect 
banking, household wealth, productive facilities, consumer spending etc. Such a 
semi- knowledgeable, semi- ignorant central bank would decide on interest rates in 
somewhat unpredictable ways, and there may be many occasions in which markets 
are taken by surprise. 
 However, with the introduction of inflation targeting since the late 1980s, it 
became imperative to create far more predictability between central banks and 
markets. This made it necessary to render invisible these fundamental uncertainties 
faced by policy- makers (Walter and Wansleben  2019 ). Accordingly, central bankers 
increasingly drew on a model of the economy in which uncertainty was in fact not 
an important factor (Woodford  2009 ). Equilibrium output, the non- inflationary 
rate of employment and the natural rate of interest were all assumed to be know-
able variables that could orient policy- making and its coordination with financial 
markets. Accordingly, there were fewer and ‘fewer occasions on which the author-
ities’ decisions – as opposed to the underlying economic developments – cause[d] 
uncertainty in the markets’ (Butler and Clews  1997 : 48) – which was perceived as 
a  virtue of the inflation targeting regime. 
 In other words, the tools and techniques of macroeconomic policy championed 
by central banks have enhanced and strengthened the ‘normality expectations’ 
undergirding valuations in financial markets. This has then reinforced the expan-
sionary dynamics of finance, leading to a proliferation of contracts (e.g. of securitised 
assets), market relations and balance sheets that presuppose an unchanging macro-
economic background structure upon which financialisation rests (Nesvetailova 
 2015 ; Mehrling  2011 ). Particular features of financialisation, such as the interrelated 
expansion of asset and money markets, rely on these normality expectations, and 
more generally on the notion that central banks will maintain stability in regard 
to all major macroeconomic variables (inflation, interest rates) that are relevant for 
financial markets. However, as the transatlantic financial crisis of 2007– 2009 has 
brought home, the ‘success’ of central banks’ coordination with finance should  not 
be confused with the development of reliable and sustainable ways of governing 
capitalist democracies. Indeed, the events in these years rather demonstrated that the 
self- validation between policy- makers and market actors had become dissociated 
from the actual socio- economic structures – precarious labour market situations, 
debt pyramids etc. – to which their macroeconomic models and valuation practices 
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purported to refer (e.g. Fligstein  et al.  2017 ). However, this has not led to a funda-
mental questioning of the governmentality regime associated with financialisation. 
Rather, central banks’ ‘unconventional’ expansionary monetary policies since 2009 
reflect a reinforcement of finance- oriented and finance- centred policy- making 
(Braun  2018b ). The central aim of post- crisis policy has been to reinstate confi-
dence within finance about the indefinite continuity of ‘normal’ patterns of output, 
inflation, interest rates etc., with the intended effect of inducing market actors 
to re- engage in investments and credit provision, which are believed to generate 
growth. Finance thus remains at the centre of macroeconomic governance and thus 
maintains its privileged role in ‘mature’ capitalism. 
 To be fair, there has been some critical discussion among expert economists 
about the adverse consequences of such regimes. For instance, Tobias Adrian and 
Nelly Liang write that:
 Monetary policy works though financial conditions on expected economic 
outcomes, but risks to financial stability involve potential tail risks. The tail 
risks to future macroeconomic outcomes manifest only in some states of the 
world, when adverse shocks are realized. These dimensions are important 
because they greatly complicate efforts to incorporate financial stability in 
the determination of monetary policy. Policy makers would need to look 
beyond expected conditions for downside risks that arise with uncertain 
probability in the future ( 2016 : 4). 
 Yet there seems to be little appetite among policy- makers to take seriously these 
adverse financial stability effects, not to speak of the broader societal problems, 
which arise from the current finance- oriented governance regime. 
 Conclusion 
 Up until now the highly problematic ‘politics of the future’ entailed by the char-
acteristic temporality of modern finance, and its widening implications due to 
financialisation, have by- and- large passed under the radar (but see, Adkins  2018 ; 
Langenohl  2018 ;  2007 ). While our focus in this chapter has been on how techno-
logical, epistemic and political infrastructures make this temporality more durable 
and lend it a degree of invisibility, the concerns we would like to raise are related 
to these – for the most part sociological and anthropological – ‘diagnostics of the 
present’. 
 To be sure, the fragilities in the financial system that result from the continuous 
need to stabilise the ‘discounted’ fictive future values in the present have been 
widely noted (Mehrling  2011 ; Nesvetailova  2007 ), but they have only rarely been 
linked to the peculiar temporalities of modern finance (but see LiPuma  2017 ). 
More commonly, financial fragility is instead interpreted as an issue of  complexity  – 
to be addressed by increasing the transparency of markets, and in particular by 
reducing the epistemic uncertainty that this complexity generates with regard to 
the system’s own future (Gr ä bner and Kapeller  2015 ; Cooper  2011 ). 
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 Following from our argument, the present attempts, through regulation and 
monetary policy, to manage and contain the complexity of contemporary finance 
may, paradoxically, contribute to instability if the main aim remains to stabilise the 
working fiction of an ergodic, ‘timeless’ temporality on which financial markets 
are premised. This ergodic normality has become the very foundation of the cal-
culability of financial values (Peters  2019 ), its commensurability across assets and 
markets, and thus the liquidity and stability of those markets themselves. This is all 
the more the case as there has been a marked, global trend towards market- based 
finance (Murau  2017 ; Gabor  2016 ) in which the ability to shift assets in markets has 
become the basis of liquidity (Mehrling  2011 ), increasing the systemic risk entailed 
by disruptions to this frame of calculability. The need to protect this temporality, the 
frame of calculability and structure of valuations it undergirds, forces central banks 
into continuing their role of reinsurer of systemic risk and market- maker of last 
resort that contributed to the 2007– 2009 crisis, backstopping the value of a widening 
pool of – only seemingly – ‘liquid’ assets (Mehrling  2011 ; Borio and White  2004 ). 
The ‘unconventional’ monetary policies of quantitative easing pursued by central 
banks around the world since 2008 are even named so as to evoke their rationale 
of restoring and safeguarding the technical presuppositions of ‘normal’ or ‘conven-
tional’ forms of governability. Likewise, the ‘macro- prudential’ financial regulation 
that has come to dominate regulatory debates (Coombs  2017 ; Baker  2013 ) attempts 
to correct the fragilities created by the ‘distended present’ of modern finance by 
increasing the transparency of risks (e.g., through stress tests), creating resiliences 
and facilitating ‘efficient’ risk- sharing within the financial system. Despite some 
undeniable innovations at the level of technical frameworks and instruments at its 
disposal since 2008– 2009, monetary policy thus continues to be geared towards 
ergodicity as its operative framework. ‘Macro- pru’ and unconventional policies aim, 
first and foremost, at restoring and protecting  normal conditions in financial markets , 
as a platform for effective monetary policy. This  normality is conceived of in ergodic 
terms and observed through (mathematical) models that are premised on ergodicity. 
Deviations from normality thus become an impediment to be neutralised in order 
to secure the inter- temporal consistency and effectiveness of monetary policy – 
rather than being seen as (potentially) indicative of (fundamental) uncertainties 
of which market actors (and central banks!) would need to take heed, and which 
might require adjustments to their calculative strategies. Instead, central banks pro-
actively seek to restore ‘quasi- ergodic’ conditions in financial markets, by reducing 
what they perceive as market imperfections that prevent the even inter- temporal 
dissemination of monetary policy signals. However, in combating manifestations 
of uncertainty as  anomalies that stand in the way of monetary policy operations 
premised on the ergodicity of finance and the economy, central banks are sterilising 
the very signs that the future may indeed substantively differ from past and present. 
Their interventions provide financial markets with a working fiction of an ergodic 
world, and, rather than  removing vulnerabilities, they counteract the very processes 
through which collective sense- making could solidify into effectively constraining 
price signals – until, that is, the next crisis… 
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 Note 
 1  In technical terms, ‘[e] rgodicity is fulfilled, if the time average of a system or process 
equals its ensemble average. The time average is the average of one observed trajectory or 
realisation of a process (one time series). The ensemble average is the average over every 
possible state of a system’ (Kirstein  2015 : 1). The assumption of ergodicity is crucial for 
predominant formalisations of economic dynamics as ‘the ergodic case is much easier 
to handle mathematically’, although in principle ‘non- ergodicity is a necessary property 
of a mathematical model, if the model is supposed to describe trajectory occurrences of 
endogenous novelties and change’ ( ibid .). 
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 SHARING RISKS OR PROLIFERATING 
UNCERTAINTIES? 
 Insurance, disaster and development 
 Leigh Johnson 
 Introduction 
 Today, anyone who is under the impression that insurance is a luxury that is only 
available in wealthy countries of the global North is faced with a multitude of 
examples to the contrary. Not only are traditional lines of insurance business, like 
life and health insurance, growing rapidly in much of the global South, new forms 
of insurance harnessing powerful geospatial monitoring and modelling technolo-
gies are increasingly being deployed to offer Southern governments insurance for 
hazards such as droughts, floods, cyclones and diseases. It is hoped that such coverage 
will secure development gains. But has the growth of such tools actually reduced 
uncertainties? So far, the evidence is mixed. 
 The actuarial technologies of the insurance industry have long been central to 
the development of methods to assess uncertainty. These methods yield quanti-
fiable – and thus priceable and transferable – risk. Amid the proliferating uncer-
tainties of climate change and the growing cost of disasters, the impulse to insure 
across more geographic and hazard domains has grown. Insurers and multilateral 
institutions now explicitly seek to narrow what they call the ‘global protection 
gap’ – the difference between total economic losses and insured losses (Lloyd’s  2018 ; 
Swiss Reinsurance  2015 ). Development institutions and insurers have advanced 
several strategies to occupy this protection gap, which is widest in countries of 
the global South. They have advocated insurance- linked tools such as catastrophe 
bonds, promoted the application of insurance- based logic to new domains like pan-
demic diseases and launched insurance pools at new multi-country scales. 
 Yet almost none of these instruments look like what we imagine as traditional 
insurance arrangements. The large majority of these instruments are ‘parametric’ 
products, in which payouts are triggered by measured or modelled environmental 
variables. This chapter first explores why parametric insurance and related risk 
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transfer tools are increasingly popular responses in development practice. It then 
argues that this embrace can paradoxically proliferate uncertainties when insurance 
contracts fail to pay out, illustrated with reference to drought insurance in Malawi 
and pandemic insurance in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The chapter closes 
by envisioning how insurance might be refashioned from a ‘technology of hubris’ 
to a ‘technology of humility’ (Jasanoff  2003 ), suggesting some principles for more 
relational deployments of insurance that could begin to recuperate its promise as a 
technique of mutual solidarity and sustainable risk- sharing. 
 The impulse to insure 
 There are both economic and political reasons why insurance – and disaster risk 
finance more broadly – have become major domains for development intervention. 
Given that many Southern countries have long since been compelled to remove 
social safety nets and market controls as a condition for continuing to receive loans 
from international institutions, there is often little to cushion their populations, 
leaving them especially vulnerable to shocks. An early World Bank piece advancing 
the framework of weather risk management identified the processual link between 
micro and macro: ‘Ultimately, the precariousness of farmers and producers translates 
into macroeconomic vulnerability’ (Hess  et al .  2002 : 296). Multilateral institutions 
now identify disaster shocks as a major impediment to a country’s macroeconomic 
stability and its ability to maintain the welfare of its citizens (Cummins and Mahul 
 2009 ). Disasters constitute a fiscal ‘squeeze’: while a government’s unbudgeted relief 
expenditures rise, its future revenue- raising capacity deteriorates as household assets 
are lost and incomes decline. Declining revenues impair a government’s capacity to 
pay off existing loans or issue bonds, forcing it to take on more emergency debt. 
Such dynamics are not just the concern of international financial institutions: activist 
organisations such as the Jubilee Debt Campaign have recently argued that climate 
change is intensifying these patterns, warning of ‘climate debt traps’ resulting from 
post- disaster emergency borrowing, such as the loan Mozambique took following 
Cyclone Idai in 2019 (Sauer  2019 ). 
 Insurance – and particularly the global insurance industry – occupies pride of 
place in the push to move from  ex post to  ex ante financing arrangements. This is 
partly a result of scalar relations. The difficulty of some of the thorniest problems 
in the field of development – large ‘natural’ disasters, climate change impacts and 
pandemic disease among them – is that they are spatially and temporally covariant. 
While everyday coping systems might work to buffer people from quotidian indi-
vidual shocks, they are overwhelmed when many people in a region suffer from 
the same event at the same time. Likewise, government funds, if they exist at all, are 
quickly exhausted, particularly in countries with small economies. For instance, the 
Solomon Islands has no disaster reserves, and average annual disaster losses consume 
6.5 per cent of Vanuatu’s GDP (World Bank  2015 : 9). 
 In these contexts, the large and globally diversified pools of capital held by 
the reinsurance industry have become a virtually indispensable element of the 
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development sector’s approach. In the absence of a multilateral development 
insurer, 1 it is the reinsurance industry that can quickly dispatch the quantities of 
post- disaster liquidity required. This industry has also systematically cultivated 
actuarial and modelling expertise and positioned itself as a consummate provider 
of risk management solutions. Its operational framework dovetails with Western 
donors’ mandates to make aid more auditable and economically efficient, and to 
deploy market- based solutions and private sector capital to bridge financing gaps 
(Mawdsley  2015 ). 
 Since the mid- 2010s, cash- strapped humanitarian and aid agencies have faced 
ballooning numbers of crisis- affected populations, exacerbated by ongoing con-
flict, extreme weather events linked to climate change and increasingly uncertain 
funding streams from isolationist Western donors. This precarious situation has 
driven an emphasis on the dollar- for- dollar efficiency of aid and objective cri-
teria for its disbursement. This aligns with an insurance- based approach to model-
ling, pricing and contractually managing risks. Formal insurance or insurance- like 
instruments require contractual specifications that delineate who is responsible 
for post- disaster transfers, for what and in what circumstances. Such specificity 
holds obvious appeal for improving welfare given the delays and chaos of ordinary 
humanitarian response – what Dunn ( 2012 ) terms ‘adhocracy’. 
 In theory, the process of deciding what insurance coverage to purchase should 
encourage pre- disaster risk assessment, management and response planning. The 
pre- defined terms of insurance contracts should secure funding for response and 
delineate post- disaster responsibilities (Clarke and Dercon  2016 ). In turn, the 
automaticity of payouts based on environmental measures should secure timely 
financing for urgent needs and facilitate disbursement from a distance, while trans-
parency about payout conditions should reduce perennial donor concerns about aid 
leakage and corruption. This, at least, is the vision. 
 In practice, many applications of insurance technologies have demonstrated the 
hazards of what science studies scholar Sheila Jasanoff ( 2003 : 238) calls ‘technolo-
gies of hubris’. By this, she refers to technologies that leverage science ‘to facilitate 
management and control even in areas of high uncertainty … [which] achieve their 
power through claims of objectivity and a disciplined approach to analysis’ ( ibid .). 
Despite the power of these technologies, their advocates are often overconfident of 
their accuracy and rigour, and blind to forms of uncertainty that fall outside their 
framing assumptions. They tend to invoke the objectivity of their expertise in order 
to avoid political debate and calls for social accountability. The cases of drought and 
pandemic insurance, to which the chapter turns next, suggest that parametric insur-
ance is no stranger to the hazards of technological hubris. 
 The political economy of basis risk: blame and liability 
 To understand how uncertainty becomes a transferred political and economic 
object we need to grasp the logic of assembly behind parametric insurance tools. In 
ordinary  indemnity- based insurance contracts, losses are inspected and the monetary 
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payout made is at least ostensibly proportional to that loss. But indemnification 
is expensive, and requires constant work with regards to surveillance and data 
gathering. In contrast, most disaster risk insurance contracts now on offer are built 
on  parametric logic. In parametric contracts, payouts are determined by the value of 
one or more measured environmental variable – a parameter like rainfall or pas-
ture greenness – that can be monitored at a distance. Parametric logic posits scalar 
correspondence between selected variables at easily observed scales, and actual 
losses at less easily observed scales. Contract designers inevitably make tremendous 
simplifications and exclusions when postulating this correspondence. 
 By definition, parametric contracts must abstract from contextual conditions, 
setting standardised proxies that can be efficiently applied to determine payouts. 
These technical processes of simplification, exclusion and decontextualisation have 
allowed insurance to be offered for places and perils previously deemed too unre-
munerative and risky for traditional insurance to operate. But these abstractions 
have generated their own new sets of uncertainties. 
 Most prominently, parametric design inevitably leaves those insured holding 
‘basis risk’. This refers to the risk of a discrepancy between the measures and models 
that determine payouts, on the one hand, and events on the ground, on the other. 
Even traditional indemnity insurance carries some basis risk: those insured typically 
have some ‘deductible’ amount of losses they must self- fund first, and claims can be 
denied if losses were caused by a contractually- excluded event (Muir- Wood  2017 ). 
Indeed, traditional insurers regularly make legal recourse to carefully constructed 
contractual definitions of harm and limits to liability in order to avoid paying 
indemnities (e.g. Baker  1994 ). 
 But basis risk for parametric insurance is of a different nature. One- to- one 
indemnification for losses is never promised. Payout determinations can be made 
without the insurer conducting any on- the- ground loss assessment with insured 
parties. A great deal then rests on the accuracy of the measures and models selected 
as proxies. Yet insured parties are rarely familiar with how well these proxies cor-
respond to their experience (or not), and often lack the actuarial skills to assess 
a contract’s reliability. Compounding the problem of proxy accuracy, catastrophe 
insurance coverage poses a more general problem. Unlike insurance for more 
quotidian events, catastrophe insurance is a ‘credence good’, where the irregular 
and infrequent temporality of loss events makes it difficult for buyers to assess the 
quality of the product before purchase. Learning takes place after premiums have 
been paid, when those insured see how an actual contract performs in comparison 
to their expectations (Clarke and Wren- Lewis  2013 ). 
 Drought insurance 
 Several countries insured by the African Risk Capacity 2 drought insurance pro-
gramme have learned retrospectively about the limitations of the coverage they 
purchased. Organisationally housed within the African Union, ARC brings sover-
eign nations into a mutual insurance pool for drought protection, with backstopping 
Insurance, disaster and development 49
by global reinsurers. ARC’s design is routinely championed as a path- breaking 
example, leveraging satellite data and regional solidarity to finance drought disaster 
response (UNFCCC  2017 ). The risk pool is capitalised by participating countries’ 
premiums, alongside interest- free equity from the UK and German development 
agencies. Payouts are triggered based on estimates of the number of drought- 
vulnerable people requiring relief, as modelled by ARC’s proprietary software, 
Africa RiskView. If triggered, ARC payouts must be used to fund the member’s 
pre- approved contingency plan for relief operations. 
 A great deal rests on the accuracy of the model’s estimated number of drought- 
vulnerable people. Africa RiskView constructs a complex causal chain to arrive 
at this number. It feeds satellite- based rainfall estimates into agronomic models of 
reference crops; shortfalls are then compared with pre- existing analyses of food 
security and population vulnerability to generate an estimate of the maximum 
number of people affected by a drought event. Member countries customise their 
insurance contracts to trigger a payout when a certain threshold number is reached. 
 In 2015, Malawi became the first southern African country to join the ARC 
pool of seven total members, paying US$4.7 million in premiums from its treasury 
for drought insurance cover. In March 2016, the Malawian government declared 
a drought emergency. Rains had failed at a critical time for the staple maize crop, 
and the stress was compounded by extremely high temperatures. Households’ food 
stores and assets were already depleted by the previous season’s droughts, floods 
and high food prices, stemming partly from an ongoing El Ni ñ o event (e- Pact 
 2017 ). In June, ARC announced that Malawi’s drought insurance contract had not 
triggered a payout. Its model estimated the size of the drought- affected population 
at just 21,000 people. Meanwhile, a joint assessment by the government and aid 
organisations put the number at 6.5 million people (ActionAid  2017 ). 
 Though the biggest drivers of this staggering discrepancy are still subject to 
debate, poor data and poor model specification both played a part. Initially, ARC 
blamed the underestimate on the fact that Malawi had selected a long- cycle maize 
variety as the model’s agronomic reference crop, while the majority of Malawi’s 
farmers had recently switched to planting a short- cycle hybrid variety that was 
catastrophically damaged by cessation of rains after planting. Because the reference 
crop was chosen by government teams presumed to be knowledgeable about their 
country’s agricultural sector and its vulnerabilities, ARC deflected responsibility 
for the discrepancy to the Malawian government. Yet a later ground- based survey 
and model assessment found that both short- and long- maturing varieties of maize 
suffered similar drought impacts, suggesting that the model would have performed 
poorly even with the correct reference crop (e- Pact  2017 :  33– 34). The likely 
greater problems lay in the model’s parameters: it did not account for the impacts 
of high temperatures on plant evapotranspiration and water stress, or the timing of 
dry spells during a crop’s growth cycle ( ibid. ). After seven months of consultations, 
donor pressure and international media scrutiny, ARC’s Board of Directors for-
mally approved a policy exception and agreed to disburse US$8.1 million to resolve 
the ‘Malawi crisis’ (ARC Agency  2016 ). Nine months after the government’s 
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emergency declaration, Malawians finally received ARC- funded relief in the form 
of legumes for household consumption. 
 Though ARC adjusted its model following the Malawi crisis, its problems did 
not end there. Africa RiskView again did not trigger a payout for a 2017 drought 
in Mauritania, despite dire conditions on the ground. A  ground- truthing team 
suggested the discrepancy stemmed from inaccurate rainfall data, poor assumptions 
in the agronomic model and the strikingly invalid assumption that farmers would 
have the resources to replant following failed rains (ARC Agency  2017 ). Again 
ARC’s board approved an exception and made an extra- contractual payout (ARC 
Agency  2018 ). 
 Pandemic bonds 
 No such exceptions to policy were possible when the World Bank’s first pan-
demic bond failed to trigger a payout in July 2019. That month, the World Health 
Organization declared the Ebola virus outbreak that began in 2018 in the eastern 
DRC a ‘Public Health Emergency of International Concern’ (WHO  2019 ). By this 
time, it was already the second largest Ebola outbreak in recorded history, respon-
sible for more than 1,500 deaths. 
 Following donors’ abysmally slow response to the 2014– 2016 Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa, the World Bank developed the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility 
in consultation with the WHO. The PEF is intended to disburse surge financing to 
enable rapid responses to ‘infectious disease outbreaks before they take on pandemic 
proportions’ (World Bank  2018a : 4). 3 Unlike ARC, where countries must self- select 
into the risk pool and pay an insurance premium, the PEF coverage automatically 
applies to all countries eligible for assistance from the World Bank’s International 
Development Association lending arm, without requiring any premium payment. 4 
While it includes a ‘cash window’ for early donor support, the PEF’s signal innov-
ation is an ‘insurance window’ that draws down private investments made in a 
US$425 million catastrophe bond (Erikson  2019 ). An insurance payout for relief 
efforts is triggered if three major conditions are met: reports from the WHO con-
firm at least 250 total deaths; a third- party model deems rates of disease transmission 
to be growing over a sustained period and the disease spreads across borders resulting 
in at least 20 deaths in a second country (World Bank  2018a ). 
 The requirement for geographical spread disqualified the Ebola epidemic in the 
DRC from triggering PEF’s insurance window. Though several Ebola deaths were 
confirmed in Uganda and feared in Rwanda and Tanzania, the count never reached 
20 in a second country. As medical anthropologist Susan Erikson ( 2019 ) notes, the 
PEF’s emphasis on the transparency and exactitude of disease counts ignores the 
vastly uncertain conditions under which disease data are collected: often by free-
lance enumerators and irregularly paid health workers hired to travel vast distances in 
dangerous conditions, and possibly denied access to villages. Recent violent attacks 
on health workers in the DRC underscore the ongoing precarity of the counting 
enterprise. Nonetheless, so far, no one has alleged that the insurance window trigger 
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conditions were actually met in the DRC and neighbouring countries, or that an 
error of measurement prevented a payout. Rather, the contractual criteria set a high 
enough bar – confirmed deaths  and cross- border spread  and growth rate – that it 
may well be the case that not all were met at the same time. It is impossible to know. 
Meanwhile, investors in the PEF catastrophe bond lost none of their principal, and 
continued to receive interest payments. Critics have heaped opprobrium on the 
World Bank for its role in designing the unscathed bond (Garrett  2019 ; Jonas  2019 ), 
and public health scholars suggested its conditions would have generated a payout 
for only two events since 2006 (Brim and Wenham  2019 ). Indeed the PEF bond 
did not trigger its US$195 million payout for COVID-19 until late April 2020, 
when this chapter was already in press (World Bank 2020). 
 Uncertain liability 
 ARC’s and PEF’s recent experiences suggest new domains of uncertainty introduced 
by insurance tools. In Malawi, bad data and poor model specifications led ARC to 
underestimate the actual extent of drought and its impact on farmers. Rather than 
introducing automaticity and timeliness to drought relief funding, the ARC contract 
gave rise to dispute, blame and delay. In the DRC, the bond’s activation criteria legally 
prevented the World Bank from drawing down investors’ funds despite the raging epi-
demic (Erikson and Johnson 2020). Rather than delivering capital market funds for 
public health emergencies, the coverage gave rise to befuddlement and recrimination. 
 In both cases there is a political economy of basis risk and liability. Contractual 
structures designed to preserve tight control over payouts are necessary in order 
to secure reinsurance cover or capital market investments. Both reinsurers and 
investors demand surety that their capital will only be depleted under specific 
conditions. Firms model the likelihood of these conditions transpiring in order 
to price contracts, estimate total exposures and hedge portfolios. When basis risk 
events occur, reinsurers and investors are largely unaffected – although reinsurers 
may suffer reputational damage from being associated with a product that did not 
pay out when public opinion deems it should have. 
 Who then  is liable? In Malawi and Mauritania, ARC’s governing board even-
tually approved exceptions to policy to allow the compensatory payouts. In both 
cases, ARC’s reinsurers did not object, because the payouts (US$8.1 million and 
US$2.1 million, respectively) were small enough that the reinsurance coverage was 
not activated. The funds came out of ARC’s risk pool, co- owned by German and 
British government aid agencies and ARC’s African member states. Ultimately, it 
was governments and their taxpayers who shouldered the exceptional payments. 
 Unlike ARC, PEF’s catastrophe bond cannot permit  post hoc exceptions, as it is 
legally bound by the terms of the prospectus circulated to investors. If an epidemic 
does not meet the bond’s activation criteria, but still meets minimum epidemio-
logical thresholds, governments or responding humanitarian agencies can request 
funds from the PEF’s ‘cash window’, funded by German and Australian develop-
ment aid (World Bank  2018b ). It was this window that disbursed US$50 million 
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for the 2019 Ebola epidemic in the DRC, and was empty by the time COVID-19 
emerged as a new threat in 2020. Again, it was governments and their taxpayers 
who shouldered the cash payments. 
 Indeed, there is a good argument to be made for wealthy governments bearing 
such costs. But this reflects a different political economy of liability than one in 
which capital from private reinsurers and investors is truly leveraged to narrow the 
‘global protection gap’. In the cases of ARC and PEF, the reinsurer and investor 
capital underwriting these products remained intact in the midst of severe droughts 
and a historic epidemic. 
 There are some cases when parametric tools fortunately work as advertised, such 
as a US$22 million ARC payout to Senegal in November 2019. Yet models and 
triggers for sovereign parametric products thus far appear biased in favour of insurers. 
If basis risk errors were random, the number of ‘downside’ basis risk events should 
roughly equal the number of ‘upside’ events (when an index suggests conditions on 
the ground are worse than they actually are, potentially triggering an excessive payout). 
Yet there is little evidence of upside events. The number and variety of cases in which 
contracts misfire suggest that the turn towards parametric insurance products is not 
consistently reducing uncertainty for Southern governments, or reliably transferring 
it to the private sector. Rather, it may be redistributing the undesirable components 
of uncertainty as basis risk both to those insured and to donor governments, who bear 
the costs when parametric products fail to deliver protection. 
 While parametrics promise Southern government decision- makers coverage for 
a stated hazard, they also expose them to a new kind of risk. This, in the words of 
a senior risk modelling executive, is ‘the toxic politics of basis risk’ (Muir- Wood 
 2017 ). This is the political liability of spending scarce treasury funds to purchase a 
policy that does not pay out when the government expects it to, or when angry citi-
zens think it should. If fear of basis risk drives enough decision- makers to remove 
their countries from a risk pool – as occurred with ARC following the Malawi 
crisis – this creates cascading doubts for other members about the long- term via-
bility of the pool itself. Uncertainty proliferates. 
 Technologies of humility? 
 Given these challenges, one might ask whether it is possible to rescue the promise 
of insurance as a technique of mutual solidarity and sustainable risk- sharing. Can 
parametric insurance arrangements ever reliably  reduce uncertainties and secure 
financing for disaster liabilities, as proponents hope? Or are they bound simply to 
pass uncertainties around? 
 It is possible to imagine insurance otherwise. Here, we might begin our re- 
envisioning with Jasanoff ’s ( 2003 ) proposal for new ‘technologies of humility’ in 
policy- making that complement and correct the hazards of technologies of hubris. 
Technologies of humility are ‘institutionalized habits of thought that try to come 
to grips with the ragged fringes of human understanding  – the unknown, the 
uncertain, the ambiguous, and the uncontrollable’ ( ibid.: 227). These habits of 
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thought acknowledge areas of fundamental uncertainty, the possibility of unfore-
seen consequences and the need for plural viewpoints and collective learning. This 
epistemological disposition is a crucial corrective to technically complex mod-
elling, which by its nature tends to minimise the significance of whatever falls 
outside its field of vision, and overstate the importance of whatever falls within 
it ( ibid. : 239). Approaching parametric insurance products from the disposition of 
technological humility yields some unconventional ideas for re- imagining their 
design and function. 
 Jasanoff suggests four focusing questions we might use to cultivate technologies 
of humility. These are questions that technologies of hubris persistently avoid. Is 
the scope of the problem appropriately  framed ? Who is  vulnerable ? What are the  dis-
tributive implications? And how should we  learn from failure? Let us consider each 
in turn. 
 Framing : The framing of the ‘global protection gap’ suggests both a problem and 
a solution. If the problem is uninsured losses then the solution that follows is 
extending the reach of insurance tools to new hazards, new geographies and new 
domains of the economy. But, as the law of the instrument holds, ‘to someone 
with a hammer, everything looks like a nail’. If the problems of uninsured losses 
and unassigned contingent liabilities are instead reframed as missing safety nets and 
absent social contracts, the fields of play suddenly become much larger. Questions 
of social protection and democratic governance come into view. Insurance can be 
put into perspective as only a modest and partial solution. Parametric products may 
or may not fulfil a need. 
 Attention to framing might also lead us to consider whether calling parametric 
products ‘insurance’ is cognitively useful, or instead misleading. Language shapes 
expectations. The term ‘insurance’ connotes a relationship of security and indemni-
fication that parametric products expressly avoid. Calling parametric products ‘insur-
ance’ may downplay the inevitable uncertainty and basis risk they contain. Describing 
them rather as ‘derivatives’ – financial products whose value is based on the behav-
iour of another underlying variable – would make these uncertainties more evi-
dent. At first glance, this might seem a counterintuitive suggestion: derivatives were 
notoriously implicated in the accumulation, packaging and trade of massive mort-
gage debts culminating in the global financial crisis of 2007– 2010. Yet this experi-
ence arguably raised media and political awareness of their prevalence and the risks 
of their use. Unless or until parametric insurance products are systematically quality- 
controlled to track and ensure correspondence between indices and losses, they are 
essentially weather and environmental derivatives. Describing them as such might 
signal their limitations and prompt a healthy new degree of scrutiny over their use. 
 Vulnerability: We have already seen how the design of parametric products some-
times leaves those insured holding large basis risk. This is the chance that they will 
pay an insurance premium, experience a catastrophic event and then receive no 
payout according to contractual terms. Though basis risk can be reduced through 
careful design, it can never be eliminated. It must be accepted as a corollary of 
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extending insurance arrangements to populations and locales not traditionally 
deemed insurable. 
 Who, then, is particularly vulnerable to such basis risk? Countries whose 
governments are willing to experiment with the imperfect coverage of parametric 
sovereign insurance contracts tend to be those whose marginal position in the 
global political economy compels them to accept a compromise on terms set by 
global insurers, investors and development banks. Those with limited technical and 
actuarial training are especially vulnerable, as they may not be able to assess fully 
the terms of the coverage offered, and thus may remain unaware of the basis risk 
their treasuries will retain. Building technologies of humility to address such vul-
nerability would minimally require transparent technical and actuarial analysis of 
competing options, advocacy on countries’ behalf with insurance providers, and 
cultivation of regional or country- based networks of expertise. It is critical that 
such a data analytics- intensive technical role be played by parties without any finan-
cial or operational interests in a country’s ultimate risk management choices, unlike 
in today’s model, in which technical expertise flows from reinsurers, reinsurance 
brokers and the World Bank. 
 Distribution : An obvious question often monitored by donor institutions concerns 
the distribution of insurance payouts. This is in essence a question of auditing who 
receives payouts from insurance policies, and tracking the cost to distribute each 
dollar of aid via this channel as opposed to another, such as cash transfers (Jensen 
 et  al.  2017 ). Although it is indeed critical to understand this, a deeper question 
of distribution remains: where does the bulk of donor funds put into parametric 
insurance ultimately accrue? What is the likelihood of a given donor dollar being 
distributed (in cash or kind) to a vulnerable person, or being retained by an insurer 
or intermediary? When would a contract have paid out for past historical events? 
While historical calibration is often conducted for the purposes of pricing insur-
ance contracts, this information is rarely made public, nor are payout frequencies 
(and their relative costs and trade- offs) subject to public deliberation. An approach 
promoting humility could mandate the standardised disclosure of these distribu-
tional arrangements and facilitate debates over the minimum criteria for publicly- 
subsidised coverage. 
 Learning : When technological innovations in insurance fail to live up to the 
expectations heaped upon them – as so many technologies inevitably do – a cru-
cial question concerns what and how we can learn from these experiences. When 
predictive models misfire, blame and recrimination typically follow. The opacity or 
transparency with which insurance institutions review and revise models and data 
sources is a critical determinant for (re)building credibility among those insured 
and the public. But there will always be some degree of causal ambiguity, and com-
peting explanations for failure will depend on actors’ positions within the insurance 
relationship. 
 A better question, then, is not what institutions learn about the shortcomings 
of their models, but rather how basis risk events could galvanise the development 
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of different fora for decision- making that would make parametric insurance more 
adaptive, context- dependent and responsive. This would require letting go of some 
of the persistent impulses towards control that led to the embrace of parametric 
insurance tools in the first place. We might imagine, for instance, fora for partici-
patory deliberation among mutually insured parties about what should constitute 
a basis risk event, or what criteria should be used to reallocate inevitably limited 
indemnification funds to such cases. Such fora would need to be animated by a 
different model of trust than the asymmetric one that characterises typical insurer– 
insured relations, in which those who are insured are asked to place their trust in 
an insurer who expressly doubts the trustworthiness (or wisdom) of those being 
insured. Within participating countries, fora could be established in which civil 
servants, civil society organisations and beneficiaries themselves could deliberate 
over the inevitable trade- offs involved in their country’s selection of particular con-
tractual terms and triggers. 
 Some will object that this reorientation would undermine the entire ontological 
framework of insurance, based as it is on probabilistic calculation and objective payout 
criteria. Yet the history of insurance in mutuals, friendly societies (Van Leeuwen 
 2016 ; Ismay  2015 ) – and even commercial reinsurance (Jarzabkowski  et al.  2015 ) – 
demonstrates that more relational and contextual deployments of insurance are pos-
sible, and indeed were the norm for centuries. But these have typically been built on 
more extensive interpersonal ties and expectations of longer- enduring relationships, 
both between members of the risk pool and between insurer and insured. 
 Despite their promise to extend insurance security to new geographies and 
hazard domains, parametric insurance and ‘insurance- like products’ currently 
suffer from a legitimacy deficit due to the basis risk they transfer to those insured. 
Basis risk needs to be understood not simply as a problem of poor design, but 
as an existential political challenge to the framework of parametric insurance. 
If we are to salvage the value of parametric insurance as a solidaristic tool for 
coping with uncertainties, then we must approach the technology with a dose of 
humility. Parametric insurance could become a far more democratic tool of risk 
governance, building ‘on people’s legitimate expectations of equality, represen-
tation, fairness and public accountability’ (Jasanoff  2010 : 29). But this requires a 
radical openness to re- imagining its design and the constituencies to which it is 
accountable – and a willingness to relinquish the illusions of objective control at 
a distance. 
 Notes 
 1  The likes of which are proposed by Clarke and Dercon ( 2019 ). 
 2  www.africanriskcapacity.org . 
 3  However, anthropological accounts of Ebola’s spread in West Africa suggest that funding 
shortfalls were far from the most significant factor in preventing the disease’s containment 
(Erikson  2016 ; Wilkinson and Leach  2015 ). 
 4  In 2020, this included 76 countries, 39 of which were in Africa ( http:// ida.worldbank.
org/ about/ borrowing- countries ). 
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 THE UNRAVELLING OF 
TECHNOCRATIC ORTHODOXY? 
 Contemporary knowledge politics 
in technology regulation 
 Patrick van Zwanenberg 
 Introduction 
 Technology regulation has long been an area of governance where the problematic 
nature of officially sanctioned knowledge regularly spills over into wider political and 
public settings. From clashes over atmospheric nuclear testing in the 1950s to more 
recent disputes over the commercialisation of agricultural genetic engineering, vir-
tually all technology- related controversies of the last 70 years have pivoted around 
conflicts over the knowledge claims that regulatory institutions invoke to inform 
and justify policy decisions. Critics have long argued that officially sanctioned 
knowledge claims reflect a particular, usually very narrow, framing of what are gen-
erally profoundly ambiguous issues (Wynne  1975 ), and frequently provide a false 
precision in regard to what are often arbitrary and highly uncertain judgements and 
assessments (National Research Council  1983 ). They have also stressed that the pre-
cise ways in which these forms of knowledge ‘closure’ occur are invariably shaped 
by the political commitments and policy preferences of incumbent state and indus-
trial actors, whether intentionally or inadvertently (Jasanoff and Wynne  1998 ). Any 
form of closure will, in turn, delimit the kinds of policy and technological options 
that decision- makers even contemplate, and prefigure the choices made about those 
options that are subject to consideration (Felt  et al.  2007 ). As a consequence, regu-
latory decisions are often strongly influenced, even determined, by the political 
values and policy preferences of states and regulated industries, but those values and 
preferences are disguised in apparently logical and rational language (Stirling  2008a ; 
Mayer and Stirling  2004 ; Jasanoff and Wynne  1998 ). 
 The evident tensions have been exacerbated by a long- standing historical ten-
dency on the part of scientific and policy institutions everywhere to insist that 
there are, in fact, no political or normative dimensions to the knowledge claims 
that inform and justify policy decisions. This has been achieved firstly by depicting 
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technology regulation as concerned only with addressing the safety of individual 
technologies, as if this were  logically the only legitimate grounds for social concern 
about technology, and secondly by treating issues of safety as if they were fully 
comprehendible and predictable  ex ante as a problem of calculable risk, or at least as 
a resolvable technical uncertainty. 
 In this portrayal, technological change is assumed to reflect the inevitable 
unfolding of scientific progress, rather than human choice, while the business of 
understanding potential harm is a rational scientific problem that can be solved in 
an impartial and objective way. Technology policy therefore becomes a technocratic 
exercise of calculating risks to human and environmental health and diminishing 
them to a socially acceptable level, in order to ‘optimise’ singular, apparently inevit-
able pathways of technological change. 
 It is not difficult to see why this depiction is expedient, at least for some actors, but 
it is wishful thinking. The world has experienced a long series of major unexpected 
problems with technologies, from the huge human toll from the use of asbestos, to 
the effects of chlorofluorocarbons on ozone depletion, to major industrial accidents 
such as at Chernobyl and Fukushima. These have shown how very serious harm 
often comes as a complete surprise, or despite very low official estimations of the 
chances of it occurring or at a magnitude far greater than predicted (Pfotenhauer 
 et al.  2012 ; Harremo ë s  et al.  2001 ). Furthermore, the utter failures, at least in some 
jurisdictions, to secure legitimacy for politically contentious technologies such 
as civil nuclear power and agricultural genetic engineering have torpedoed the 
implicit assumption that safety is the only meaningful public issue at stake in rela-
tion to the ways in which our technological futures unfold (Wynne  1983 ). 
 Policy institutions and jurisdictions have responded very slowly and unevenly, if 
at all, to these kinds of problems, and to an important critique of orthodox regu-
lation, led by both the environmental and public health movements and by natural 
and social scientists (e.g. Stirling  2008b ; Global Environmental Change Programme 
 1999 ; Santillo  et al.  1998 ; Wynne  1982 ). Even where events and acute crises have 
made it overwhelmingly clear that at least some aspects of claims to science- based 
objectivity in regulatory decision- making are highly normative, the traditional 
depiction of regulation as a singularly rational technocratic endeavour has proved 
remarkably resilient in many institutions. 
 In this chapter I reflect on this conundrum through a brief discussion of two 
areas of contemporary European technology regulation, which I  suggest have 
wider resonance: the cultivation of transgenic plant varieties and efforts to reform 
pesticide regulation. Both cases illustrate how unfolding events, campaigning and 
contextual issues and processes can sometimes force a partial ‘opening up’ of other-
wise routine or opaque processes of knowledge closure, potentially heralding a 
broadening of technology regulation, for example so that policy addresses a wider 
set of potential vulnerabilities, or compares the pros and cons of different techno-
logical practices. Yet both cases also show how a more intellectually honest appre-
ciation of, and response to, the uncertain, contested and provisional nature of much 
regulatory knowledge is politically very challenging for many institutions and the 
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industries they regulate, and how many regulatory agencies and industry bodies 
have responded, and are responding, to such ‘opening up’ dynamics by trying 
aggressively to reassert an orthodox technocratic depiction of regulation, and in 
doing so shut down the rationale for more ambitious regulatory experimentation. 
 The more general phenomenon here is that political contexts and processes 
mediate a dynamic, perhaps dialectic, tension in much contemporary technology 
regulation – between the long- standing tradition of framing technology regula-
tion around a control- based vision of risk management, supported by government- 
industry knowledge claims, and countervailing pressures to challenge the power 
embodied in such reductionist framings and to broaden out questions about 
technological vulnerability, and ultimately technological choice, for wider deliber-
ation and collective decision- making. How such tensions play out in any specific 
area of regulation and whether a more emancipatory knowledge politics – and in 
turn transformative technology policy – can be fostered remain open questions. 
I argue that the emerging sustainability transformation agenda holds considerable 
potential to help foster such a shift, given that it invites a framing of the ways we 
think about technological vulnerabilities, and about socio- technical futures, that is 
fundamentally incompatible with orthodox regulatory approaches. 
 Transgenic crop regulation and the intractability of 
‘incertitude’ 
 More than two decades of protracted conflict and regulatory paralysis in Europe in 
regard to the cultivation of genetically engineered (GE) crops illustrate very well 
how different dimensions of what Stirling ( 2008b ) calls ‘incertitude’ – an unpacking 
of the broad, colloquial notion of ‘uncertainty’ (see  Box 4.1 ) – affect and sometimes 
complicate knowledge production and regulatory decision- making. 
 In the early 1990s, the brand new European transgenic crop regulatory regime 
was typical of most areas of technology regulation:  its remit was to anticipate 
and avoid ‘adverse effects’ on human health and the environment from indi-
vidual technological artefacts, in this case transgenic crop varieties. The need 
for, and the potential benefits of, the new technology did not form part of the 
assessment, but were effectively assumed. Assessment focused, at least initially, on 
anticipating relatively direct forms of (practically measurable or estimable proxies 
for) potential harm, which were then evaluated against the benchmark of damage 
already caused by prevailing technological practice, in this case intensive agricul-
ture. Scientific and regulatory conclusions about the potential ‘risks’ posed by the 
new crop technology were reported as if they were derived from an objective 
assessment of the scientific facts, with little if any acknowledgement of uncer-
tainties, subjective assumptions or limits to what scientists could practically antici-
pate. This way of analytically defining, conducting and representing technology 
regulation was not inevitable, but rather followed the practice that had been 
established almost everywhere in the post- war period (Stirling  2010 ; Millstone 
and van Zwanenberg  2002 ). 
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 BOX 4.1  DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF INCERTITUDE 
 Risk  – possible outcomes and their likelihoods can be reliably estimated 
 Uncertainty  – possible outcomes are clear, but there is no basis for assigning 
probabilities 
 Ignorance  – neither outcomes nor their probabilities can be fully characterised 
 Ambiguity   – probabilities can in principle be characterised, but there is no 
agreement over how to define the possible outcomes  – for example, in 
terms of what the problem is, how the object of regulatory attention is 
bounded and which questions to address 
 Source: Stirling ( 2008b ) 
 Right from the outset the new European regime ran into difficulties. The 
European single market meant that regulations had to be consistent across member 
states, so the new regime was based on the expectation that authorisation of a new 
transgenic crop in one member state would apply across Europe. In practice, unan-
imity proved impossible to obtain. 
 In the early 1990s, several biotechnology firms applied to release novel GE var-
ieties. Regulators in the countries where the applications had been made accepted 
the firms’ claims, based on field trial data, that adverse effects were unlikely. However, 
several other countries immediately dissented, claiming that a broader range of 
plausible potential adverse effects should have been taken into consideration. For 
example, Denmark and Austria objected to the approval in the UK of herbicide- 
tolerant canola (also known as oil seed rape) on the grounds that commercial culti-
vation of that variety might result in an increase in overall herbicide usage and, via 
hybridisation with wild relatives, might create herbicide- tolerant weeds, requiring 
additional herbicides to be used. These effects had been acknowledged as possible 
during the initial approval process in the UK but had been discounted, not on the 
grounds that they were unlikely but because any increase in herbicide usage would 
be a result of crop management practices, and not a  direct harmful effect of the trans-
genic variety itself, and because the emergence of herbicide- tolerant weeds would 
be an ‘agricultural problem’ rather than a cause of ‘environmental harm’ (Levidow 
 2001 ). This was  not a disagreement about how evidence should be interpreted but 
rather reflected  ambiguities regarding how ‘harm’ should be defined and what pre-
cisely the potential ‘problem’ was that regulation ought to be addressing, and there-
fore what issues should properly fall within the boundary of any assessment. The 
reasons why the objectors dissented had to do with their own particular agricultural 
priorities and contexts. Denmark, for example, was trying to reduce agrochemical 
contamination of groundwater, which it relied on for drinking water. 
 The European Commission overruled these kinds of objections and approved 
the new transgenic varieties. Yet the refusal to recognise the validity of these 
objections, and subsequently many others about the scope and analytical framing of 
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assessment, eventually provoked several countries unilaterally to ban crop varieties 
that had already secured Europe- wide approval. As the decade wore on and GE 
crops and food became increasingly contentious, a range of broader concerns about 
the ‘problem’ posed by transgenic crops began to find expression in public debates. 
For example, the Italian parliament emphasised the risks of dependence on multi-
national firms and the threat to traditional crop varieties (Levidow  2009 ). But these 
were not issues that regulators were permitted to consider. 
 The more familiar issue of technical  uncertainty was also utterly pervasive. 
Consider, for example, the potential problem described above of the hybridisation 
of transgenic canola with wild relatives, creating herbicide- tolerant weeds. Although 
we know that transfer of canola genes to weedy relatives can occur, measurements 
of pollen flow at 100 metres from transgenic canola have varied across different data 
sets by nine orders of magnitude (Meyer  et al.  2005 ). Estimates of the frequency 
of gene transfer will also depend heavily on contingent management practice, and 
the development of resistant weeds by selection will also depend on herbicide use 
practices by farmers, which are also highly variable. As Meyer and colleagues put 
it:  ‘obvious problematic effects … can be identified. To what extent they should 
be regarded as harmful to the environment is a matter of interpretation. Credible 
probability calculations cannot be made’ (Meyer  et al.  2005 : 237). 
 In such circumstances, subjective judgements have to be invoked if the 
conclusions of assessments are not to remain chronically open- ended. For example, 
what kinds and qualities of evidence are  sufficient to conclude that herbicide- tolerant 
weeds will emerge as, say, a serious environmental problem? Regulatory institutions’ 
responses to such uncertainties were contentious, but not only because the neces-
sarily subjective judgements deployed were invariably represented as flowing from 
the scientific ‘facts’. 
 In addition, several critics argued that such judgements were deployed inconsist-
ently, with evidence suggestive of harm assumed to be ‘insufficient’ far more readily 
than evidence indicative of the absence of harm (Hilbeck  et al.  2012 ; Levidow  2001 ). 
In the late 1990s, for instance, a laboratory study on the ecological effects of transgenic 
insecticidal maize reported significant mortality among lacewing butterfly larvae 
(a beneficial predator insect often found in maize fields) that had been fed on another 
species of caterpillar that was first raised on GE maize leaves. UK advisers did not 
challenge these experimental findings but argued that the laboratory study was not a 
realistic representation of the field situation – for example, because the larvae would 
have had a more varied diet in real- world conditions, and would therefore have 
been exposed to less GE maize (Wynne  2006 ). Critics pointed out that ‘although 
such hypotheses were not unreasonable’ they were almost exclusively made about 
studies that indicated potential harm: laboratory- based observations that suggested 
there was no harm from new transgenic plant varieties were routinely taken to be an 
adequate representation of real field situations (Wynne  2006 ; Levidow  2001 ). 
 Ignorance about the consequences of cultivating GE crops was an even more 
formidable problem, but it was barely recognised as such, and its implications were 
neglected. By definition, ignorance cannot be identified except after the fact, but it 
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is interesting to observe how scientists and regulators sometimes diminished earlier 
states of ‘institutional ignorance’, in the sense that categories of adverse effect or 
causal pathways of harm that were not initially recognised by regulators (and so were 
not made the subject of questioning) were later discovered. The above example of 
the lacewing butterfly larvae study illustrates this point. Early regulatory- scientific 
studies of the possible effects of insecticidal GE maize on ‘non- target harm’ were 
based on investigating the  direct effects of the insecticidal toxin expressed in GE 
maize varieties on beneficial insects (Levidow  2003 ). Those tests had found no add-
itional harm from the GE maize. However, experimental tests were later performed 
by a university on carnivorous insects (i.e., the lacewing larvae study) further along 
the food chain in what is called a tri- trophic test (i.e., involving the plant, a pest and 
a predator). This more  indirect causal pathway did indicate harm, in ways that had 
not been previously recognised or considered. 
 This example of institutional ignorance is entirely normal. Anticipatory regu-
latory knowledge about the consequences of commercially growing GE plants, 
based on small numbers of field trials and laboratory studies, has no chance of 
adequately capturing the complexity, contingency and variety of the conditions 
of actual commercial use. In part this is because of a host of practical constraints 
on what can be practically explored, but it is also because of normal scientific and 
regulatory commitments to particular kinds of theoretical models, testing methods 
and assumptions (Wynne  1992 ). Such commitments  are sometimes questioned and 
enlarged, as part of a normal healthy process of scientific learning, as in the above 
 example – although it is telling that in that case the prevailing experimental design 
was only re- examined by a non- regulatory- scientific institution in a context of 
intense public concern about the new crop technology. 
 A window of opportunity? 
 Intra- European disputes over the licensing of GE crops, particularly in relation to 
competing understandings as to what precisely the potential ‘problem’ was with the 
new crop technology, and therefore what kinds of questions ought to be explored, 
but also over what should count as adequate or sufficient evidence of safety, posed a 
serious challenge to the prospects of arriving at common regulatory decisions. One 
response would have been to recognise the challenges of incertitude, which were 
increasingly obvious, and which social scientists, NGOs and some protagonists had 
helped highlight. Taking those challenges seriously would have entailed making 
explicit and justifying  – and if necessary renegotiating  – the inevitable norma-
tive assumptions that are part and parcel of regulatory- scientific assessment. This 
would have entailed, for example, debating what burdens of proof were appro-
priate in particular situations of technical uncertainty, or what the relevant scientific 
questions to ask should be, given ambiguity over the potential problems posed by 
GE crop technology. Taking ignorance seriously might have involved adopting a 
less hubristic representation of what anticipatory assessment can achieve, and might 
have involved trying to nurture a learning culture within regulatory institutions. 
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 Initially, it appeared that something approaching these kinds of responses might 
be forthcoming. By the late 1990s, concerns about the safety and acceptability of 
GE crops had exploded as a public issue across Europe. Environment ministers from 
several member states refused to support any more applications for new crop var-
ieties until substantial revisions to the legislation were made. Ministers demanded 
that a wider range of potential risks be considered in applications – in particular, 
indirect effects that arise from the changed agricultural practices associated with 
a GE crop. They also wanted an obligation to monitor crops after approval, the 
rationale being to check for any adverse consequences that had not been discovered 
in experimental field trials, and for food and animal feed produced using GE plants 
to be traceable throughout the product chain, in order to ensure that food could be 
withdrawn if new evidence emerged regarding unknown health hazards (Levidow 
 et al.  2005 ). Interestingly, these latter proposed revisions showed a recognition of 
ignorance about the potential consequences of agricultural biotechnology com-
mercialisation, and an institutional attempt to try to diminish our vulnerability to 
such ‘unknown- unknowns’ (Wynne  1992 ). 
 New legislation incorporating all of these demands came into force in 2001. 
This occurred in the wake of the BSE or ‘mad cow’ crisis of 1996, shortly after 
which it became clear that profound uncertainty about whether the cattle dis-
ease might be transmitted to humans had been entirely glossed over by ministers 
and officials, in both the UK and within the European Commission. In the 
wake of the BSE crisis many regulatory institutions began to emphasise how 
important it was from now on that the institutions responsible for the assessment 
of scientific evidence should be ‘independent’ and that scientists should ensure 
that levels of uncertainty should be explicitly identified and communicated in 
plain language to decision- makers, and that any assumptions should be expli-
citly documented (OST  2005 ). A key driver of these reforms was the actions of 
government chief scientists, who had been alarmed not only by the potential 
catastrophe of BSE but also by the way in which ‘science’ had been used as pol-
itical cover for ministers and officials throughout the saga (van Zwanenberg and 
Millstone  2005 ). 
 Reasserting orthodoxy at the European Commission 
 In practice, however, a more intellectually honest treatment of incertitude was 
not forthcoming. Instead, the Commission and its advisers attempted to reassert a 
modified version of the orthodox, technocratic depiction of regulation, although – 
in a partial concession – regulation was now split into two distinctive parts: ‘risk 
assessment’, which was represented as a policy- free, objective scientific endeavour, 
and ‘risk management’, which involved some normative decisions (Millstone  2009 ). 
Levidow ( 2017 ) notes how many senior people at the Commission had diagnosed 
the conflicts over GE crop assessment and decision- making over the previous 
decade as arising from national politics interfering with the proper scientific basis of 
risk regulation. New legislation introduced a centralised procedure of authorisation 
by the European Commission (Dolezel  et al.  2011 ), and the idea was that the new 
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European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) would now play a more central role in sci-
entific assessment of GE crops, while risk management would be the responsibility 
of the European Commission. As Directorate- General for Health and Consumers 
Commissioner David Byrne put it in 2002:
 [EFSA’s] independence will ensure that scientific risk assessment work is not 
swayed by policy or other external considerations. … [The development of 
EFSA’s reputation for independence and excellence] will put an end to com-
petition in such matters among national authorities in the Member States. We 
have seen evidence of this in the past and I hope that it will over time become 
a thing of the past (Byrne  2002 : 3– 4). 
 However, the new role for EFSA only exacerbated intra- European disputes. After 
several new transgenic crop varieties were approved by the Commission in the 
2000s, Germany, France, Austria and Italy declared national prohibitions on their 
cultivation, which they were permitted to do under a ‘safeguard clause’ if new 
scientific information demonstrated a risk to human health or the environment. 
EFSA concluded that all the prohibitions lacked sufficient scientific evidentiary 
support and the Commission ruled that the bans were illegal – although none of 
the member states concerned backed down. 
 The unilateral bans had been made for the same kinds of reasons that had under-
pinned disputes in the previous decade: disagreements over which effects should 
count as ‘adverse’, and over what should count as meaningful or adequate or rele-
vant evidence for a risk assessment (Levidow  2017 ; Wickson and Wynne  2012 ). 
EFSA’s role was thus critical in facilitating the continuing impasse. For the Agency 
there was only one relevant framing of the scientific- regulatory problem and only 
one plausible interpretation of the evidence, namely its own. Its own scientific 
guidelines required Agency staff to make all assumptions explicit (EFSA  2009 ), but 
in practice it had ignored normative judgements within science, or represented 
them as scientific considerations (Levidow  2017 ). 
 For some analysts, the Commission and EFSA’s ‘normative- free’ sound science 
representation of transgenic crop assessment reflects an entrenched institutional 
commitment to the European single market, which in turn requires a single regula-
tory system and therefore a centralised, standardised risk assessment (Wynne  2006 ). 
For others it is more an attempt by the Commission and EFSA to disguise a pro- 
biotech agenda – the Commission sees biotech as essential for future growth and 
competitiveness – under the guise of unitary science (Levidow 2015; Dolezel  et al. 
 2011 ). Yet others point to naive beliefs in the political neutrality and universality 
of regulatory science on the part of some scientists and officials, and in particular 
in the scientistic assumption that science ought to define the human meaning of 
issues such as GE crop innovation. In this reading, any concerns other than those 
identified by officially sanctioned scientific institutions must be illegitimate ‘hidden 
interests’ and ‘anti- scientific’, especially if they are not exclusively about public 
or environment health but extend to cover public concerns about the political- 
economic effects, or drivers, of GE crop innovation (Wynne  2014 ). 
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 Additional explanations are not necessarily incompatible with any of the above. 
For example, Commission officials may have concluded that it was too politically risky 
to acknowledge openly the contingent and highly uncertain nature of regulatory- 
scientific knowledge because it could then become very difficult to draw a line and 
prevent further, endless deconstruction of whatever claims were officially sanctioned. 
The political risk here is not just that institutions are unable to pretend that conten-
tious policy decisions can be justified solely by recourse to evidence, but that events 
may quickly spiral out of control. An explicit acknowledgement that we cannot pre-
dict future impacts might lead logically to demands for expensive or burdensome 
controls, or to politically problematic questions being posed, such as ‘why then are 
we supporting this technology?’, ‘what and whose needs is it designed to satisfy?’ and 
‘what are the alternatives?’ It is far easier politically, perhaps, to insist that knowledge 
claims are universal and complete. British officials often made this kind of political 
calculation during the BSE saga, for instance (van Zwanenberg and Millstone  2005 ). 
 Pesticide regulation and the sustainability 
transformation agenda 
 In attempting to impose a singular meaning of ‘risk’, and a single analytical 
treatment of it, on multiple European countries with diverse sets of concerns and 
agricultural priorities, European GE crop regulation has scuppered any prospect 
of common regulatory decisions. By contrast, in the field of pesticide regulation 
standard approaches to risk regulation have been stretched to accommodate a much 
wider analytical framing. A significant factor influencing this is the emerging sus-
tainability transformation agenda, which has challenged some long- held ortho-
doxies in pesticide regulation. 
 In 2011, two new pieces of European legislation on pesticide approval and pesti-
cide use came into force (EC  2009a ;  2009b ). The new legislation contained four 
novel regulatory measures that drive a coach and horses through the traditional 
analytical treatment of pesticide regulation. These are to: 
•  use  hazard- based cut- off criteria to prohibit all pesticides that exhibit the intrinsic 
potential of serious toxicity or persistence; 
•  use  comparative hazard assessment to substitute authorised chemical pesticide uses 
for the least hazardous alternatives, including non- chemical techniques; 
•  promote  non- chemical pest management , specifically organic farming and 
•  establish  integrated pest management in all agricultural practice (in which bio-
logical, agronomic and physical forms of insect, weed and fungal control are 
given priority over chemical control). 
 The new measures represent a profound challenge to the central regulatory tenet 
that anticipatory risk assessment provides a sufficiently reliable and complete basis 
upon which to anticipate and control potential harm from the commercial use of a 
technology. Consider, for example, the new hazard- based cut- off criteria measure, 
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which means that the intrinsic toxic potential or persistence of a compound 
becomes grounds for prohibition. The traditional risk- based approach would also 
involve estimating the likely exposure to the compound under different conditions 
of use and to different populations; it would model and estimate dose- response 
relationships based on experimental rodent studies, and then derive estimates of 
the magnitude of potential harm to humans under different use scenarios, as the 
basis upon which regulatory decisions are taken. That orthodox approach is, how-
ever, afflicted by persistent uncertainties because numerical estimates of the mag-
nitude of harm at different levels of exposure (or more typically the derivation of 
a threshold level of exposure that constitutes ‘no harm’) are usually impossible to 
derive without deploying a series of cumulative, entirely subjective assumptions 
(Bailar and Bailar  1999 ). They are also vulnerable to ignorance  – for example, 
because relevant exposure pathways may be entirely unknown (Wynne  1992 ). 
 The adoption of a hazard- based approach (long advocated in the literature on 
precautionary forms of appraisal, see Lofstedt  2011 and Harremo ë s  et  al.  2001 ) 
does not avoid vulnerability to incertitude. Important forms of toxicity may be 
unknown and therefore remain untested. Yet it substantially diminishes such vulner-
ability, for the reasons provided above. It errs on the side of caution, on the grounds 
that we are unlikely to be able reliably to identify thresholds of safe exposure to 
compounds that are, for instance, carcinogens or endocrine disruptors, or to ensure 
that actual use of such compounds will conform to regulatory assumptions about 
working practice. 
 The particular formulation of the measure on comparative hazard assessment 
under these new pieces of European legislation  – in which non- chemical 
techniques of pest control must be included as a comparator  – also demolishes 
another orthodox regulatory tenet:  the traditional bounding of the ‘object’ of 
regulatory scrutiny as only involving individual technological artefacts. Yet that 
bounding is ambiguous. There is no scientific reason why, instead, the object of 
regulatory attention should not extend to multiple artefacts (and their synergies 
and interactions), or an entire technological system or technological trajectory or, 
as in the new European legislation, an artefact assessed by comparison with alterna-
tive technological or policy means of obtaining the same social goal. Indeed, since 
the greater scope of specificity of such a comparative approach would be more 
scientifically rigorous, the real reason for restricting attention in the conventional 
approach must be recognised instead as expediency, in favour of the privileged 
interests whose particular innovations receive such singular treatment. 
 More generally, the combination of the four new measures under the new legis-
lation – which both increase regulatory pressure to withdraw existing chemical 
technologies and support the creation of non- chemical alternatives – effectively 
defines the entire system of chemical pesticide- based crop production itself as a 
source of vulnerability, even though that system is based on approved pesticides. The 
purpose of regulation is no longer the orthodox one of ‘optimising’ supposedly self- 
unfolding pathways of chemical pesticide- based agricultural production, but rather 
of redirecting those pathways and transforming agricultural production. 
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 What, then, prompted this much wider analytical framing of pesticide regula-
tion? The novel assessment measures were drafted by Green Party Members of the 
European Parliament on the European Parliament’s Environment, Public Health 
and Food Safety Committee, and then steered through the legislative process 
with the support of some of the smaller EU states (Bozzini  2017 ; Panke  2012 ). 
The measures were strongly informed by ideas about precautionary forms of 
technology appraisal, and specifically long- standing concerns about the failure of 
orthodox pesticide regulation to anticipate and control threats to human health 
and the environment (Bozzini  2017 : 66). In 2019, the committee emphasised the 
central role of pesticides in the collapse in insect species, farmland birds and other 
biodiversity, and argued that current dependence on pesticides was ‘incompatible 
with sustainable agriculture’ (European Parliament  2019 : 3). It described the new 
legislation as ‘a prerequisite for … accomplishing a transition towards sustain-
able agriculture’ ( ibid. :  11). Here, then, we see a new political context, shaped 
by the rise of precautionary thinking, and by the emerging ‘sustainability trans-
formation’ agenda, and which, in response to existential environmental threats, 
seeks to reframe the traditional regulatory focus, moving from the management 
of individual technologies to fostering transformative socio- technical change 
(cf. Intergovernmental Science- Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services  2019 ). 
 A reassertion of orthodoxy? 
 Unsurprisingly, the new measures were heavily criticised by many governments and 
by the chemical pesticide industry, both before and after the legislation came into 
force. In 2008, for example, the UK’s Pesticide Safety Directorate objected to the 
then proposed hazard- based cut- off criteria, insisting that ‘no meaningful benefits 
to public health protection from any criteria, beyond those delivered by the existing 
risk assessment arrangements, have been demonstrated’ (cited in Bozzini  2017 : 71). 
Those remarks are a defence of the fundamental orthodox regulatory assumption 
that asserted risk parameters, and their supposed means for definitive quantification, 
provide an entirely adequate basis for control – an assumption that, of course, the 
new legislative measures fatally undermine. 
 Tellingly, the UK government has interpreted the legislative obligation to estab-
lish integrated pest management in all agricultural practice as an issue of economic 
optimisation, rather than as a means of reducing harm, on the basis that risk- based 
regulatory approval of pesticides already adequately manages safety (Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs  2012 ). It has therefore made minimal efforts 
to support the adoption of integrated pest management, suggesting instead that this 
should be a voluntary option for utility- maximising farmers. As with GE crop regu-
lation, explicit recognition of the challenges of incertitude, and the implications 
this logically entails for broadening the scope and ambition of regulatory decision- 
making, has prompted a reaction on the part of some jurisdictions to reassert an 
orthodox technocratic depiction of regulation. 
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 It remains unclear how this will play out. The European Parliament has described 
how, in the eight years since the new legislation came into force, implementation 
has become bogged down in arguments about the desirability, precise meaning and 
practical implications of many of the proposed new objectives (European Parliament 
 2019 ;  2018 ). The introduction of the hazard- based ‘cut- off ’ assessment of substances 
was delayed to 2014, and five years later had resulted in the prohibition of only one 
pesticide active ingredient; meanwhile several member states and the agro- chemical 
industry have been lobbying to drop the use of the hazard- based cut- off assessment 
altogether. Comparative assessment began in 2015, but so far no compounds have 
been substituted for safer alternatives. Little progress, in most member states, has 
been made on encouraging the use of alternative pest control techniques or the 
adoption of integrated pest management. Instead, there has been an increase in the 
overall volume of chemical pesticide use across the EU as a whole ( ibid. ). 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that the contemporary politics of technology regulation 
play out through a key tension: between an established narrow framing of what is 
at stake in technology regulation, namely the optimisation of singular pathways of 
technological progress based on a control- based vision of risk management, and 
countervailing pressures to challenge those reductionist framings and open up 
questions about technological vulnerability, and ultimately technological choice, to 
wider deliberation and collective decision- making.
The experience of European regulation of transgenic plant varieties shows how 
a key moment of ‘opening up’ was associated with processes of regulatory harmon-
isation, following the creation of the European single market, and the fallout from 
the BSE crisis. In the case of pesticide regulation, new, emergent political processes 
associated with ideas about precaution and the ‘sustainability transformation’ 
agenda have challenged established approaches to assessment. Both cases illustrate 
how contestation over knowledge can unsettle established regulatory practice and 
prompt a broadening of the scope of regulation – radically so in the pesticides case. 
They also illustrate how some institutions and industry bodies have responded by 
trying to reassert an orthodox depiction of knowledge and regulation, thus under-
mining a rationale for more ambitious, potentially transformative, forms of policy. 
 The pesticides case suggests that the sustainability transformation agenda may be 
a particularly significant, emerging aspect of the political contexts that mediate the 
tensions described in this chapter. Propelled onto policy agendas by the twin crises of 
climate breakdown and biodiversity collapse, the significance of the transformation 
agenda is that it invites a framing of the ways we think about technological vulnerabil-
ities and of socio- technical futures that is fundamentally incompatible with orthodox 
regulatory approaches. That agenda focuses policy attention on the vulnerabilities 
posed by entire trajectories of linked socio- technical change, rather than the threats 
presented by individual artefacts; on questions about what kinds of futures we want, 
rather than the assumption that there is a single deterministic pathway of progress and 
70 Patrick van Zwanenberg
on questions about the multiple contending pathways involved in getting there, and 
so the importance of appreciating plural knowledge and deliberating among different 
options, rather than denial of ambiguity. Above all, it undermines the orthodox 
assumption that regulation can adequately anticipate and control the vulnerabilities 
posed by our unfolding technological futures. If that were so, why is there an urgent 
need to transform established socio- technical practice? 
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 CONTROL, MANAGE OR COPE? 
 A politics for risks, uncertainties and 
unknown- unknowns 
 Emery Roe 
 Introduction 
 My discussion of a politics of uncertainty is best begun with a lesson in humility. 
I had the good fortune to be on an interdisciplinary team of researchers investi-
gating the resilience of large- scale socio- technical systems: namely, the chance that 
levees and dikes would breach in the California Delta. I was the team’s policy ana-
lyst, and other team members were from backgrounds in engineering, geographic 
information systems, crisis management and the social sciences. While this was an 
important US National Science Foundation project, we had been on big research 
projects and interdisciplinary teams before. 
 Now, the lesson learned: it was only after a year of regular meetings that the team 
leader and I realised we were operating under very different operating definitions of 
resilience. His was the time to recovery after a levee breach, mine was the ability of 
the levee to absorb shocks before breaching. This was a sobering experience, given 
the decades of experience of those involved and the explicit project focus on resili-
ence. It is also a good example of the impact of ambiguity as outlined in the Stirling 
typology of incertitudes, discussed in the introduction to this book. 
 So, too, definitions of, and assumptions about, risk and uncertainty cannot be 
taken for granted in high- stakes settings across multiple disciplines. No matter 
how often we distinguish between, on the one hand, measurable risks (where 
estimates of the probability and consequences of failure exist) and, on the other 
hand, non- measurable uncertainties (where estimates of the probability or conse-
quence of failure are missing, if not unobtainable), there are those who insist that 
risk and uncertainty are not separable. Arguably the most famous example is ISO 
31000 ‘Risk management – Principles and guidelines’, which states up front: ‘risk 
[is defined as] the effect of uncertainty on objectives’. Of course, the International 
Standard goes into more detail about the probabilities and consequences of failure, 
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but the point of departure in uncertainty is unmistakable. So, too, for ordinary lan-
guage and its deliberate ambiguity when it comes to the terms uncertainty, risk, 
unpredictability, chance and likelihood, among others. 
 This chapter demonstrates that another set of distinctions is as crucial as that 
between risk, uncertainty and the unknown- unknowns of unstudied/ unstudiable 
conditions: it is equally necessary for a politics of uncertainty to distinguish between 
controlling, managing and coping with those risks, uncertainties and unstudied 
conditions. Here, too, however, ordinary language – and its lexicographers – take 
‘control’, ‘manage’ and ‘cope’ as overlapping, if not synonymous on occasion. 
I should not then be as surprised – as I usually am – that when I say ‘manage’ to an 
audience from other disciplines, they think I’m talking about control. Believe me, 
there is nothing further away from my mind at that point than illusions of control! 
 I come from a profession – policy analysis – that has long given up organising 
notions of Weberian hierarchies, and command and control, in favour of – the 
names speak for themselves – muddling through, garbage- can processes, adhoc-
racy, coping agencies, goal displacement with means- as- ends, bricolage and, my 
favourite, managing messes (for more on these notions, see Roe  2013 ). Of course, 
control can and does exist, but for policy analysts such as myself any starting 
assumption that complex systems, let alone contemporary politics and major pol-
icies, can macro- control each important micro- operation is misleading, where not 
outright dangerous. 
 The argument in what follows is that just as it is dangerous to close down demo-
cratic deliberations to risk only, so too is it dangerous to close down that deliber-
ation to the pros and cons of control. A politics of uncertainty recognises that a 
world where risks must always be controlled falls far short of meeting the trans-
formative challenges involved in better managing uncertainties and coping better 
with unstudied/ unstudiable conditions where control is not possible. Indeed, trans-
formation may be all about managing – or coping better – with so- called existential 
risks that cannot be controlled. 
 Preliminaries 
 This chapter’s argument is grounded in research findings on real- time per-
sonnel operating large socio- technical systems – think: critical infrastructures for 
water, energy, telecommunications and transportation (for details see Roe and 
Schulman  2016 ;  2008 ). In ways described later in the chapter, personnel must 
manage real- time operations  precisely because they do not have control of the 
entire system as a system at any one time, and at the same time because coping 
passively with system- wide shocks that are outside of their direct control is also 
not an option. Instead, they must actively manage risks they cannot control, as 
well as actively manage key uncertainties so as to avoid unstudied conditions. 
Moreover, when they find themselves in unstudied conditions, they cope not 
just reactively but by planning the next step ahead. Worse behaviour for a politics 
of uncertainty can be imagined! 
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 What do these professionals mean by control, management and coping? In 
formal terms, control is when the system’s input variance, process variance and 
output variance are rendered low and stable. Think of the nuclear reactor power 
plant:  guns, guards and gates are used to ensure outside inputs are controlled; 
processes within the nuclear station are highly regulated by government to ensure 
few or no mistakes are made (operations and procedures that have not been 
analysed beforehand are not permissible); and the output of the plant – its elec-
tricity – is kept constant, with as low variance as possible (nuclear power is often 
considered the ‘baseload’ for a system, on top of which are added other types of 
electricity generation). 
 The problem now and in the foreseeable future is that the number of crit-
ical infrastructures having low input variance/ low process variance/ low output 
variance are fewer and fewer because of increasing political, economic and social 
unpredictabilities affecting their service provision. Indeed, the very same political, 
economic and social turmoil has undermined older control- centred notions of 
the Frankfurt School’s ‘totally administered society’, Harold Lasswell’s ‘garrison 
state’ and Erving Goffman’s ‘total institutions’  – where key social entities were 
determined by elites (a theme that is also central to academic discussions of totali-
tarian politics and societies). 
 It is the case today that an increasing number of electricity generation sources – 
and very important ones – face high input variability. Deregulation (involving lib-
eralisation and privatisation) of the integrated utilities has brought with it volatile 
electricity markets and prices; and, in addition, environmental factors like the cli-
mate have become more unpredictable. Consequently, operational processes inside 
other power plants have had to become more varied (this being the so- called law 
of requisite variety (Weick  1995 ; Ashby  1952 )), with more options and strategies to 
process and produce what still must be a low- variance output: namely, electricity at 
a regulated frequency and voltage. Coping in these systems embraces cases where 
process variance can no longer be managed to match input variance and/ or where 
output variance is no longer low and stable. Earthquakes, catastrophic fires and tsu-
namis have had just this effect with default of professional behaviour and operations 
to coping behaviour. 
 These initial strategies and types of ‘unpredictabilities’, as infrastructure 
operators would call them, are summarised in  Table 5.1 . To be clear, they are based 
on the observations of and descriptions provided by infrastructure operators in our 
research. 
 Why do these infrastructure distinctions matter for a politics of 
uncertainty? 
 The infrastructures we study, like water, energy and transportation, are mandated 
to operate in a highly reliable fashion – that is, to provide the critical service in 
question safely and continuously even during (or especially during) turbulent times. 
To do so requires the variety of operational approaches just described. In like fashion 
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are politics described as being about – and are expected to be about – underwriting 
and stabilising respective services, and this too requires varieties of power. 
 Further, once you realise that operations in critical infrastructures and in politics 
are undertaken in the face of a host of shared uncertainties and shocks, five inter-
knitted features of infrastructures and politics take on prominence: 
•  First, infrastructures and politics often have the same operational/ 
administrative areas. States and cities, for example, have their own trans-
mission grids and water supplies, including respective political and regula-
tory oversight. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how modern politics could 
be undertaken without foundational infrastructures for telecommunications, 
energy and such like in place. 
•  Second, both infrastructures and politics centre on high stakes . 
Managing uncertainty is a matter of life and death if critical infrastructure ser-
vices fail; the often- related high stakes of politics are visible and central across 
governmental and administrative scales relying on the infrastructures. 
•  Third, managing uncertainty in real- time for infrastructures is an 
ever- present challenge, as it is in politics. If you cannot manage non- 
measurable uncertainties now when it matters, why would we believe your 
promises to control or cope with them better later on? 
•  Fourth, non- measurable uncertainties, and not just measurable risks, 
are to be managed in infrastructures and in politics. Politicians and 
 TABLE 5.1  Forms of unpredictability: definitions and outcomes 
 Type of 
unpredictability 
 Definition  Type of operational 
approach 
 Outcome 
 Risk  Probability and 
consequences of 
failure are known 
and estimated 
 Control  Low and stable output 
variance through keeping 
low input variance and 
low process variance 
 Uncertainty*  Either probability 
or consequences 
of failure are 
unknown or not 
estimated 
 Manage  High input variance 
matched by high process 
variance to ensure 
low and stable output 
variance 
 Unknown- unknowns  Neither probability 
nor consequences 
of failure are 
known for 
estimating 
 Cope  High and unstable 
output variance and/ 
or inadequate process 
variance to match input 
variance 
 * This definition, consonant with how infrastructure operators see uncertainty, is less expansive than 
‘uncertainty’ in the Stirling framework (Stirling 2010). Note also that the operator term ‘unknown- 
unknowns’ does not capture the subjective and intersubjective features conveyed by ‘ignorance’. 
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reliability professionals (including their staffs) manage real- time uncertainties 
in ways that do not stand or fall on undertaking formal risk assessment or 
standard methodologies. Also, it is notable that the ‘public interests’ of large, 
critical infrastructures – ensuring system- wide safety and reliability across pol-
itical settings  – necessitate sensitivities to different types of uncertainty, and 
their respective management. 
•  Fifth, the inevitably major role for real- time uncertainty management 
remains under- appreciated when it comes to the craft of politics, as 
well as the craft of infrastructure operations. Some discipline- based or 
science- based experts and academics tend to dismiss the professionalism, domains 
of practice and processes for managing large socio- technical systems and politics. 
 You can think of real- time managers of infrastructures operating in the same way 
as those in policy- making and politics who have learned that managing a mess in 
policy and management (stopping a good mess from going bad or preventing a bad 
one from getting worse) may be far better than trying to clean that mess up once 
and for all. Why? Because attempts at achieving a ‘once and for all solution’ can and 
often do make major policy messes more difficult to manage (Roe  2013 ). In the field 
of critical infrastructures, you see this recognition that management is not control 
but must be more than coping reactively in the shift from the terminology of ‘con-
trol rooms’ and ‘control operators’ to, for example, ‘operations centres’ and the more 
accurate job titles of ‘dispatchers’ and ‘schedulers’. In order to avoid any confusion 
with ‘controllers’, my research colleague, Paul Schulman, and I have termed such 
infrastructure operators and their real- time support staff ‘reliability professionals’. 
 More detailed argument 
 Since ‘control’ and ‘manage’ are perceived differently, senior staff in some 
infrastructures we have researched make a big point about how risk controls 
(read: compliance) are not the whole of risk management. As one high- level risk 
manager for a large energy utility put it:
 The approach we’ve taken is that compliance is the first step in risk manage-
ment. Compliance requirements that are in place are our first obligation in 
risk management. It’s the minimum that we built the rest of our enterprise 
risk management on. You can do more than just compliance. So compliance 
and risk management aren’t two separate things, where we do one and then 
the other. You do both at the same time. 
 For example, we do risk management with respect to compliance:  We 
determine how comfortable we are with respect to our controls for compli-
ance. What problems are there in our compliance programmes? Where do we 
stand in respect to industry standards or even better on this? (From transcript 
of an interview held on 30 March 2015, with the senior manager of a risk 
enterprise unit of a major northern California utility). 
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 This difference between control and management of risks is graphically displayed 
in  Table 5.2 : 
 Since no existing compliance measure or preset risk control can be expected to 
be 100 per cent effective, the cell ‘Control/ Risks’ in  Table 5.2 is lightly shaded and 
must be complemented by ‘Manage/ Risks’, the darker shaded cell, for risks that 
cannot be controlled in real- time or must not be assumed to be controllable right 
now, when it matters. For example, it is because tomorrow’s heat wave is uncontrol-
lable that electric and natural gas grids have to manage the added load requirements 
for, and associated risks relating to, assets and personnel. 
 Such management strategies for measurable risks, we found in our research, 
include having a range of subject matter experts and outside certification programmes 
and reviews for process safety management and risk management protocols – again, 
as a way of increasing process options and strategies to match an increasing input 
variance. The crux, though, is that even in managing risks, the reliability professionals 
do not rely solely on a single distribution of numbers. Numerical averages and ranges 
wobble, and this has to be compensated for by experienced and skilled reliability 
professionals. 
 It is not only risks that have to be managed because it is dangerous to assume 
they can be controlled: key non- measurable uncertainties must also be managed. 
Infrastructure operators typically distinguish uncertainties in terms of missing 
estimates for the probability or consequence of failure. Since the estimate of risk 
is defined as the product of the estimates of the probability and consequence of 
failure, uncertainties are cases where operators have (rough) estimates of probabil-
ities and consequences of failure, but not for both at the same time. The same 
follows when the logic of risk is cast in terms of threats, exposures and vulnerabil-
ities. Real- time infrastructure operators may have better knowledge of the prob-
ability of failure than they do of the consequences of failure; alternatively, they may 
have better knowledge of consequences than of probability. 
 Over and over again in our research, and to complicate our initial definition of 
‘uncertainty’ ( Table 5.1 ), real- time operators told us they were able to manage uncer-
tainties about which they may know something more about their consequences 
than they do about their likelihoods, or  vice versa . Where utilities know more about 
probabilities of failure than the expected consequences of failure, we found one 
management strategy to be planning for or preparing around worst- case scenarios 
 TABLE 5.2  Primary approaches to operating for three types of unpredictabilities 
   Objective of operational approach 




 Control    
 Manage    
 Cope    
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and extra safeguards. Where more is known about the consequences of failure 
than the likelihood of failure, one management strategy (also for increasing process 
variance) is the expanded use of simulation studies and of investments in uncer-
tainty reduction with respect to the probability of failure. For example, ‘deep dives’ 
into specific cases are undertaken by experienced personnel – and not just subject 
matter specialists. The cell ‘Manage/ Uncertainties’ has a darker shade in  Table 5.2 , 
to reflect this primary approach. 
 In case it needs saying, for a world where events are sometimes uncontrollable, 
and in other cases unmanageable (i.e., process options and strategies cannot be 
increased to reflect increased input variance), there are instances where neither the 
probability nor consequences of failure are known or studiable under the demands 
of real- time urgency. (Or, if you prefer, those concerned are at a loss to deter-
mine just what are the threats, exposures and vulnerabilities.) Here is where coping 
behaviour of infrastructure operators in the face of the unknown- unknown is not-
able – but it is coping with a difference. 
 When real- time infrastructure operations suffer a shock that pushes those 
operations into unstudied conditions, the professionals are not only expected to 
be resilient as regards absorbing the shock, they are at the same time expected 
to be planning the next step or operation ahead. They do not want to bounce 
back to the same position that left them vulnerable:  they want to bounce for-
ward to better real- time operating conditions. This coping is  coping- ahead in 
the face of real- time unknown- unknowns (darker shade in  Table  5.2 ), since it 
involves planning above- and- beyond reactions in real- time. One such coping- 
ahead strategy that is directed to planning the next steps for real- time operations 
is the routine use of variously named ‘white hat’ teams that are internal to the 
infrastructure. These teams seek to find ways to undermine real- time system 
operations so as to anticipate more effectively – predict  and prepare for – defects 
that are exploitable by system attack, intentional or otherwise. Planning ahead 
for addressing defects becomes a template – imperfect as it must be for what are 
unknown- unknowns  – when responding later on to what are encountered in 
real- time as functionally similar defects. 
 An emancipatory politics of uncertainty? 
 This chapter now shifts its register from the descriptive to the normative. The oper-
ational strategies and unpredictabilities that society’s critical infrastructures seek to 
handle better are also necessary for the successful enactment of policy. To do other-
wise, I suggest, is to open politics to more catastrophe. 
 Return to  Table 5.2 and its highlighted cells. I ask you to see the highlighted 
cells as principal stepping- stones along a pathway for addressing unpredictabilities 
in complex, high- stakes systems and processes. (Note the accent on ‘principal’ 
leaves aside any complications arising when the empty cells in  Table 5.2 are not 
empty.) I  submit that to take a politics of uncertainty seriously centres on dem-
onstrating – constantly – behaviour that recognises the need to better cope- ahead 
with unknown- unknowns, that recognises the need to manage some uncertainties 
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and risks better than they are now being managed and that recognises control of 
all this is not possible, where attempts to exert such control create grave political 
hazards instead. 
 This politics of uncertainty is, as such, a full- time job for those who treat the 
politics seriously. How then is it emancipatory? William Kentridge, painter and 
artist, provides an insight. To the interview question, ‘You’ve been called the patron 
saint of ambiguity. How do you feel about that?’, he responded:
 How do I feel? Ambiguous: I like it and I don’t like it. I wish some things 
could be much clearer that one holds onto without any doubts.  I’m wary 
of certainty, but I’m very weary of uncertainty, also (quoted in Buck  2016 [my 
italics]). 
 I adapt his insight – wariness of certainties (namely, the pretence to certainty that 
full control of major politics and policies is achievable) and weariness of having 
continually to manage and cope- ahead  – as the starting point for a politics of 
uncertainty. This starting point forces us then to ask:  why put up with wari-
ness and weariness? What keeps ‘us’ going? What do we get from these multiple 
unpredictabilities and having to address them in multiple ways? 
 For me, the wariness and weariness are associated with emancipation: emancipa-
tion from thinking there is no alternative, and emancipation from thinking complex 
policy problems are wicked and as such intractable. The world cannot be controlled 
to be only one way; it is far too complex for that, with many components, each 
component having multiple functions (I am a husband, father, blogger…), and the 
many interconnections between and among components, functions and the wider 
environments in which these are embedded enable all manner of interpretations, 
explanations and descriptions. No single reading can cover, let alone exhaust, that 
complexity. 
 The upshot of this inexhaustibility is that complex problems can be cast in mul-
tiple ways; or to come at it from another direction, any complex problem that has 
no description other than ‘there’s no alternative’, ‘it’s intractable’ or ‘it’s a wicked 
problem’ is an exaggeration that has closed down discussion and analysis long before 
any insights into alternative possibilities have been obtained. More, those alternative 
descriptions lie in knowing better than striving for complete control and instead 
undertaking managing and coping- ahead. Knowing that this is so and acting on the 
knowledge is, for me, the hard work of emancipating new possibilities. Some would 
call this recasting of emancipatory possibilities transformative. 
 Note how different this politics of uncertainty is from the politics of the techno- 
managerial elites deploying concepts like ‘uncertainty’ for instrumental advantage, 
or the politics of international corporations who see uncertainty as blind- eye vola-
tility for capitalist growth, or a conservative politics permanently sceptical of any-
thing like implementing remedies. In the next section, I explore an example of how 
recasting and transformation can work. 
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 Recasting global climate change locally 
 Let us assume the situation is one of ‘too little/ too late’ with respect to ameliorating 
global climate change in global ways. I do this not because I  insist it to be true; 
rather, let us assume this is the worst- case scenario and see if we can, nevertheless, 
recast it in ways that make it more tractable to positive intervention. If we can recast 
a worst case by appealing to the distinctions in the pathway of control, management 
and coping- ahead just discussed, then other scenarios are opened to recasting as 
well in the face of the very real global climate change now underway. 
 There are many ways in which the  Table  5.2 pathway can be used to recast 
the too- little/ too- late worst- case scenario without denying any of its urgency or 
validity. Time and space allow for just one illustration. Let us take as our point of 
departure a recent major review of the published research on the impacts of climate 
change (Mora  et al .  2018 ). Here is what the review article concludes in its main text:
 Our assessment of the literature yielded a small number of positive and neu-
tral responses of human systems to climate hazard exposure (reviewed in 
Supplementary Note 2). We surmise that the reduced number of positive or 
neutral impacts may be real, but may also reflect a research bias towards the 
study of detrimental impacts (discussed under Caveats in the Methods). This 
small set of positive and neutral impacts, however, cannot counter- balance 
any of the many detrimental impacts that were uncovered in our literature 
search, particularly when many of these impacts are related to the loss of 
human lives, basic supplies such as food and water, and undesired states for 
human welfare such as access to jobs, revenue and security. 
 Let us go now to the article’s Caveats subsection for details:
 Although our survey of the literature yielded some case examples of 
adaptations, positive and differential impacts (Supplementary Note 2), these 
are unlikely to reflect the full scope of the adaptations, opportunities and 
trade- offs associated with climate hazards. The large array of cases that we 
uncovered with a systematic literature search on only climatic impacts 
suggests that a better understanding of those issues (adaptations, positive and 
differential impacts) will require their own comprehensive analyses. 
 If the reader’s curiosity is piqued, they will turn to Supplementary Note 2, where 
the following passage is found. (Because this passage is long, the temptation will 
be to skim it. However, the following recasting depends on the reader giving close 
attention to the examples.)
 Although the majority of reported impacts were deleterious to humanity, 
some climate hazards led to beneficial impacts and in other cases no observ-
able responses. Reduction in malaria transmission in Senegal and Niger was 
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attributed to loss of mosquito breeding habitats brought about by drought 
and habitat loss. Drought and storms occasionally increased nutrient content 
in surviving crops, whereas drought in neighboring countries increased avail-
ability of game animals in Namibia. Drought and natural land cover change 
were in some cases reported to improve water quality due to decreased 
nutrient runoff into streams. Warming reduced seasonal affective disorders, 
and mortality during winters, although the latter is controversial and unlikely 
to outnumber increases in heat- related mortality. Flood exposure increased 
social trust, and the likelihood of people to vote. Changes in ocean chem-
istry altered the distribution of marine organisms increasing availability in 
certain fisheries. Warmer temperatures have increased tourism flow toward 
colder destinations in the UK and the Alps. The Alaskan whale watching 
industry benefited from changes in ocean chemistry leading to changes in 
whale migration patterns, allowing for longer viewing seasons. Since the 
1970s, there has been significant sea ice reduction in the Arctic providing 
increasingly navigable waters and shortening the shipping distances between 
ports. There were also cases where changes in climate hazards did not result 
in observable responses. For instance, societal impacts of floods and storms 
have not been found to contribute to the onset of civil conflict as changes in 
other hazards have. [For ease of reading, text footnotes to each finding have 
been deleted.] 
 A close reading of all the passages quoted uncovers a narrative discrepancy in Mora 
 et al. – and we know from policy analysis that such textual discrepancies can be 
the window through which we can re- see a problem differently (Roe  1994 ). In my 
re- reading: how did the ‘large array of cases that we uncovered’ referenced in the 
Caveat and itemised in detail in Supplementary Note 2 become in the main text 
‘[t] he small set of positive and neutral impacts’ that ‘cannot counter- balance  any of 
the many detrimental impacts that were uncovered in our literature search’ (my 
italics)? 
 So put, the question brings into focus the local in ways occluded by the term 
global. The first time you read through the list in Supplementary Note 2, what 
is itemised might look more like classic coping strategies (e.g., drought- induced 
hunger leaving people no choice but to do something). But now consider the list 
when seen through the lens of the more granular differentiation of operational 
strategies in  Table 5.2 . Many of the listed examples begin to look like opportun-
ities for coping- ahead and managing at the local level at which the responses were 
observed. 
 I do not know if the latter is true and I would be the first to agree with the 
authors that more research is needed on the topic of  local positive or neutral 
responses to  global climate change. But therein lies the recasting. An uncontrollable 
climate change globally exhibits a ‘large array’ of  local coping and managing options 
currently under- researched or acknowledged, which admittedly would constitute a 
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‘small set’ of positive or neutral responses  globally . In this recasting, what is ‘too little, 
too late’ at the global level remains open with respect to how late and how little 
this is across a large array of local sites. What better demonstration of a politics of 
uncertainty? 
 Note, finally, that the urgency and validity of the worst- case scenario remain, 
with local particularity persisting in new forms catalysed by global climate change. 
Am I implying then that global climate change turns out to be a ‘good thing’? No. 
Am I saying that the Mora  et al. article is representative of climate change meta- 
analyses? No. Am I saying that all recasting is transformative at the local level? No. 
What I am saying is that the truth of the matter can be pushed further precisely 
because global climate change is complex, locally. Recasting is possible because of, 
not in spite of, the complexity. Further, a large array of local cases could form a 
distribution across which practices may be emerging for local transformations and 
emancipations (the plural is deliberate). 
 Conclusion 
 If the above is roughly on- point, the worst enemy of a politics of uncertainty is that 
assumption – shared by the right and the left – that ‘management is control and 
control is power’. 
 Management is not control, and control is not the only power. Indeed, the 
power of power lies in acting on the fact that illusions of control have to be replaced 
by better notions of managing and coping- ahead in a world of multiple shocks, 
surprises and contingencies. Reverting to formal terms one last time, the desider-
atum of a politics of uncertainty is more about increasing process variance in terms 
of options and strategies than it is about ‘controlling for’ input and output variance. 
(In this way, think of sustainable development as increasing human opportunities 
to respond to unpredictable change without killing ourselves and others in the 
process.) 
 Nor do we do have to invent a politics of uncertainty. In a planet of seven 
billion- plus people, with over 190 nations, it must be assumed practices already exist 
that evince such sensitivities to different types of unpredictabilities or incertitudes, 
along with different strategies with which to address them more effectively. What 
can the rest of us learn from these practices and across other scales than global? 
 Some readers may find the preceding to fall well short of social transformation 
and human emancipation. That may be true as far as it goes, but it does not go 
far enough. Only when we differentiate terms like transformation and emanci-
pation across scales of analysis and action is the matter necessarily pushed further. 
And those wider truths? Just as an emancipatory politics of uncertainty recognises 
that uncertainty and unknown- unknowns cannot be closed down to measurable 
risk, so too do those politics require better differentiation among controlling, man-
aging and coping with those risks, uncertainties and the unknown- unknown of 
unstudied – in real- time, often unstudiable – conditions. 
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 EXPANDING CITIES 
 Living, planning and governing uncertainty 
 Sobia Ahmad Kaker, James Evans, Federico Cugurullo, 
Matthew Cook and Saska Petrova 
 Uncertain cities 
 The twenty- first century is the urban century. Cities are heralded as the places that 
will address climate change, reinvent economic growth and create new forms of 
political and social inclusion. While the city has historically resolved key planning 
problematics through innovative social, political and technical arrangements, cities 
are increasingly challenged by the scale and intensity of contemporary planning 
conundrums. Contemporary cities are chronically underfunded and over burdened, 
home to deeply divided communities and decrepit infrastructure, and struggling 
with chaotic unplanned growth and chronic pollution. These divergent narratives 
of hope and despair spring from a deep uncertainty surrounding the future of 
humanity as an urbanised species. What will the megacities of the future look like 
and how will they cope with unprecedented scale and complexity? What new ways 
of governing, planning and living in cities will emerge to make us happier and 
healthier? Whose responsibility it is to even address these questions? 
 These debates brought the authors of this chapter together to question how 
uncertainty is orienting governments, planners, policy- makers, experts and urban 
residents to approach urban challenges. The outcome of our collaboration is a con-
sideration of how different forms of uncertainty are experienced, determined and 
managed in cities, by whom and based on what types of knowledge and techniques 
of governance. We were interested in excavating the ways in which uncertainty 
stimulates experimental forms of urban development and governance, and what the 
political implications of this are. 
 The contributors to this chapter engage with the concept of uncertainty through 
the vantage point of their own engagements with cities and urbanism. They approach 
the problematic of uncertainty from different perspectives. For example, Sobia 
Kaker and James Evans review how uncertainty is lived, experienced and managed 
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through ordinary urban infrastructures and technologies. They engage with the 
‘street level’ – a form of uncertainty that Sobia Kaker argues is ‘ordinary’. Federico 
Cugurullo and Matthew Cook both focus on the techno- managerial aspects of 
urban governance. In particular, they engage with technological advancements and 
smart cities, and how these present uncertain futures (Federico Cugurullo), or how 
they may offer adaptive, inclusive and innovative solutions to age- old planning 
conundrums (Matthew Cook). Saska Petrova, on the other hand, crosses scales. 
She explores how the coming together of energy precarity – a lived condition of 
individualised suffering – is tied to the intersecting failures of urban planning and 
governance in light of climate change- related uncertainties. 
 The authors also recognise the temporal planes of uncertainty. James Evans 
focuses on the present of uncertainty as an existing condition, while Sobia Kaker 
speaks of uncertainty as an unfolding process that exists along a timeline. In her 
example from Karachi, Sobia Kaker discusses how uncertainty is almost made 
knowable by a forecasting of the future through an experience of the past. Similarly, 
Federico Cugurullo discusses the adoption of innovative yet uncertain transport 
technologies in the past to forecast how they may be adopted in the future. 
 And finally, in their engagement with these issues, each author brings to the fore 
questions around the politics and ethics of living, planning and managing urban 
uncertainty. Saska Petrova discusses how under neoliberal frameworks of governing 
energy deprivation and related uncertainties, the issue of responsibilisation and indi-
vidualisation perpetuates precarity. Meanwhile, Sobia Kaker points out how the 
celebratory valorisation of people’s anticipatory and speculative practices in response 
to ordinary uncertainty shifts attention away from the dismal performance of pol-
itical authorities to ensure citizens’ safety and care. Similarly, Federico Cugurullo 
highlights the political questions of who exerts influence in shaping the emergent 
city, and how far these voices are democratic, while Matthew Cook presents a more 
optimistic picture of technological adaptation as a participatory exercise. 
 The authors each use empirically rich case studies from their ongoing research 
on expanding cities to present five perspectives on urban uncertainties. In the first 
section Sobia Kaker presents her case study of ongoing uncertainty in Karachi in 
Pakistan. In doing so she distinguishes the lived and experienced forms of uncer-
tainty in cities from the techno- scientific/ managerial problematic of uncertainty. 
She terms this everyday form of uncertainty ‘ordinary uncertainty’. By showcasing 
the ways in which everyday information exchange helps urban residents to under-
stand events, speculate how they would unfold and act in the present keeping the 
unfolding future in mind, she illustrates how governing ordinary uncertainty is an 
everyday practice for the urban majority. However, she warns that this social prac-
tice of collaboratively navigating an uncertain future should not be celebrated as a 
triumphant moment of urban capabilities of adapting to chronic crisis, nor should 
it be romanticised as an ideal practice for ensuring urban resilience. She argues that 
it is important to be mindful of the political nature of information exchange within 
an environment of precarity and uncertainty, and to develop alternatives that are 
more grounded in feminist ethics of care. 
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 In the second section James Evans analytically engages with the operation of 
informal motorcycle taxis in Kampala ( boda boda s). He showcases how unplanned 
and self- built transport infrastructures offer a resilient mode of transportation in 
chaotic, uncertain cities. He explains how  boda bodas are sustainable, resilient and 
adaptable modes of transportation which respond to the lived uncertainty that is 
characteristic of ever- expanding African cities. They are more ‘sustainable’ than 
cars, while being highly adaptable in terms of design and as modes of transport, 
and have the potential to reach places that are otherwise disconnected from the 
urban fabric due to badly constructed/ non- existent road networks. He argues 
that, while  boda bodas and similar informal modes of transport are being legislated 
against by municipalities that are keen to conform to an image of modernity and 
rational planning, the fact is that formal alternatives are simply not as respon-
sive to the changing needs of people, or to the unplanned and uncertain urban 
landscape. 
 In the third section Federico Cugurullo discusses the technology of self- 
driving cars, and the layers of uncertainty that the adaptation of this new tech-
nology brings for urban governors. Not only is there uncertainty regarding the 
technology itself (whether it is reliable, effective and safe), but also in relation to 
the uncertain future of the cities within which such technologies will be used. 
How successful will they be and how well will they be integrated within the 
existing urban fabric? How can we plan for the uncertain future of these tech-
nologies in the present? He explains how, in the past, anxieties surrounding the 
adoption of new transport technologies were pushed aside by powerful actors 
who disregarded public concerns to implement their visions of the futuristic city. 
Presenting the example of self- driving/ driverless cars, he argues that a key driver 
of these technologies is their promotion by companies that are invested in smart 
urbanism, and that these companies are already automating the management of 
urban transport infrastructure. 
 In the fourth section, Matthew Cook presents the case of smart city 
developments in Milton Keynes in the UK. He explains how a network of 
IT companies, local business leaders, the Milton Keynes Council, the Open 
University, Future Wolverton (a community benefit organisation) and other gov-
ernment agencies and bodies came together to develop a local vision of ‘smart’ 
for Milton Keynes. He positions the arrival of ‘smart’ in Milton Keynes in relation 
to growing worldwide trends in urban planning. Increasingly, big data is used by 
urban managers to provide agile planning responses to governance conundrums 
in unruly cities. He rejects critiques of smart city visions as being techno- centric 
and totalising, and argues that the development of smart city initiatives in Milton 
Keynes is consistent with the city’s experimental and innovative planning history, 
and is a result of careful negotiation. 
 In the final section, Saska Petrova discusses energy deprivation and inequalities 
in the urban context. She foregrounds issues of ethics and politics as central to her 
discussion. She argues that it is important to use a framework of precarity to under-
stand uncertainty tied to energy provision, especially for vulnerable populations 
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living on the urban margins. She argues that precarity defines the normalisation of 
contemporary energy uncertainty, especially as the issue of energy deprivation is 
increasingly understood to be a domestic and private issue, one that responsibilises 
the individual for their condition. Instead, she argues that urban environmental 
and ecological conditions, political deadlocks, material inequalities and failures in 
planning practices come together to marginalise vulnerable populations, whose 
experience of energy deprivation is magnified by climate change- related uncer-
tainties. She places the responsibility for managing and governing these uncertain-
ties squarely on the shoulders of intersecting political authorities that are implicated 
in its production. 
 Ordinary uncertainty and everyday knowledge: perspectives 
from Karachi 
 Karachi, the Pakistani port city, is a megacity of over 18 million residents. Everyday 
life in the city is prone to frequent disruption as a result of infrastructural break-
down, riots and protests, violent ethno- political/ sectarian conflict, and insecurity 
events tied to criminal or terrorist activities. These events regularly interrupt the 
rhythm of people’s everyday lives, disturb the trajectory of their movements across 
the city, and are generative of an environment of what can be referred to as ‘ordinary 
uncertainty’. 
 ‘Ordinary uncertainty’ is connected to the techno- scientific understanding of 
uncertainty as an unknowable future and, in relation to this, a domain of govern-
mental knowledge production, anticipatory action and politics (Anderson,  2010 ; 
Callon  et al . 2009 ; Adams  et al .  2009 ). But it is also markedly different from such 
conceptions of uncertainty. Instead of understanding it as an exceptional condi-
tion that is articulated, managed and solved by policy- makers, governors and/ or 
formal institutions, ordinary uncertainty shifts the perspective of uncertainty to 
an ordinarily prevailing condition that is at the heart of urban life, as outlined in 
recent debates in urban studies (Zeiderman  et al.  2015 ; Simone  2013 ). To under-
stand uncertainty as ‘ordinary’ we must recognise that the experiential domain of 
uncertainty is very much that of everyday urban life, and that the work of specu-
lation, prediction and governance is an everyday practice for the urban majority. 
 In Karachi, for example, urban residents navigate uncertainty by applying their 
knowledge of a shifting future, learned from futures past. For example, news of 
low- intensity conflict between rival ethno- political parties localised in one part of 
Karachi may cause taxi drivers (particularly ethnically identifiable ones) to hesitate 
regarding taking on customers visiting other parts of the city. Karachiites who have 
experienced similar conflicts in the past know that the contours of security and 
insecurity are quick to shift in a city where ethno- political violence occurs in an 
orchestrated form of ‘ordered- disorder’ (Gayer  2014 ). Taxi drivers who refuse to 
take on customers may have experienced harassment first- hand, or may have heard 
enough stories of ethnically motivated killings of rickshaw and taxi drivers who 
‘trespass’ into ethno- political strongholds to know which routes and places to avoid 
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at what times of day. They are willing to lose some income and a few customers, 
especially since they are able to predict accurately that things will return to normal 
within a couple of weeks. 
 Engagement with such forms of ordinary uncertainty in Karachi resonates with 
scholarship on crisis and uncertainty (McFarlane and Silver  2017 ; Newhouse  2017 ; 
Cooper and Pratten  2014 ; Vigh  2009 ), and reveals that the exchange of informa-
tion is crucial to its navigation. City residents, police, government officials, private 
security actors, news reporters and analysts, and risk assessment officials all follow 
information relating to ongoing insecurity events. They exchange related updates 
either during casual personal interactions with each other, or with the help of 
digital and material technologies, such as social media apps, radios and televisions. 
The circulating information allows participating residents to ‘read’ disruptive situ-
ations, keeping in mind how similar events played out in the past. In doing so, 
Karachiites can speculate on the trajectory of particular events and manage the 
spatio- temporal uncertainties associated with them. This form of experiential risk 
assessment helps urban residents consider whether they should go out into the city, 
what modes of transport they should take, which places/ routes should be avoided, 
how long to avoid them and at what times of day. 
 Although such practices of governing uncertainty mostly work in Karachi, 
we need to be cautious in our celebration of flexibility, adaptive capabilities, 
everyday forms of hedging, and successful cooperation (Newhouse  2017 ; 
Zeiderman  et  al.  2015 ; Simone  2013 ) as successful or ideal forms of man-
agement. It is important not to displace the responsibility for care in man-
aging uncertainty to already stretched communities. Broader research by Kaker 
2017 has carefully analysed relations and processes of information exchange in 
Karachi, and reveals the limits and politics of information exchange. By tracing 
the circulation of information around a particular insecurity event in Karachi, 
the research found that security- related information, which urban residents 
follow attentively, is often perpetuated with purpose. In its exchange, the infor-
mation passes through official and unofficial channels, and may be exaggerated, 
flawed, biased or simply untrue. The socio- technical infrastructures of informa-
tion exchange are unequally structured, and oftentimes information becomes a 
political resource that actors use to achieve personal/ group advantages. In this 
context, the social relations of creating certainty themselves become a source 
of uncertainty. 
 Uncertainty and urban transport 
 Urban life is increasingly uncertain, and cities often look most chaotic at street level. 
Traffic congestion causes harm to billions and jeopardises the planet’s sustainability. 
This is problematic as mobility is a key driver of economic and social development, 
determining access to jobs, goods and services (UN- Habitat  2010 ). In Africa alone, 
350 million more people will live in cities by 2030 (Pieterse and Parnell  2014 ), but 
the region will receive less than 5 per cent of the global investment in transport 
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infrastructure (UN- Habitat  2013 ). In response, unregulated modes of transport 
with flexible fares, schedules and routes – like rickshaws, tuk- tuks, minibuses and 
motorbikes – characterise cities across Asia, Africa and South America (Cervero and 
Golub  2007 ). But, while the majority of city dwellers in the global South rely on 
informal modes of transport for their mobility, these modes of transport are being 
legislated against by municipalities, as they fail to fit frameworks of planning and 
investment. At root, informality – whether it is a rickshaw or a self- built house – 
fails to fit the image of a ‘modern’ city that is synonymous with both automobility 
and the ability to plan. As with slum clearance, banning informal modes of transport 
causes damage to lives and livelihoods, and the formal alternatives are less responsive 
to the needs of rapidly changing populations and urban landscapes. 
 Motorcycle taxis epitomise this tension. While unfamiliar in the West, they are 
used by billions of people across the global South for personal and business trans-
port. For example, in 2010 there were upwards of 200,000 motorcycle taxis serving 
the Ugandan capital of Kampala, home to some 1.5 million people. Offering afford-
able transport to the poor, motorcycle taxis are more efficient in terms of fuel, space 
and maintenance than cars. The bikes themselves are adapted to the landscape, with 
extra seat padding cushioning against potholes and bumpy mud roads, and high 
ground clearance keeping passengers and cargo clear of rough surfaces. Motorcycle 
taxis provide access to peripheral informal settlements, especially during the rainy 
season, when poorer roads and paths often flood (Goodfellow  2015 ). Flexible and 
cheap, they contribute to the connectivity and resilience of the city, being used to 
run errands and to deliver both goods and information, in addition to providing 
personal transport. Motorcycle taxis play a major role servicing hard to reach areas, 
enabling disadvantaged groups to access work and healthcare that is too distant to 
walk (Porter  2014 ). 
 In this way, informal transport is both adapted and highly adaptable to the 
uncertain conditions that characterise life in informal and fast- growing urban areas. 
Manifesting what Abdoumaliq Simone terms the distinctive mobility of the African 
city, where movement is essential to daily survival,  boda bodas support the ‘thickening 
fields of social relations’ (Simone and Abouhani  2005 : 1) that city dwellers depend 
on. Because of this, motorcycle taxis reduce uncertainty for inhabitants, making 
otherwise impermeable urban landscapes permeable. They reflect the actually 
existing city – a highly uncertain and unplanned florescence of self- built (infra)
structures and informal economic activities. Mobility is an emergent capacity that 
flows from the combination of motorbikes, drivers, support industries, topography 
and infrastructure. Understanding how to work with inherent uncertainty in ways 
that support, rather than undermine, livelihoods of both users and providers applies 
not just to transport and mobility, but to all aspects of urban informality. Transport is 
often where these tensions surface as – unlike slums, which are often out of sight – 
informal transportation permeates and defines the experience of an entire city. 
 The challenge of ‘managing’ uncertainty pertains to almost all urban planning. 
Cities are systems that generate uncertainty  – like nuclear power plants or 
industrialised food production systems, but with two differences. First, urban 
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systems are organic in that they are at least partly designed from the bottom up, 
rather than by formal structures of control. Second, uncertainty is a permanent 
lived experience of inhabitants. Rather than an unintended consequence that 
is experienced acutely, but intermittently, uncertainty is a chronic condition in 
cities – distributed, pervasive and known. In this sense, the continuing inability of 
planners and policy- makers to engage meaningfully with uncertainty is particularly 
unfortunate. Population growth, chronic underfunding and lack of space make it 
unfeasible for cities to build their way out of trouble – they must work with what 
already exists. 
 Self- driving cars and uncertain urban designs 
 There is a lot of uncertainty surrounding the technology of self- driving. On 18 
March 2018 a woman was crossing a road in Tempe, Arizona. A self- driving Uber 
car moving along the same road did not perceive her. The autonomous car ran over 
the woman, killing her. Since then, scepticism regarding self- driving cars has been 
voiced by many in the global media, and such scepticism has been confirmed in 
sociological studies looking at the attitudes that people have towards self- driving 
technologies (Cugurullo  et al . 2020 ; Stilgoe  2018 ). Vulnerable road users in par-
ticular, such as pedestrians and cyclists, are afraid of this emerging form of urban 
transport, and these concerns will arguably not disappear until car manufactures like 
Tesla can demonstrate that a car controlled by artificial intelligence is as safe as one 
driven by a human being (Penmetsa  et al .  2019 ; Taeihagh and Lim  2019 ). 
 This layer of uncertainty concerning the extent to which autonomous cars will 
be integrated within the transport portfolio of cities adds to the uncertainty of urban 
design. Historically, changes in urban transport have led to changes in the design of 
cities. In the modernist city of the 1920s, for instance, the popularisation of the car 
triggered the development of highways and arterial roads that revolutionised the 
built environment (Sheller and Urry  2000 ). In the near future, the urban changes 
that the diffusion of autonomous cars might trigger are uncertain. The future is still 
opaque, but there are two possible scenarios that are currently being discussed. On 
the one hand, there is a utopian scenario in which self- driving cars are employed 
via sharing services. Studies indicate that, especially in large metropolitan areas, 
people are open to the idea of sharing an autonomous car, instead of owing one 
(Haboucha  et al .  2017 ; Firnkorn and M ü ller  2015 ; Fagnant and Kockelman  2014 ). 
This attitude could decrease car ownership, improve traffic and, overall, reduce the 
amount of space that is reserved for cars (Duarte and Ratti  2018 ). Many parking 
spaces and roads would become superfluous, and could morph, for example, into 
bike lanes, pedestrian streets or urban gardens: in essence, places for people, rather 
than spaces for cars. 
 On the other hand, the popularisation of autonomous cars could shape a dys-
topian urban future. Autonomous transport promises productive onboard activities: a 
promise that might lead to more and longer commutes (Hawkins and Nurul Habib 
 2019 ). Take the Volvo 360c model, for instance: an autonomous car that can become 
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a bed, a bar or a living room, depending on the needs of the owner. Such self- driving 
technologies could improve the experience of travelling in a car, to the point of 
increasing the demand for cars and for the urban space that they need in the city. 
 Overarching these uncertain urban designs there is arguably a bigger uncer-
tainty: one that covers like a thick mist the politics of the city, where innovation 
in autonomous urban transport takes place. If we go back in time to look at urban 
history we can clearly see that, in the past, dangerous forms of urban transport were 
integrated into the built environment, regardless of the attitudes that people had 
towards them. In the Baroque city, for example, as Lewis Mumford ( 1961 :  368, 
370)  remarks, the stagecoach ‘killed more people annually than the railroad that 
followed it’, and ‘in France, parliament begged the king to prohibit vehicles from 
the streets’. In strongly undemocratic contexts, this dissent was not taken into 
account, and politically powerful actors imposed their urban visions. 
 What will happen in the future when autonomous cars are operational is an 
open question, but the present has already given us two important hints. First, with 
the automation of the management of urban infrastructure and services as one of its 
key foci, smart urbanism is the matrix through which autonomous urban transport 
unfolds (Batty  2018 ). Second, we know that current practices of smart urbanism are 
often top- down and driven by neoliberal rationales of economic growth (Cugurullo 
 2018 ; Karvonen  et al .  2018 ; although see below). Therefore, while being important, 
people’s feelings towards emerging autonomous technologies might, in the end, 
play only a marginal role in determining future urban designs (Acheampong and 
Cugurullo  2019 ). Whoever rules the city is likely to dictate its shape, and questions 
of technological innovation and urban design thus become questions of urban gov-
ernance under conditions of uncertainty. 
 Uncertainty and the governance of smart city developments 
 Cities are viewed by many as having considerable agency to resolve key issues 
(such as climate change), stimulate new forms of economic development and foster 
innovative political and social arrangements (Rohracher and Sp ä th  2017 ; EC  2012 ). 
However, at the same time, cities are suffering from the effects of over a decade of 
austerity, and are experiencing increasing income and social inequalities, poorly 
maintained infrastructure and significant pollution problems (North  et  al .  2017 ). 
Thus, while somewhat optimistic urban futures are often posited, their realisation 
may also be framed as uncertain. In many instances, ways to address these framings 
of urban futures involve knowledge of the city by collecting so- called ‘big data’ to 
inform city management responses. Indeed, sensors, big data hubs and apps have 
been built in many cities to form urban digital platforms under the auspices of the 
‘smart city’ (Kitchin  et al.  2019 ; Caprotti and Cowley  2019 ; Cowley and Caprotti 
 2019 ). Such development visions are spreading and, indeed, continue to spread 
across a field of actors, including IT companies and policy- makers, consultants and 
government institutions associated with cities (Bouzarovski and Haarstad  2019 ; 
Haarstad and Wathne  2018 ). 
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 Smart city visions have inflected developments in many cities, including Milton 
Keynes (MK) in the United Kingdom. MK was developed in the late 1960s 
as part of a wave of new town developments to relieve post- war development 
pressures, mainly for housing. Situated some 60 miles north of London, it is the 
fastest growing UK city, with a population of 245,750, set to expand to 308,500 
by 2026 (Destination MK  2019 ; MKI  2017 ). MK’s development has been inflected 
by multiple global circulations. For example, the grid road system upon which it is 
based was exported from Los Angeles by Mervin Webber, ‘applied’ and ‘adapted’ in 
MK (Walker  1982 ). It also pioneered self- build housing and low- carbon housing 
developments (PRP Architects  2010 ). As such, MK is open to new ideas and ‘smart’ 
is the latest in a long line of socio- technical developments to inflect developments 
in the city (Valdez  et al .  2018 ). 
 Smart ‘arrived’ in MK via a network of actors  – not a city to city network, 
but a network of private and public bodies, including consultants, government 
agencies, land developers, business leaders and leaders of community organisations. 
Smart inflected MK developments via governance practices situated in the formal 
and informal institutional landscapes associated with MK. For example, in the city 
council; in public fora open to the public, but largely attended by a semi- regular 
group of elite actors, such as the events organised by the Fred Roche Foundation; 
in the meetings of community groups, such as the Future Wolverton association or 
on the doorsteps of the households surveyed by volunteer community engagement 
organisations, such as Community Action MK. 
 In such institutional spaces, actors such as MK Council and the Open University 
played a major role in making and curating relations to form the basis of smart 
city initiatives. Different versions of MK and different versions of ‘smart’ were co- 
constructed and responses to the uncertainty associated with such developments 
emerged.  Post hoc , a step- wise engagement with ‘smart’ can be discerned. Initially, 
policy- makers met IT consultants to learn about their smart city offerings. 
Subsequently, the MK:Smart project was developed. Funded by the UK govern-
ment, and led by the Open University and MK Council, this project focused on 
the development of an urban platform built around a data hub and various ‘apps’ to 
augment infrastructure, such as transport, energy and water infrastructure. Finally, 
informed by the outcomes of the MK:Smart project, ‘smart’ is now focused in 
MK on aspects of the city where it closely aligns with governance and policy 
rationalities, such as transport planning (Cook  et al.  2018 ). 
 Here, such governance practices comprise a ‘learning’ journey: moving from the 
generic claims of smart visions to identifying specific outcomes and potentialities of 
‘smart’ in MK. From the outset, MK policy- makers acknowledged the uncertainties 
associated with smart city claims; there was never an intention to make MK a ‘smart 
city’, but rather to explore the potentialities of ‘smart’ for MK, and to encourage this 
to influence developments. Within MK, this approach is entirely consistent with the 
historically contingent set of ‘flexible’ governance practices sedimented in the city 
since its inception. More generally, although smart city visions have been widely 
critiqued for their techno- centrism and seemingly totalising force (Luque- Ayala 
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and Marvin  2015 ; Greenfield  2013 ), actually existing smart city developments are 
often somewhat tentative and exhibit an experimental modality that valorises prag-
matic learning over coordinated actions to realise specific goals, such as environ-
mental sustainability (Caprotti and Cowley  2019 ; Cugurullo  2018 ; Caprotti and 
Cowley  2017 ). 
 Seen in this way, smart city initiatives are emblematic of growing trends in urban 
governance that have emerged in response to an increased awareness of the world as 
complex, uncertain and non- linear. Indeed, despite the rhetorical claims of various 
planning epochs, planning practice has perhaps never been a modern techno-
cratic institution, but one mainly founded on negotiation, identifying and realising 
‘windows of opportunity’, and, crucially here, embracing uncertainty. 
 Urban(ising) energy precarity: uncertainty and scales of action 
 Energy and fuel poverty have traditionally been explored as domestic issues, 
expressed by the inability to secure adequate levels of energy services in the indoor 
environment of the home (Bouzarovski and Petrova  2015 ). As such, they have 
been principally discussed in terms of vulnerabilities and uncertainties centring on 
the residential sector. However, energy deprivation principally occurs in an urban 
context. 
 With their specific material and environmental circumstances (green areas, air 
pollution, the effect of heat islands) cities are directly implicated in how energy 
deprivation is produced, experienced and addressed. What is more, cities are pol-
itical entities where multiple practices and relations of power, authority and gov-
ernance are intertwined across a multiplicity of regulatory arenas. All of this points 
to the need for an integrated perspective to understand the nexus between energy 
inequality and the urban. 
 The ‘energy precarity’ framework provides a stepping- stone for understanding 
how energy deprivation is articulated and conditioned beyond the home. It develops 
conceptual tools to examine the everyday experiences associated with uncertain 
energy infrastructures in urban geographies. Energy precarity also draws attention to 
the multiple ways in which domestic energy deprivation is politically induced as a 
lack of ‘rights to the city’. This approach has been employed as a means of uncovering 
the spaces where energy deprivation is produced, experienced and contested. It 
has highlighted the inherently relational nature of energy demand, through which 
energy deprivation metaphorically and physically overflows the limits of the home, 
creating multiple modalities of injustice and deprivation (Petrova  2018 ). 
 There are strong links between energy precarity and uncertainty. In a broader sense, 
precarity, precariousness and precarisation have been used as signifiers of uncertainties, 
risks and vulnerabilities (Thieme  2017 ). Precarity has come to define the normalisa-
tion of uncertainty and anxiety under a neoliberal capitalist regime that promotes 
individuality and self- responsibility. Energy deprivation has also been approached in 
this very manner – as a domestic and private issue. In dominant framings, energy 
and fuel poverty are burdened with stigma and social exclusion (Hards  2013 ; Day 
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and Hitchings  2011 ), rather than being seen as the consequence of inadequate and 
exclusive urban planning and governance practices that produce unequal spatialities. 
People who live in energy deprivation tend to be presented in a trivialised and stylised 
manner: an elderly lady covered in a blanket in front of a radiator or electric heater; a 
miserable- looking child in a dark, damp room. The wider story of who these people 
are is often missing, even if their domestic vulnerability remains personified and 
exposed to the public. The urban settings that they inhabit remain erased and ignored. 
This is despite the fact that most vulnerable people tend to inhabit marginalised urban 
areas, with poor- quality housing and a lack of environmental amenities (such as poor 
access to green areas), in addition to experiencing elevated levels of air pollution as 
well as limited or expensive public transport connections. 
 Climate change- related uncertainties are likely to lead to further pressures 
on energy deprivation, due to the increased prevalence of summertime cooling 
challenges stemming from the overheating of homes and cities. This is precisely why 
solutions to the multiple political and spatial uncertainties that underpin energy 
precarity cannot be found solely in the domain of socio- technical and spatial fixes. 
Instead, they require more radical thinking in terms of how cities construct and 
govern their energy systems, taking into account the rising tide of decentralised and 
citizen- led efforts to govern energy flows. 
 Conclusion 
 The five perspectives on urban uncertainties presented above are drawn from the 
authors’ extended research on urban challenges in expanding cities. Taken together, 
they broaden our understanding and conceptualisation of uncertainty. Through 
their rich, empirical examples on how present and future uncertainties link to 
the past, the authors showcase that uncertainty exits along a temporal continuum. 
In addition to this, by focusing on the range of actors collaborating to plan for 
and govern uncertainty (informal, formal, government, communities, corporations) 
over extended periods of time, the authors present a picture of uncertainty as an 
ongoing process – one that is lived, experienced, planned, negotiated and governed 
by a multiplicity of actors, operating across variegated space and time. Through their 
discussion of ordinary uncertainties tied to insecurity in Karachi, informal negoti-
ations of urban circulation in Kampala, technology adaptation in the futuristic city, 
smart city developments in Milton Keynes and climate change- related precarity 
and energy deprivation, the authors assemble an understanding of uncertainty as an 
ongoing temporal, experiential and political process. 
 Yet the authors’ focus on expanding cities also opens up a debate on the pol-
itics of uncertainty, and, more importantly, on the ethics of governing uncertainty. 
As cities become more informal, demands on services more acute and environ-
mental conditions more extreme, it becomes evident that neoliberal governance 
settings often fail urban majorities. Kaker, Evans and Petrova warn that uncertainty 
and precarity are often co- constructed, and reproduce urban inequalities. However, 
as long as these concerns are recognised and taken seriously, and urban residents, 
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governors and corporations collaborate to foster a progressive socio- political milieu, 
then perhaps it could be possible to find flexible, innovative and equitable solutions 
to governing uncertainty. 
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 UNCERTAINTY IN MODELLING 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
 The possibilities of co- production through 
knowledge pluralism 1 
 Lyla Mehta and Shilpi Srivastava 
 Introduction 
 Uncertainty is at the core of the climate change problem. Uncertainty is defined 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as ‘a state of incom-
plete knowledge that can result from a lack of information or from disagreement 
about what is known or even knowable’ (Barros  et al .  2012 : 128). Considered to be 
a ‘super- wicked problem’ by scientists and policy- makers (Curry and Webster  2011 ; 
van der Sluijs  2005 ), climate change policy- making is often dominated by efforts 
to minimise and control uncertainty, and ‘attempts to quantify it in one way or 
another’ (Hallegatte  et al.  2012 : 10). This approach has been increasingly critiqued 
for not providing a useful basis for meaningful policy responses (Vogel and Olivier 
 2019 ; Shackley and Wynne  1996 ), and at the same time it does not reflect the lived 
realities of local people, who are often at the frontline of climatic uncertainty but 
far removed from the decision- making processes. In the  Fifth Assessment Report , the 
IPCC ( 2014 ) acknowledges that there are uncertainties that we will never know 
and that the best response is to understand and cope with them. In this light, alter-
native perspectives have emerged over recent years that focus on embracing uncer-
tainty through ‘robust’ decision- making (Lemos  et al.  2016 ) or engaging with and 
integrating local or indigenous understandings through citizen science (D’Souza 
and Kale  2018 ; Panda  2016 ). 
 Why is this important? Decisions are made today that will affect future vulner-
abilities – and, in turn, impacts – from extreme environmental change, including 
climate change. There is a growing recognition that the global, national and sub- 
national responses to uncertainty have been inadequate (Stirling  et al.  2007 ; Wynne 
 1992 ). The largely Northern- focused literature of science and technology studies 
has been critical in elucidating the narrow ways in which uncertainty is often 
conceptualised by modellers, scientists and planners (Mehta  et al.  2019 ; Wynne  1992 ). 
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Despite the increasing recognition of growing complexity, dynamism and uncertain-
ties, decision- making is still predominantly driven by techno- managerial solutions 
that may either falter in the face of local social dynamics and uncertainties or end 
up harming certain groups, usually the poor (Leach  et al.  2010 ; Mehta  et al.  1999 ). 
These top- down processes fail to take into account more embodied experiences of 
uncertainty, which culminate from the broader political- economic and historical 
experiences of exploitation, discrimination and dispossession. They tend to priv-
ilege ‘modernist’ environmental practices and disparage other forms of knowledge 
as primitive, irrational or vernacular (Arora  2019 ; Ranganathan and Bratman  2019 ). 
 In this chapter, we focus on how uncertainties are characterised in scientific 
models, explore their inherent limitations and argue that responding to climate- 
related uncertainties requires a combination of different knowledges and meth-
odological approaches. We first begin by conceptualising uncertainty in climate 
change. This is followed by a discussion of the limitations that arise out of model-
ling, and the practices of working with uncertainty, focusing on how uncertainty 
is negotiated, maintained and represented in forecasting models. Using the case of 
two projects in  South Asia, we explore the opportunities and challenges of know-
ledge co- production between the scientific, policy and lay communities. Our core 
proposition is that investigating and unpacking the gaps in diverse conceptions of 
uncertainty can facilitate processes that embrace rather than eliminate uncertainty. 
This is because, as Melissa Leach  et al. ( 2010 ) and Andy Stirling  et al. ( 2007 ) argue, 
subjective judgements, multiple knowledges and diverse interpretations around 
uncertainty are inevitable and must be central to responses to uncertain situations, 
in turn shaped by historical and socio- cultural processes (Lyons  et al.  2019 ). 
 Conceptualising uncertainty in climate change 
 Climate shocks and stresses, such as cyclones, floods, droughts, changing rainfall 
patterns and extreme temperatures are some examples of uncertainties that planners 
and local people in the global South regularly confront. Climate- related uncertainty 
refers to the inability to predict the scale, intensity and impact of climate change 
on human and natural environments (Curry and Webster  2011 ). Uncertainties in 
climate change projections remain particularly high and, combined with economic 
and political drivers of change, they make local- level effects difficult to predict 
(Barros  et al.  2012 ). 
 Thus, there is now a growing acknowledgement that climate science is better 
at dealing with uncertainties arising due to macro trends, such as temperature 
extremes and sea level rise, than understanding the effects at the local level, due 
to downscaling challenges (Bhave  et al.  2016 ). These local- level effects include the 
impacts of land use change, water management trends and socio- political and eco-
nomic processes that can increase uncertainties for local people (Swart  et al .  2009 ). 
These are what Robert Wilby and Suraje Dessai refer to as ‘the envelope of uncer-
tainty’ (Wilby and Dessai  2010 : 181), which intersects with social, political, eco-
nomic, cultural and scientific domains. 
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 Warren Walker  et al. define uncertainty as ‘any deviation from the unachievable 
ideal of completely deterministic knowledge of the relevant system’ (Walker  et al. 
 2003 :5). Three types of uncertainties are relevant for our discussion. First, aleatoric 
uncertainty, referring to natural fluctuations, a high degree of variability and disequi-
librium dynamics having unknown effects (cf. Achutarao  2016 ). Second, knowledge 
or epistemic uncertainties, which refers to indeterminate knowledge about changes 
and their impacts (Barros  et  al.  2012 ). Third, uncertainties linked to larger polit-
ical economy conditions, including unanticipated outcomes due to socio- political 
interventions, and how they are experienced by diverse groups (Mehta  et al.  1999 ; 
Wynne  1992 ). All these uncertainties are experienced, framed and interpreted dif-
ferently by different actors and are linked to relations of power that justify different 
institutional practices and responses (Rein and Sch ö n  1993 ). While acknowledging 
aleatoric uncertainty, our focus in this chapter is on epistemic uncertainty and the 
interaction with wider institutional and socio- political processes. 
 Given the ‘deep uncertainty’ (Hallegatte  et al.  2012 : 4) presented by climate 
change, new approaches are needed as it is difficult to ‘eliminate’ uncertainty all 
together. This has given rise to a growing ‘family of approaches’ focused on pro-
viding robust outcomes in the face of a range of possible changes, ranging from 
large computer- based models to qualitative assessments. Approaches include a 
focus on ‘no regrets’, reversibility and flexibility in the face of uncertainty, building 
in safety margins, and reducing decision- making time horizons (Hallegatte  et al . 
 2012 ), alongside approaches that emphasise the importance of more bottom- up 
methods of climate assessment and adaptation (Conway  et al.  2019 ). Common to 
these approaches is that they acknowledge and embrace uncertainty, rather than 
trying to avoid or minimise it. However, despite these good intentions, there is 
still a tendency to manage uncertainty through top- down, techno- managerial 
practices and framings in contemporary climate discourse and practice:  for 
example, through the current notions of the ‘climate emergency’ and a ‘war on 
climate change’. As argued by Mike Hulme ( 2020 ) and Sinichiro Asayama  et al. 
( 2019 ), portraying climate change as ‘black and white’ obscures both deep uncer-
tainties in science as well as the local- level impacts, concealing the inherently 
political nature of the term. In the worst case, the ‘emergency’ could be used as 
a justification for techno- managerialism on a massive scale, such as solar geo- 
engineering or authoritarian forms of regulation. 
 We recognise that knowledge about climate is co- produced alongside the social 
orders in which it is shaped and driven (cf. Jasanoff  2009 ). Hence, our notion of 
co- production does not principally relate to bringing different groups of people 
together to create new knowledge (cf. Ostrom  1996 ):  rather, it is more about 
teasing out forms of knowledge that are often overlooked or undervalued by more 
traditional forms of knowledge- making. This includes embodied, emotional and 
tacit ways of knowing and representing the world. This requires a pluralist sen-
sitivity to and appreciation for a persistent diversity of understandings (Stirling 
 et al.  2018 ). We contend that transformative change – that is non- linear, involves 
deep- seated structural change and challenges the  status quo of existing development 
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structures (O’Brien  2012 ; Pelling  2011 ) – is only possible if such plural pathways of 
knowledge- making are facilitated and encouraged. 
 Can we know better? Modelling for climate change 
 Climate change involves such complex systems that one of the few, but fundamen-
tally pervasive, ways to deal with it is through computer models. Models are simpli-
fied representations of complex systems, and as such are never the ‘real’ thing – a fact 
that is often ignored. Computer models of climate change are often riddled with 
uncertainty and may not fully represent the complexity of climate processes. While 
model structure uncertainty refers to uncertainty about the form of the model 
itself, technical uncertainty arises from the implementation of these models. Other 
challenges include attempts to synthesise disparate sources and sets of data, and 
the impossibility of using experimentation to test hypotheses (Swart  et al .  2009 ). 
Therefore, several choices need to be made while constructing a climate model 
and deciding how these processes are represented. These choices also concern the 
parameters chosen and the values attributed to these parameters. Other sources of 
uncertainty in climate projections and modelling include internal variability and 
natural fluctuations, model uncertainty (i.e., that different models simulate different 
responses in the climate), and scenario uncertainty (e.g., demographic change, 
emissions pathways) (Hawkins and Sutton  2009 ). 
 Social scientists studying the ‘social life of models’ tell us that climate model-
ling takes place according to diverse reasoning and across different scales (Hastrup 
 2013 ). In this process, nature is conceptualised and futures are reimagined. At the 
centre of the scientific practice is the creation of boundaries and distinct binaries 
(Douglas  1986 ) between the subjective and the objective, between the abstract cli-
mate and the particularities of weather (Heymann  2019 ; Hulme  2017 ). The abstract 
and supposedly ‘objective’ is represented by the hard science of modelling, which 
can ignore or externalise the subjective dimensions of uncertainties or neglect their 
political dimensions (cf. Jasanoff  2009 ). Such scientific approaches are just one of 
the many ways people anticipate and prepare for the future, and they need to be 
viewed together with the day- to- day strategies used by people who live with the 
uncertainties of climate (Hastrup  2013 ). However, a certain politics of knowledge 
results in particular domains (especially so- called hard science) gaining authority 
over others. Yet, all forms of knowledge (including so- called expert knowledge) 
are culturally and socially embedded and moulded by particular social, power and 
gender relations. Models are also embedded in narratives and storylines about a 
future based on certain assumptions (cf. Hajer,  1995 ), but, through a range of polit-
ical practices and boundary- ordering devices, they gain authority over other forms 
of knowledge (Heymann  2019 ; Shackley and Wynne  1996 ). 
 Historically, local communities have developed practices and strategies to plan for 
and live with ecological uncertainty and variability (Hastrup  2013 ). These practices 
include seasonal mobility, crop diversification or risk- averse behaviours to cope 
with resource fluctuations. However, climatic change presents a radical rupture with 
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what communities have been attuned to in the past. Thus, following Lyla Mehta 
 et al. ( 2019 ), we distinguish between uncertainty from ‘above’ and uncertainty from 
‘below’, recognising that there are overlaps and nestings between these two rela-
tional categories. We also recognise that bridging these two domains requires actors 
and knowledge systems that can translate across the domains, hence the notion of 
the ‘middle’, representing actors and space(s) of negotiation of knowledges and 
practices. 
 Uncertainty from ‘above’ is represented by climate scientists, policy elites and 
decision- makers. The standard approach for conceptualising uncertainty is to quan-
tify it in terms of probabilities (e.g. Sigel  et al.  2010 ), reducing it to risk through 
statistical models that accommodate sophisticated data with multiple variables 
across a range of spatial and temporal scales (Edwards  2001 ). Of course, many 
modellers acknowledge the limits to models and their predictions due to limited 
understandings of the climate system (Curry and Webster  2011 ), although there 
will be hierarchies and multiple rationalities within these systems (Curry and 
Webster  2011 ). 
 Uncertainty from ‘below’ concerns the framings of lay people, as differentiated 
by gender, class and caste. It is experiential, non- official knowledge – not neces-
sarily played out verbally or articulated formally but instead a more ‘practical’ or 
‘tacit’ form of knowledge (cf. Bourdieu  1977 ). While our concern is largely with 
marginalised groups and perspectives, lay knowledge can also be linked to a very 
heterogeneous group consisting of both rich and poor, more powerful and powerless 
people. A wide literature from anthropological, sociological and political ecology 
traditions has demonstrated how local people live with and adapt to uncertainty 
(e.g. Scoones  2019 ; Hastrup  2013 ). Many indigenous knowledge systems evolve 
through adaptive learning based on developing a complex knowledge base of the 
environment and lessons from past mistakes – a version of ‘post- normal’ science 
(cf. Funtowicz and Ravetz  1993 ). Thus, such knowledges not only complement 
more macro perspectives but perhaps also reveal aspects that can be missed by more 
macro and global perspectives. 
 We, of course, acknowledge that climate change and uncertainty from ‘above’ 
and ‘below’ have different relative strengths and epistemological entry points, and 
have potential for complementarity. Both are culturally and socially embedded in 
local institutions, practices and power relations. Both, however, tend to approach 
temporal and spatial concerns differently, as we discuss further below. Neither 
scientists nor local people are homogenous and we do not intend to privilege one 
form of knowledge over the other. There are clear power differentials between the 
two, and power relations shape these categories and their relations with each other. 
That said, there is potential space for collaboration and bridging, where knowledges 
are negotiated across actors. As Hulme ( 2020 ) points out, such differences can be 
worked out iteratively, through negotiation within power structures and institu-
tional processes. 
 We now turn to how stakeholder dialogues and roundtables that seek to break 
down political power and disciplinary divides can provide diverse actors with 
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opportunities to engage with and learn from diverse perspectives (Bhatt  et  al. 
 2018 ). Such emerging dialogues stress the importance of bringing to the fore 
hidden and alternative perspectives and solutions, while highlighting the need 
to address the power imbalances that prevent the application of alternative ways 
of valuation and epistemic diversity, which are so urgently required to address 
growing climate- related uncertainties. We highlight two such experiments below, 
and the challenges and opportunities that they present for the co- production of 
knowledge. 
 Starting a dialogue with different perspectives: experiments in 
bridging through roundtables on climate change uncertainty 
 Climate change is like an elephant in the story, and while people see different 
things (e.g. ear, tail, trunk), we need to look at it as one whole animal (Roundtable 
participant, Gandhinagar 2018).  This quote from an NGO participant in a 
roundtable discussion nicely summarises the many ways in which climate and its 
associated uncertainties are characterised by actors from the above, middle and 
below. Although epistemic divides can lead to confrontational politics, they can 
also open up possibilities and opportunities for learning from diverse perspectives 
(Bhatt  et  al.  2018 ). We convened four roundtables in different settings in India 
and Europe. 2 The objective was to bring together perspectives and experiences of 
government officials, academics, scientists, practitioners and activists on climatic 
uncertainty in order to examine how discourses on uncertainty from ‘below’ and 
‘above’ are contested, accommodated or hybridised in these politically charged 
spaces. 
 The Oslo roundtable was organised as a dialogue between natural scientists 
and social scientists, while the other three roundtables, which were organised in 
India, were rooted in their site- specific contexts (the dryland dynamics of Kutch 
in Gujarat; the rapidly urbanising context of the metropolis Mumbai and the del-
taic islands of the Indian Sundarbans). All the roundtables ended up being quite 
distinct in both orientation and scope. This was due to the different locations (e.g., 
whether at a university, a government institute or a neutral seminar venue) and 
the role played by the local partners and co- hosts. For example, in Oslo, we largely 
had researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds and just two policy- 
makers. In Mumbai, the audience at the Indian Institute of Technology– Bombay 
largely comprised natural and social scientists, with some NGOs and local fisher 
activists. In both of these settings the discussions were preoccupied with academic 
discourses on uncertainty. By contrast, the Gujarat meeting, perhaps due to its 
location in the state capital (Gandhinagar), was dominated by government officials 
and policy- makers from different departments, who welcomed the opportunity to 
engage with each other’s work, alongside many researchers and NGOs. Similarly, 
in Kolkata, the meeting had a good mix of different scientists, researchers and 
NGOs, as well as government officials. In all cases, but in different ways, power 
differentials were evident. 
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 The roundtables played a key role in highlighting different understandings 
of uncertainty, while simultaneously opening up opportunities for sharing and 
learning. For some participants, the roundtable was a new experience and they 
appreciated the opportunity to engage with and learn from diverse perspectives. For 
others, the roundtable rehearsed well- known diverse views and brought to the fore 
the challenge of reconciling these plural perspectives (Mehta  2018 ). 
 Several key messages emerged. First, the importance and relevance of social 
science perspectives as regard challenging the dominant positivist framings of climate 
science. For example, sea level rise and flooding in Mumbai gets more complex once 
you start to unpack the social and political dimensions of these challenges, such as 
the grabbing of land on the coastline – including fragile mangrove ecosystems – by 
property developers and a total disregard of the natural creeks and rivers that offer 
natural drainage for the city. Second, issues related to scale and modelling. For local 
people, who are focused on uncertainty from ‘below’, there is more engagement 
with local weather variability (or everyday change) (cf. Hulme  2017 ), and they draw 
on multiple rationalities and intersecting explanations. Climate scientists, by contrast, 
are concerned with long- term climate change and short- term forecasting, but usu-
ally construct understandings statistically and not experientially. This is also exempli-
fied in the quote below from a natural scientist at the Oslo roundtable:
 There is a complete mismatch between what people think uncertainty means 
and what scientists think uncertainty means, so if we could talk about cer-
tainty instead it would help a lot. The climate models are made to look at 
effects of emissions or scenarios, and those changes or these differences only 
come into play after about 30 years, so every uncertainty before that is not 
really dealt with. Such models should be used only for things that are rele-
vant at that kind of time scale  – for instance, should we build a dam in 
this site or that. Going to the local level, where people are uncertain about 
some things, the models do not help. There is a fundamental misconcep-
tion that climate models can do anything in the here and now, locally (Oslo 
roundtable, August 2017). 
 Third, policy- makers prefer to rely on scientific expertise to understand climate 
change, rather than the subjective understandings of local people, which they often 
dismiss as anecdotal evidence  – as occurred in the Gandhinagar roundtable. We 
also observed that policy- makers argue for the use of ‘certain’ ‘evidence’, because 
uncertainty, they believe, creates policy paralysis. This was explained by a senior 
bureaucrat in Gujarat:
 Policy- makers usually like to be certain about the course of action and 
they can work with likely scenarios but not with something that is highly 
uncertain. We need to justify our decisions. Uncertainty creates policy chaos, 
and the decision cannot be taken if the range of uncertainty is too high 
(Paraphrased, Gujarat roundtable, January 2018). 
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 While the climate scientists and meteorologists admitted to the limits of working 
with uncertainty, we observed resistance on the part of the bureaucrats, who pre-
ferred to ‘control’ and ‘minimise’ and, if possible, ‘eliminate’ uncertainty as much as 
possible. 
 Fourth, several field- level bureaucrats also argued that discussions of climate 
change usually suffer from an elite bias because most of the deliberation and sci-
entific investigations are conducted in English, ignoring understandings of climate 
uncertainty in the local vernacular. For many policy- makers, we found that the 
local level was a black box and uncertainty was messy and not clearly articulated. 
 As mentioned earlier, the roundtables were not designed to resolve or harmonise 
these differences: rather, they served as a platform to bring these differences to the 
fore and to demonstrate how discursive, social and institutional power shapes the 
understanding and framing of climate uncertainty. They did indeed help bring to 
the surface many different possibilities and issues. We started with the idea of 
‘bridging’, but this seemed too restrictive, suggesting a link between similar groups. 
Instead, we began to think in terms of crossroads or junctions, which suggest 
meeting points and confluence between different actors and perspectives. Here 
too the importance of bringing to the fore diverse ways of valuation and epistemic 
diversity is key. Whose voices and priorities are privileged over others (as none 
of these spaces are power- neutral)? For example, is it possible for a camel herder 
in Kutch to have a seat around the table with policy- makers, and, if it is, how 
will different expressions of uncertainty interact with the institutional hierarchies 
and structural inequalities? Convening such spaces may open up the possibility 
of experiments with Habermasian communicative rationality, participation and 
deliberation (Dryzek  2002 ; Honneth and Joas  1991 ), but the hidden and invisible 
dimensions of power also need to be addressed as we bring these perspectives into 
dialogue with each other. This requires methodological innovations, not only to 
engage in dialogue but also to facilitate synergies in knowledge production. 
 Moving towards transformative change through co- production 
 Co- production involves the negotiation of knowledge as well as power; through 
co- production both new knowledges and social orders are produced (Jasanoff 
 2004 ). In roundtables, as in other forms of engaged research, knowledge is produced 
through relations of power and their intersection with historical, social and eco-
nomic processes. For example, in another project, TAPESTRY, 3 we focus on how 
bottom- up transformation takes place in marginal environments that are facing 
high levels of uncertainty associated with droughts, floods and cyclones, influenced 
by the uneven impacts of capitalist expansion that is threatening people’s well- 
being and sense of place and identity in India and Bangladesh. Across these sites, 
alliances between hybrid actors – local communities, NGOs, scientists and some 
state agencies – are seeking socially just and ecologically sound alternatives, based 
on local people’s plural understandings of what transformation entails. In each of 
the sites, the team is facilitating an engaged process of situated learning, working 
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with locally based partners who both research and also co- produce transformative 
action with local communities. For example, fishers in Mumbai are challenging the 
growth- led paradigms of urban expansion, while also carving out ways to address 
plastic pollution, which is damaging their fishing habitats. Equally, in the deltaic 
Sundarbans in India and Bangladesh, climatic threats have undermined many 
islanders’ well- being and collaborative efforts between civil society organisations, 
local communities and scientists are helping to restore ecology and livelihoods. 
Meanwhile, in the drought- prone drylands of Kutch in Gujarat, India civil society 
organisations and villagers are challenging dominant state paradigms regarding 
drylands and pastoralism, while also improving poor people’s quality of life and 
enhancing biodiversity. 
 Although such initiatives provide the scope to re- imagine nature– society 
relations in uncertain, marginal environments, these emergent processes may be 
resisted by incumbent players, and may not always challenge underlying inequalities 
associated with class, ethnicity, gender or caste. They also involve a delicate power 
relationship between civil society organisations and diverse communities, begging 
the question who is imagining what, and for whom? We must equally ask: how 
does one ensure that the voices of the most marginalised, who are at the forefront of 
climatic uncertainty, are able to come to the fore? In response, we need to think of 
methodologies and consider the ethics around these experiments in co- production, 
while we re- imagine uncertainty as an opportunity. 
 Communicating uncertainty: reflections on methods 
 Creative and participatory methods can potentially open up new and existing 
conversations that otherwise might be impeded by hierarchical social structures, 
such as caste traditions or gender inequities. These may include storytelling, mural 
paintings, photovoice, photostories and a range of methods that seek to address 
power imbalances and ensure that hidden and subaltern perspectives are central. 
For example, we used the community- based participatory action research method 
photovoice to capture the embodied experiences of uncertainty. 4 Although scientists 
and policy- makers may see uncertainty in the form of coastal erosion or warming 
temperatures, local people experience uncertainty in more tacit and affective ways. 
This manifests itself in loss of culture, place and identity due to threats to traditional 
pastoralist livelihood practices due to a decline in the camel population and chan-
ging access to their traditional grazing lands on mangrove islands. Besides capturing 
these responses, the photovoice methodology also opens up ways of communi-
cating understandings of uncertainty to different stakeholders. This is because visual 
images can break down language and disciplinary barriers, which often impede 
climate change communication and knowledge co- production and engagement. 
 All roundtables began with a powerful photovoice presentation highlighting the 
precarity of ordinary people in regard to climate change- related uncertainties, illus-
trating how they make sense of, live with and adapt to them. The visual stories 
demonstrated how uncertainties at these local scales are further compounded by 
108 Lyla Mehta and Shilpi Srivastava
wider socio- economic changes, such as industrialisation along with the coast or 
port developments, which often destroy the commons, whether grazing lands, 
mangroves or fishing habitats. The interlinkages between resources, livelihoods and 
socio- economic change are often bypassed in siloed mainstream policy processes, 
through departmental jurisdictions and policy programming. Photovoice thus 
helped in revealing some of these blind- spots in climate policies and implementation. 
 For example, as part of our research on climatic uncertainty in pastoral commu-
nities in the border district of Kutch in Gujarat, India, we organised a photovoice 
series to understand the gendered experiences of uncertainty, focusing on the lives 
of women within these communities. In this context, photovoice played a transgres-
sive role in two key ways. First, within the mainstream scholarship on pastoralism, 
women’s role is under- represented and under- theorised. Hence, the focus on women 
brought to light powerful images of the ‘invisible’ care economy that sustains the 
pastoral system on a day- to- day basis. Second, in contrast to the dominant framings 
of climatic uncertainty in the form of high temperatures, erratic patterns of rainfall 
and sea level rise, the photovoice method revealed more embodied, socially and 
culturally embedded experiences of uncertainty. Some examples include frequent 
trips to drying wells in the summer, picking fodder leaves, milking buffaloes and 
washing the calves, and the role of faith and religion in coping with climatic uncer-
tainties. Thus, through photovoice, we were able to tease out tacit and embedded 
forms of knowledge and experience that are often undervalued and overlooked by 
traditional forms of research and top- down policy processes. 
 Our experience with photovoice shows that the use of such methods provides 
agency to local actors to frame problems in ways that are seen as relevant and appro-
priate to their knowledge and lived experiences. These embodied understandings 
can also facilitate dialogue with scientists and policy- makers. For instance, women 
from the Sundarbans used photovoice to make a representation of their demands 
to the Sundarbans Development Board in West Bengal (Ghosh  et al.  2019 ). Such 
iterative learning can provide new insights and perspectives in combining diverse 
knowledge, can challenge and reframe mainstream narratives and can also open up 
possibilities for dialogue and communication between a range of actors. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have highlighted the divergent framings of uncertainty in relation 
to climate science, and how these come to be negotiated, maintained and shaped in 
forecasting models, through scenarios and projections, as well as in their interactions 
with science and policy processes. We have also highlighted the epistemic disjunc-
ture in the framing of uncertainty and drew on the heuristic of the ‘above’, ‘middle’ 
and ‘below’ to demonstrate the divergent frames and understandings that shape 
these cognitive lenses. Drawing on creative methodological experiments, we argued 
that there is a potential to harness this diversity to facilitate practices of engagement 
and co- production between diverse stakeholders. Such emerging dialogues stress 
the importance of bringing to the fore hidden and alternative perspectives and 
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solutions, while highlighting the need to address the power imbalances that prevent 
the application of alternatives ways of valuation and epistemic diversity, which are 
so urgently required for transformative change. 
 Roundtables present a potentially fruitful way of bringing divergent perspectives 
into dialogue with each other. However, as we have shown, these spaces are pol-
itically charged and disagreements about the use of the term uncertainty abound. 
Although the interactions with climate scientists in some of these spaces have 
been fruitful – encouraging them to open up to the experiences of others – the 
majority of the scientists involved had reservations. Especially in India, the senti-
ment persisted that ‘we can teach people, but have nothing to learn from them’. 
The roundtables were not envisaged as spaces of harmonisation and reconciliation, 
but were meant to allow us to bring the diversity of perspectives to the fore, as 
well as to observe the workings of power and how these are negotiated and shape 
understandings of uncertainty. 
 The use of visual methods such as photovoice and photostories can effectively 
capture lived and tacit experiences of uncertainty. Besides providing agency to local 
people, who have often been categorised as ‘subjects’ of research, such approaches 
provide a voice to vulnerable and marginalised communities, making them active 
participants in research and the creation of knowledge. Such co- produced research 
can potentially empower people to shape the conditions of their lives, creating 
spaces to produce and disseminate knowledge and actively shape development and 
research processes. However, sustained engagement is required in building relations 
of trust and reciprocity, as well as addressing power relations  – and also in the 
research process. 
 Hence, co- production of climate knowledge will require altering the modernist 
and homogenising frame of knowledge production and dissemination that has long 
colonised practices through target- oriented top- down framings. This means embra-
cing more decentralised and plural ways of knowing, with the aim of co- producing 
both new knowledges and social orders. In this chapter, we have also outlined the 
challenges involved in such processes when tackling existing power relations and 
existing social and gender inequities. This makes it important to develop meth-
odologies and practices that open up new forms of dialogues among a diversity 
of actors and knowledges. These must both challenge existing social orders and 
embrace the multiple modalities of future- making and the plural practices of antici-
pation and living with uncertainty. 
 Notes 
 1  This chapter draws on Mehta  et  al . ( 2019 ). We are grateful to Ian Scoones and Andy 
Stirling for their helpful comments and to Ruby Utting for her help with the references 
and formatting of this chapter. 
 2  These roundtables were convened as part of the  Climate Change, Uncertainty and 
Transformation project, funded by the Norwegian Research Council,  www.nmbu.no/ en/ 
faculty/ landsam/ department/ noragric/ research/ our_ projects/ projects/ node/ 21234 . 
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 3  TAPESTRY is short for Transformation as Praxis:  Exploring Socially Just and 
Transdisciplinary Pathways to Sustainability in Marginal Environments. TAPESTRY is 
financially supported by the Belmont Forum and NORFACE Joint Research Programme 
on Transformations to Sustainability, which is co- funded by Economic and Social Research 
Council, Research Council of Norway, Japan Science Technology Agency, International 
Science Council and the European Commission through Horizon 2020.  https:// steps- 
centre.org/ project/ tapestry/ . 
 4  https:// steps- centre.org/ project- related/ photovoiceuncertainty/ . 
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 DISEASE OUTBREAKS 
 Navigating uncertainties in preparedness 
and response 
 Hayley MacGregor, Santiago Ripoll and Melissa Leach 
 Introduction 
 Concern about deadly infectious diseases with local outbreak or pandemic poten-
tial has grown significantly, in a world characterised by increasing global mobility 
and significant social, economic and ecological transformations. In recent years 
such fears have crystallised in the restructuring of institutional architectures within 
agencies with a global health remit, alongside initiatives to predict, prepare and 
respond to epidemics. Underlying the fears of global actors is the reality of limited 
knowledge about many aspects of outbreaks, coupled with predictions of poten-
tially devastating consequences – both rapidly unfolding and fatal. A better delinea-
tion of the contours of uncertainty in global planning and practice is vital, we argue, 
to understanding the assumptions made about appropriate measures, the allocation 
of responsibility and the justifications of actions. 
 The 2013– 2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa was a key episode in galvanising 
global attention towards disease- preparedness activities, geared towards pre- emptive 
control in the event of outbreaks. Practices focused on prediction and control con-
centrate on turning uncertainties into ‘risk’, through surveillance, modelling, early 
warning and scenario planning (e.g. WHO  2017 ). Alongside the scientific uncer-
tainties that are the focus of these efforts, a further source of uncertainty has increas-
ingly come into view for scientific and policy communities:  the behaviour of 
affected populations and the social and political dynamics and geographies of disease 
‘hotspots’. This has catalysed an increased recognition of social science perspectives 
and the value of disseminating knowledge about the contexts in which disease 
outbreaks occur – socio- economic, political and ecological (Leach  2019 ; GLOPID- 
R  2019 ). Thus, a growing recognition of ‘context’ in the epidemics science- policy 
space has been a significant development. We argue here that new discourses and 
practices have emerged around this realisation. These can be detected in initiatives 
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such as those to standardise risk communication and community engagement, to 
develop social science protocols to inform outbreak response, or to obtain synthesis 
briefings from social scientists for frontline workers – in an attempt to make the 
unpredictable and lesser known spaces of ‘social context’ more discretely intelligible 
and legible. 
 As social scientists working on epidemics we too have beaten the drum about 
the fact that ‘context matters and must be known’. We have actively contributed 
to this discourse in the hope that it could serve as a bridge to the inclusion of 
perspectives beyond the biomedical, and in an attempt to avoid potential harm from 
interventions that might be naive as regards on- the- ground realities. We have led 
and participated in initiatives to brief epidemic responders on context, such as the 
Ebola Response Anthropology Platform ( www.ebola- anthropology.net ) and Social 
Science in Humanitarian Action Platform (SSHAP) ( www.socialscienceinaction.
org ). And yet we also cannot help but reflect critically on how agencies have 
employed this knowledge, and how such initiatives can also be viewed as part of 
a broader suite of technologies to transform uncertainties – in this instance social, 
political and structural realities – into calculable risks, tamed and streamlined for 
communication to publics. In the official discourse of preparedness and response, 
local people have been variously objectified as a source of uncertainty, including 
now as (behavioural and social) ‘context’. 
 In this chapter, we seek to open up a richer dialogue about the different 
understandings and experiences of outbreaks and of uncertainty that prevail among 
global science- policy communities, and the ‘communities’ that are envisaged as the 
focus of global- level efforts, informed by, but also self- critically engaged with, these 
recent efforts to make ‘context’ and local responses knowable. We address and illus-
trate the potential contestation between the official response efforts of public health 
agencies, and alternative ways of knowing and responding to outbreaks, grounded 
in practice and mobilisation that might be more salient and trusted at local level. 
We suggest that, while there has been growing attention to these gulfs and how to 
bridge them in  response efforts, there has been less attention to  preparedness efforts 
and their understanding at local level, and how these might relate to everyday 
experiences of and responses to uncertainty. But our main concern here is to go 
further, to reflect on the limits in comprehending the ontological dimensions of 
uncertainty, particularly as experienced in places where outbreaks are happening, 
by people whose lives are precarious, with misfortunes and ‘emergencies’ – health- 
related and otherwise – that are as likely to be of the ‘slow’ (Anderson  et al.  2019 ) as 
the acute kind. For people living in these settings, we suggest, it is not ‘context’ that 
is salient but the ongoing flow – or text – of social and ecological life, in which a 
host of everyday uncertainties are constantly faced, with variable outcomes. 
 Attention to the dynamics of different levels, forms and realities of uncertainty 
raises questions about whose versions of uncertainty dominate in imaginaries of 
future outbreaks, and corresponding global response and preparedness strategies. 
Moreover, it is essential to consider whose knowledge and experiences count in pre-
paring and responding, as well as whether uncertainties related to disease outbreaks 
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are always resolvable. Are alternative processes possible for formulating international 
planning frameworks, ones that are more open to considering different forms of 
knowledge and more attentive to views ‘from below’ that might reveal alternative 
priorities and ways of being- in- the- world? Or is a more radical departure necessary, 
where a new process for organising international responses does not rely foremost 
on roadmaps developed remotely from national and local- level realities? 
 The framings and dynamics of uncertainty at the global level 
 Conventional epidemic response institutional architecture is based on the ‘outbreak 
narrative’ that highlights particular aspects of an epidemic and is blind to others 
(Dry and Leach  2010 ). The outbreak narrative is a ‘formulaic plot that begins with 
the identification of an emerging infection, discussion of global networks through 
which diseases travel, and a chronicle of the epidemiologic work that results in disease 
containment’ (Wald  2008 : 2). This ‘outbreak narrative’ focuses on particular disease 
dynamics – ‘sudden emergence, speedy, far- reaching, [and often] global spread’ – 
and on particular types of response – ‘universalised, generic emergency- oriented 
control, at source, aimed at eradication’ (Leach  et al . 2010 : 372). This narrative tends 
to prioritise the ‘global citizen’ at risk of contagion, disproportionately referring to 
citizens of the global North. This global bio- security paradigm is characterised by 
a move from public health technologies of prevention to preparedness, deploying 
particular military and security techniques for the ‘construction of potential futures’ 
in the realm of disease threat (Lakoff  2008 : 401). Preparedness involves a complex 
and rapidly developing set of concepts, architectures and practices aimed at cre-
ating a ‘vigilant alertness for the onset of surprise’ and an ‘anticipatory imagination’ 
among policy- makers (Lakoff  2017 : 20). 
 At the global level, at least three different forms of uncertainty can be delineated 
with respect to ‘expert’ scientific knowledge and outbreak responses. Firstly, in a 
situation where an actual outbreak of a known disease has occurred, there are 
uncertainties that arise in terms of how the disease will unfold, which populations 
will be most affected, how people might behave in response and what the overall 
effects will be. Secondly, considering a particular disease with epidemic potential, 
there are uncertainties regarding where the next outbreak will occur and how 
this might develop, such as whether efficient human-to-human transmission might 
occur. Thirdly, there is the situation of extreme unknowns: which Disease X might 
emerge in the near future, how organisms might be mutating and how preparedness 
can be maximised. 
 All three forms of uncertainty, as states of limited knowledge, are acknowledged 
by scientists. Discussions about ‘closing the gaps’ in scientific understandings fre-
quently form the focus and grist of numerous expert meetings, such as those 
convened on the WHO priority diseases (WHO  2019a ). The paradigm of 
evidence- based response is held as the gold standard approach for guiding action, 
and as such there are calls for urgent research to address outstanding questions, 
with the assumption that risk mitigation can be replaced by risk elimination as 
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evidence becomes more complete. In pursuit of prediction in order to manage and 
reduce risk, preparedness and response architectures prioritise technologies of con-
trol, with practices concentrated on turning uncertainties into risk, such as surveil-
lance and modelling of disease, and scenario planning. These involve the intensified 
collection and use of public health and epidemiological data, supported by clin-
ical and laboratory information, as well as novel (e.g. digital) means to collect and 
share it. 1 The common framework is to move from ‘reactive’ to ‘predictive and pro- 
active’ approaches to pathogens. R&D is also prioritised, with the assumption that 
vaccines, immune therapies and novel drugs are the ‘game- changers’ in the control 
of risk, and should be fast- tracked through human trials and into production. 
 These control- driven approaches are understandable, given the urgency 
associated with outbreak response. The stakes are often high and public health 
and response professionals are under intense scrutiny and pressure to intervene 
definitively and with assurance. While scientists might readily acknowledge the 
knowledge gaps among themselves, and discuss the tensions of balancing scientific 
uncertainties and difficulties with prediction against the need to act, this openness 
is not readily expressed beyond their professional community. A lack of certainty 
creates particular discomfort among public health professionals in discussions of 
‘risk reduction’ messages directed at the general public and the media. 
 Scientists might acknowledge that the dynamism of complex interacting bio-
logical and ecological systems make it likely that limits to forms of scientific 
knowing in regard to ‘priority diseases’ will persist, on the shifting sands of new and 
emerging uncertainties. In designing responses and engaging with publics, health 
professionals also increasingly recognise that social worlds cannot be ignored – from 
individual beliefs about disease and health- seeking behaviours to diverse cultural 
logics and conditions of life and livelihood that affect relevant social relations and 
responses (Bedford  et al.  2019 ). But, as we now show, this attention is often framed 
in terms of ‘behaviour’ and ‘context’ – and as further sources of uncertainty that in 
turn need to be tamed and controlled. 
 The uncertainty of behaviour and context 
 The 2013–2015 West African Ebola outbreak helped focus a spotlight on the 
uncertainties associated with social factors, as well as the dangers of action that 
is ‘context- blind’, even in a situation of great urgency and high mortality and a 
virus capable of epidemic spread. Social scientists working with local populations 
in efforts such as the Ebola Response Anthropology Platform highlighted the social 
processes and concerns shaping viral transmission patterns; care and burial practices; 
local innovations and institutions in addressing the outbreak; and the relationships 
and learning among community members and health workers, and the histories 
and political economies shaping these (e.g. Wilkinson  et al.  2017 ; Richards  2016 ). 
Communicated to response agencies through accessible briefings in near- real- time, 
and then the subject of global reports and reflections (e.g. GLOPID- R  2019 ), 
these efforts have contributed to greater appreciation of local social dimensions 
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of epidemic response. This has been termed ‘behaviour’ of affected populations by 
response agencies, although there is increasing recognition that this domain of ‘con-
text’ includes cultural logics, social responses, political factors and media reports, and 
that the formal outbreak response itself can shape rumours and local reactions that 
in turn will shape the evolution of the outbreak. Many scientists now reflect more 
openly on contextual factors and local responses as a major form of uncertainty in 
attempting modelling and other forms of prediction. 
 For global agencies, this growing appreciation of ‘behaviour’ and ‘context’ 
presents a new set of uncertainties that must now be grappled with in responding 
to, but also preparing for, outbreaks. To date, the dominant approach to dealing 
with this unruly contextual space has focused attention on ‘risk communication’ 
and ‘community engagement’ (e.g. WHO  2018 : 14). Agencies and initiatives such 
as the WHO’s new Health Emergencies programme are rapidly commissioning 
social science tools, methods, protocols and procedures to support these emphases, 
as well as to make social contexts legible and manageable. 2 While contributing to 
such efforts through initiatives such as SSHAP, 3 we have also been at pains to point 
out the narrow and over- simplistic ways that ‘communities’, ‘communication’ and 
‘social context’ are addressed (Leach  2019 ). 
 Central to our argument, however, is also the way that such approaches once 
again ‘close down’ on uncertainties – attempting to reduce them to predictable and 
manageable risk (Leach  et al .  2010 ). In this regard, there is a push to get a more com-
plex understanding of context onto the radar of response agencies and modellers, 
including an understanding of the dynamic, non- linear interactions between 
different social, political and ecological processes that shape disease emergence and 
outbreaks. Two examples of recent outbreak responses – Nipah in Bangladesh and 
Ebola in the DRC – show advances in appreciating local social realities, yet also 
the persistence and limits of reductive approaches to the uncertainties of behaviour 
and context. 
 Outbreaks linked to Nipah virus in Bangladesh have brought to the fore the 
disjunctures that can exist between scientific and local understandings of disease 
events. Interdisciplinary research assisted in uncovering human– bat contact as cen-
tral for ‘spillover’ to people who drank raw palm sap contaminated by bat secretions 
(Luby  et al.  2006 ). Yet, since collection of palm sap was a key livelihood strategy, 
and consumption of the sap was also a widespread social practice, interventions 
to address the risk of transmission had to consider that local people would not 
simply stop harvesting sap as a consequence of the sharing of new scientific facts. 
Innovative adaptations of methods of sap collection to reduce risks took this into 
account and low- cost interventions were advocated ( ibid .). Furthermore, careful 
social science research revealed that people held distinct beliefs regarding illness 
causation – such as that the bodily symptoms had been sent by Allah – which did 
not concur entirely with a germ theory (Parveen  et al.  2016 ; Blum  et al.  2009 ). 
People were sceptical of the links that professionals were making to palm sap, as 
their observed experience over time did not accord with the idea that consumption 
caused fatal illness. They were thus not initially inclined to change their behaviour. 
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Local beliefs needed to be taken into account in ‘risk communication’ and the 
development of public health messages ( ibid . 2016). For scientists leading an out-
break response under time pressure and media scrutiny, unexpected local responses 
that do not appear to accept scientific findings or respond in expected ways to risk 
reduction measures are cause for disquiet as they appear to counteract strategies 
based on medical facts. Again, much has been done in such cases to work with 
local people to shift ‘behavioural’ risk factors, such as with respect to the care of 
relatives with Nipah infection in ways that respect prevalent expectations and moral 
economies of care, while still being attentive to public health concerns about risk 
of transmission (Islam  et al.  2013 ; Blum  et al.  2009 ). Vaccine and immunoglobulin 
developments might be sought as a way to bypass or neutralise the vagaries of 
human behaviour, but it is likely that the dynamics of this disease, and the responses 
to it, will remain unpredictable. 
 The Ebola outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri in the DRC (ongoing since August 
2018) has focused attention on the context of conflict as an extreme form of social 
and contextual uncertainty, and one even less likely to be amenable to strategies 
of control. In the second largest Ebola outbreak after the West African pandemic, 
a vaccine that was fast- tracked for trial and development has been available and 
has, by most accounts, reduced the impact of the outbreak. But despite these con-
ventional approaches to controlling disease, the political realities have necessarily 
shaped the humanitarian response. This response has incorporated the import-
ance of ‘understanding context’, along with many of the lessons learned from the 
West African pandemic. For example, social science analysis has been effectively 
generated remotely by networks like SSHAP, and on the ground by institutions 
such as CASS ( Cellule Analyse Science Sociale  – the Social Sciences Analysis Cell). 4 
Another advance has been collaboration between field agencies and SSHAP in 
the analysis of community feedback data:  this community feedback is gathered, 
analysed and communicated to response teams. This is important because the 
response generates social uncertainties as much as the disease itself, and shapes the 
perceptions and actions of affected populations. 
 Yet the DRC Ebola response has also opened up a myriad of uncertainties 
that cannot be contained by community engagement. Military action has curtailed 
humanitarian access in particular locations and times, and concerted attacks on 
Ebola treatment centres by armed groups have reduced the effectiveness of the 
response. In SSHAP discussions this has raised the importance of peacebuilding and 
political economy expertise in social science analyses. 
 Even more importantly, the uncertainty of chronic conflict has permeated 
people’s everyday lives. Under continuous threat of physical violence, people seek 
to prioritise the immediate need for physical security over Ebola- related activities. 
An example of this was the ‘Ebola strike’ that occurred in October 2018, when 
many community members halted Ebola activities in protest at the lack of security. 
An historical political marginalisation vis- à - vis a central government that is also 
unable to protect people generates distrust of health services and enables plaus-
ible explanations of Ebola as a government plot. Conventional methods of case 
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management – listing contacts – become fraught with difficulty, as fear and mistrust 
towards the response make the act of giving that information highly risky. As the 
main method of the Ebola vaccine on trial was ring vaccination, the incompleteness 
of these lists of contacts had an important impact on the efficacy of vaccination. 
For much of the response, the number of Ebola deaths at home (rather than in 
treatment centres) of people who were not on the case management contact list was 
high, reaching up to a third of cases (WHO  2019b ). In addition, Congolese citizens 
wonder why Ebola is prioritised over other health priorities in an already limited 
health system. In turn, this mistrust is exacerbated by the disruptive Ebola economy, 
and the unequal access to finance and resources that have accompanied the response 
among fragmented local political authorities. Thus, the roll- out of the response has 
inevitably generated a new set of deep uncertainties between local socio- political 
dynamics and response activities. 
 While these examples represent stories of success in the institutionalised appre-
ciation of social issues, and measures to deal with the uncertainties of behav-
iour and context, the attempts are limited in various respects. In both cases, the 
initiatives remained part of a managerial framework that aimed to reduce uncer-
tainty to risk, and was unable to do so. Furthermore, social science inputs have to 
date been ‘layered’ on top of the response architecture, rather than contributing to 
transforming the philosophy or the constitution of the response itself. 
 Alternative experiences of uncertainty: the view ‘from below’ 
and the text of life 
 For agencies, the unpredictable influence of social and political realities on outbreak 
responses has thus come to be packaged as ‘context’. Yet what are the experiences 
of those actually living this ‘context’, for whom it is, in effect, not context but the 
text of life? This experiential reality is not uncertainty that needs to be reduced and 
rendered into risk, but is manifested as an ongoing flow of situations, to be lived 
with and negotiated. Nor are these uncertainties fully amenable to elimination 
through knowledge, since they are part of the lived, embodied fabric of social, eco-
logical and political life – what one might term ‘ontological uncertainties’. 
 In the growing, but still marginal, advocacy to include local people’s own 
perspectives in outbreak preparedness and response, there has been little attention 
to people’s lived experiences or embodiment of uncertainty. Yet exploring people’s 
experiences and responses to uncertainty in the form of everyday threats to health 
and life could provide an alternative view on how preparedness and response might 
be understood and mobilised ‘from below’. Such enquiry would explore what could 
be learned from those who live with multiple uncertainties in areas affected by 
infectious disease outbreaks. It would ask how people draw on formal and informal 
institutions, forms of public authority, social relations and practices as they antici-
pate and respond to health and other threats on a daily basis – not as some hangover 
of ‘traditional’ past beliefs, but in social responses to new forms of adversity that 
come about amid social, ecological and political transformations. It could reveal 
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and support ways for people to harness their own resources and practices, in new 
hopes and possibilities for socially- sensitive epidemic preparedness and response. In 
these ways, appreciation of lived, ontological uncertainties could become part of an 
alternative epidemic ‘preparedness from below’. 
 While this is still an open field of enquiry, 5 its salience is suggested by ethno-
graphic examples from diverse settings, which also point to some of its key 
dimensions. Such work highlights how ontological uncertainties are woven into 
people’s everyday lives and existential realities, becoming particularly relevant in 
circumstances of precarity  – whether related to subsistence, violence or disease. 
Thus in post- invasion Iraq, Al- Mohammad and Peluso explore people’s lives in 
uncertain, violent spaces as the ‘rough ground of the everyday’ ( 2012 :  42). The 
horizon of lives of people in conflict are not determined solely by ‘contextual’ 
categories, such as kinship, tribalism, religion or sectarianism, but rather as ‘living- 
in- action – that is, as phenomenologically, experientially, and sensibly grounded’ 
( 2012 : 44). 
 Uncertainties in precarious everyday lives carry particular temporalities. Thus 
Paul Richards’ work shows that Hausa farmers do not deal with the uncertainties 
of subsistence farming by looking forward and planning, and then rolling out those 
plans. While a technique like intercropping may seem like premeditated design, 
it is by virtue of the performance of sowing and the difficulties that arise in the 
emergent moment that the choice of seeds and their spatial location is chosen 
(Richards  1993 : 67). In illness a similar emergent temporality unfolds in the pursuit 
of care: the emergent symptoms, the social meaning attached to them (that often go 
beyond the biomedical) and the available and desirable avenues of care are a form of 
navigation, rather than it being a case of those who are ill following an established 
route of a health- seeking pathway, as James Fairhead  et  al. ( 2008 ) have shown 
for infant health in Guinea. Improvisation in the present can also draw on past 
repertoires: thus, Mende villagers’ implementation of locally managed quarantines 
in the 2013– 2015 Ebola outbreak re- mobilised principles and authority relations 
(such as placing youth as guards on bush paths) that had been used in the 1991– 
2002 civil war, as well as in twentieth- century outbreaks of smallpox and measles. 6 
 In dealing with uncertainties of violence and disease, people may strive for fur-
ther autonomy and control, aiming to ‘create and find some continuity in their 
lives, in the face of hostile circumstances and their own vulnerability’ (Jenkins 
 et  al.  2005 :  11). Yet such desire for control does not necessarily translate into a 
desire for certainty, or the medicalisation of illness. For example, Marita Eastmond 
highlighted a preference of refugees in Sweden to frame their ailments as a product 
of traumatic lives outside the medical concepts imposed by bureaucratic systems, as 
a way to emphasise their normality and ability to work (Eastmond  2005 ). Further, 
people may seek to resist the certainty of an unwanted outcome, such as a medical 
diagnosis with a poor prognosis. Thus Nyole people in Uganda often prefer to open 
up possibilities for healing by seeking counsel from alternative health providers, 
and if these fail, through divination in rituals, which in turn can open up particular 
social explanations (Whyte  1997 ). In precarious circumstances it might be more 
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comfortable to live with ongoing uncertainties than with the certainty of a bad 
outcome. 
 In other extreme circumstances, the uncertainties of a world where there is 
‘too much death and too much loss’ can generate a resignation in which violence, 
or the loss of life, is accepted and awarded a particular meaning (Scheper- Hughes 
 2008 : 29). Nancy Scheper- Hughes ( 1993 ) speaks of the difficult decisions that poor 
mothers in north- eastern Brazil had to make when resources were so scarce that 
their attention to the survival of some infants would mean letting the weakest die. 
Scheper- Hughes depicts this as an act of resilience, as people struggle to affect the 
elements they can control in a particular moment while living in precarious envir-
onments – in other words, caring for those children who show a ‘knack for life’ 
( 1993 : 446), while letting go of those who do not. 
 Such examples highlight that experiences of disease and other forms of ‘mis-
fortune’ in everyday life cannot be understood solely at an individual level – or 
as a matter for unified ‘communities’ – but are embedded in social relations. Thus 
‘care, and also neglect and violence, ravel and unravel the entanglings of lives with 
other lives’ (Al- Mohammad and Peluso  2012 : 45). For Nyole people in Uganda, the 
explanation of misfortune, including illness, goes beyond the body and the self and 
also lies in uncertainties about the intentions and actions of others – living, dead or 
supernatural (Whyte  1997 ). 
 In light of this, activities that are linked to narrow or immediate material 
concerns (such as farming or health- seeking), can only be understood as part of a 
wider ‘performance’ of social life, with all its uncertainties (Richards  1993 ). Richard 
Jenkins  et  al. suggest further that as a result of our human capacity to imagine 
futures and possible worlds and our desire to control particular outcomes, new 
uncertainties emerge:
 A blessing and a curse of human cognition is our talent for the complex 
imagination of options, alternatives, possibilities and ‘what ifs’. Confronted 
by the routine uncertainties of the environment and the actions of other 
humans, individual and collective decision- making in the attempt to establish 
some predictable control over matters- at- hand necessarily involves imagining 
options, alternatives and so on. The result is at least as likely to be further 
uncertainty as anything else (Jenkins  et al.  2005 : 28). 
 Towards alternative approaches to disease outbreaks amid 
uncertainties 
 Such explorations of everyday uncertainties and how people negotiate them amid 
precarious lives start to open up different, and richer, understandings of uncertainty 
as it relates to disease outbreaks. These understandings involve moves from context 
to text; from epistemology to ontology; from individual/ community perspectives to 
social relational ones; and from narrow temporalities (the immediate outbreak, the 
future plan) to multiple ones, as past, present and imagined future dynamics inform 
122 Hayley MacGregor et al.
each other. Perhaps above all, they suggest that uncertainties are not always amen-
able to being reduced to risk, and managed and controlled – and that, furthermore, 
attempts at control may simply spawn further uncertainties. 
 The reality of a multitude of forms of uncertainty, temporalities and experiences 
does not mean that we should dismiss the urgency of outbreak response, or suggest 
that efforts to research pathogens, engage with models and predict and indeed 
prepare for epidemics are not important. Understanding everyday uncertainties 
and their implications for epidemic preparedness and response must emerge from 
continuous engagement, as responses to such lived uncertainties can be revealing 
of local efforts that are of relevance for outbreak preparedness – for instance, as 
forms of local mobilisation were in response to Ebola in West Africa (Parker  et al. 
 2019 ). While we recognise the limitations of foregrounding ‘coping strategies’ in 
settings where the ‘staff, stuff, space and systems’ for combating infectious outbreaks 
are sparse on the ground (Farmer  2014 :  39), it is nevertheless important to ask 
whether different, and more inclusive, processes are possible. Thus, several provi-
sional conclusions can be drawn at this point. 
 Conclusion 
 As we have argued, the dominant narratives and approaches of global public health 
and humanitarian agencies have privileged formal science and epidemiological 
knowledge over local models of disease and response, and have emphasised ‘blue-
print’ and ‘roadmap’ approaches to preparing for and managing outbreaks. While 
recent efforts have seen greater attention to multiple types of uncertainty, the 
emphasis is on reducing these to manageable risk through better scientific know-
ledge, scenarios and surveillance. 
 Increasingly, the uncertainties associated with complex social, ecological and 
political processes, both ‘potential’ (affecting future outbreaks) and ‘actual’ (as they 
unfold in the dynamics of current outbreaks) are seen as important (Samimian- 
Darash  2013 ). Yet the dominant response has been either to reduce these uncertain-
ties to a narrow set of risk communication and community engagement issues, and/ 
or to treat them as a ‘social context’ to be rendered legible and manageable through 
narrow forms of ‘social science intelligence’. 
 Thus the watershed event of the West African Ebola pandemic led to a recon-
figuration of epidemic responses, with ‘contextual’ knowledge now likely to be 
incorporated into future interventions. However, there is a strong tendency to 
include social knowledge around socio- cultural dynamics and political economy 
within existing managerial technologies, reconfiguring social uncertainties as cal-
culable risks. Social knowledge is then mapped onto the conventional epidemic 
risk management approach of ‘predict, prepare and control’. In parallel to the pre-
diction technologies of epidemic modelling and reading ‘virus chatter’, vulnerable 
populations can be identified according to their socio- cultural and demographic 
characteristics, and recruited for ‘participatory surveillance’. In planning responses, 
social knowledge can be used to identify the role different social groups may play in 
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enabling or resisting interventions, as well as to design strategies to recruit support. 
Lastly, in terms of control, vaccination, treatment and drug- testing are rolled out 
in parallel to social science- informed community engagement activities that aim 
to enhance uptake and community acceptance. People and the social uncertainties 
they live with and enact are thus ‘tamed’ and controlled through activities informed 
by social sciences, such as public health communication, community engagement, 
behavioural change interventions or even allegedly participatory approaches, such 
as decentralised ‘surveillance’ and community feedback. 
 Despite the fact that many of these activities have succeeded in enhancing both 
the impact of epidemic response and its accountability, we have equally argued that 
this approach is often based on illusory assumptions about the full knowability of 
‘the social’. Our case studies show that there is a degree of radical and irreducible 
uncertainty that pervades all social life, but that this can become particularly salient 
in situations of precarity  – and perhaps most heightened where an epidemic is 
unfolding within a violent conflict. Beyond the limits of social science in depicting 
social realities, there are limits as regards acknowledging the range and depth of 
uncertainties and their ontological dimensions. For people living in precarious 
environments, context is less relevant than how uncertainty is phenomenologically 
experienced as they navigate the flow, or text, of life through ‘structured improvisa-
tion’ (Scheper- Hughes  2008 : 47). Striving for control in the face of uncertainty 
brings with it the need to imagine other worlds and possibilities, in which we are 
closely entangled with others. This in turn will almost inevitably generate further 
uncertainties. 
 In terms of epidemic response, this can create conflict between the risk- mitigating 
strategies of the response and the unruly uncertainties and vernacular responses that 
emerge ‘from below’. What are the implications of this for a different kind of pre-
paredness and response? Is there a way of promoting preparedness and response 
‘from below’? The meanings, practices and place of this, and how to promote it, are a 
work- in- progress, but some key features can be identified. This alternative approach 
would not be instigated by external agencies on the basis of maximising the use 
of social science information about the context. It requires a more respectful and 
empowering approach, in which people – especially in precarious contexts – shape 
the core of this response in a more autonomous way. The role of external agencies 
would be to support and build on these practices, enabling local ideas, innovations, 
institutions, resources and responsibilities to flourish. Such an approach also requires 
a more nimble, responsive, adaptive mode, eschewing fixed plans in favour of flexi-
bility, and ongoing iterative adaptation and learning. Further, epidemic preparedness 
and response ‘from below’ would need to acknowledge difference and contestation 
in how diseases and outbreaks are understood and experienced, and the different 
kinds of politics that emerge, deliberating and co- constructing strategies accord-
ingly. Finally, an approach is needed that responds not just to the immediate needs 
of a time- bound outbreak, but that also embeds this in people’s broader and longer- 
term needs, including with respect to ‘slow emergencies’ (Anderson  et al.  2019 ). 
This means an approach that is not just (or necessarily) disease- specific, but that is 
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also engaged with other priorities around security, livelihoods and the ability to live 
a meaningful and dignified personal and social life. Embracing such approaches will 
require a step change among global agencies and science- policy communities, but 
the current and future challenges of preparing and responding well and humanely 
to disease outbreaks amid uncertainties demands nothing less. 
 Notes 
 1  For example, the Global Virome project and the Global Viral Forecasting aim to listen to the 
‘chatter’ of viruses and other microbes and contain them ‘at source’. Programmes like the 
USAID- funded PREDICT ( www.usaid.gov/ news- information/ fact- sheets/ emerging- 
pandemic- threats- program ) and the Eco- Health Alliance ( www.ecohealthalliance.org/ 
program/ emerging- disease- hotspots ) have looked at disease emergence to identify gen-
etics, geographies and species to remain alert to. 
 2  www.who.int/ features/ qa/ health- emergencies- programme/ en/ . 
 3  www.socialscienceinaction.org/ . 
 4  CASS is ground- breaking as it does not sit under the Risk Communication- Community 
Engagement pillar of response, but under the Strategic Commission of the DRC Ministry 
of Health, so feeding into all pillars of response. 
 5  The idea of ‘preparedness from below’ is being explored through the Wellcome Trust- 
supported project ‘Pandemic preparedness:  local and global concepts and practices in 
tackling disease threats in Africa’, co- led by Leach and MacGregor ( www.ids.ac.uk/ 
programme- and- centre/ pandemic- preparedness/ ). 
 6  Personal communication, village chief in Sierra Leone. 
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 DISASTERS, HUMANITARIANISM 
AND EMERGENCIES 
 A politics of uncertainty 
 Mark Pelling, Detlef M ü ller- Mahn and John McCloskey 
 Introduction 
 A central tenet of disaster risk management is reducing uncertainties to manage-
able risks, such that, where possible, probabilities of outcomes are known or at least 
predictable. Thus, the starting points for research and policy are to reduce uncer-
tainty through improved knowledge of hazard processes to enable better event 
forecasting, but also to understand better how information on risk is communicated 
and accessed, and the social and political processes that constrain what individ-
uals and organisations can do with such information – since early warning needs 
early and inclusive action. This approach has delivered considerable gains in regions 
exposed to weather extremes, including coastal lands and rainfall- dependent agri-
cultural communities. 
 One of the greatest global achievements for this style of risk- based science has 
been the reduction in the number of people killed and harmed by flood events 
since records began in the 1980s (UNISDR  2019 ). Global loss data are available 
from the 1980s to present, allowing long- term trend analysis over this period. This 
shows declining mortality even when the number of flood events has increased. 
Losses to property and people affected have increased over this period, indicating 
the further challenge of reducing risk that goes beyond effective evacuation. This 
success is as a direct outcome of reduced uncertainty across all aspects of flood 
warning and response drawing together inputs from natural and social sciences. 
This gain is especially impressive when seen alongside the increased number of 
reported flood events from all causes, and the increasing number of people made 
homeless and suffering property damage. Flood risk is increasing as more people 
and property are exposed to flood hazard, with climate change acting as a hazard 
multiplier, but reduced uncertainty in knowledge about the likelihood of outcomes 
and how to act on early warning has enabled more people to make decisions to 
avoid personal harm. 
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 The success of this type of approach to reduce flood risk is important because 
it highlights the multiple factors required for success. Yet uncertainties are present 
in all areas of knowledge production and decision- making in the knowledge chain 
that underpins such early warnings. One of the key lessons from the success referred 
to is that reducing uncertainty in ways that can allow individuals to make decisions 
and avoid harm is best achieved through interdisciplinary knowledge production 
coupled with cross- sectoral policy action. The length of the knowledge produc-
tion chain is captured well by the World Meteorological Organisation HiWeather 
project ( http:// hiweather.net ) ( Figure  9.1 ). This identifies six specific stages of 
technical expertise as components of a knowledge chain. At each step, different 
combinations of science are needed to address specific technical challenges, and 
so to better articulate knowledge and identify knowledge gaps to describe the sig-
nificance of remaining known uncertainties. Each of these stages helps describe 
known uncertainty brought about by incomplete data, modelling and theoretical 
assumptions and biases in understanding and communication. Because know-
ledge to reduce risk is produced across multiple stages, additional uncertainty is 
introduced through the transfer or exchange of data, understanding and infor-
mation from one site of expertise to another. Such exchanges often require data 
transformation, for example where model output and input work at different spa-
tial scales or where additional variables have to be interpolated to allow analysis. 
Although uncertainties may of course not be reduced through such a knowledge 
chain, the hoped- for result is not a compounding of but a reduction in uncertainty 
in understanding for the end- user: the citizen at risk contemplating evacuation. It 
is worth noting the origin of  Figure 9.1 , which reflects the ambition of weather 
forecasters to make their work as relevant as possible to end- users. The result in this 
figure is a representation of a knowledge chain that is linear and emphasises formal 
scientific knowledge. This allows a clear delimitation of opportunities to improve 
the quality of early warnings – through each stage and bridges between them. It 
also prompts the question ‘How would other actors view knowledge production?’ 
from a more bottom- up viewpoint. For example, it might be that these stages are 
compressed into compound acts of assessment, often including informal or local 
knowledge based on experience. It is likely, from this perspective, that the final deci-
sion stage might be more central. 
 FIGURE 9.1  The knowledge chain for flood early warning
Source: Crown copyright (Golding  et al . 2019) 
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 The historical progression in disaster studies from a hazard to a people- centred 
approach, and more recently to an integrative and multidisciplinary framing where 
a range of epistemic logics has been recognised (including local knowledge), has 
increased awareness of uncertainties and the ambiguities buried deep in multiple 
knowledge production and communication efforts. More than this, the extension 
of disaster studies into interdisciplinary analysis (where physical and social science 
approaches are blended or synthesised) – for example in risk analysis that combines 
hazard likelihood with the susceptibility, coping and adaptation of people and 
their asset systems – has brought to the surface the political nature of knowledge. 
Science does not have a unique claim on legitimacy for knowledge production, 
even where its methods are more transparent and defendable. Local knowledge 
based on personal experience and indigenous knowledge rooted in cultural iden-
tity are increasingly recognised as being part of the conversation out of which 
knowledge becomes relevant to specific decision- makers’ needs. Here the robust-
ness and transparency of the scientific method is also key in bringing account-
ability to decision- making and confidence to action. The scientific method, with 
its roots in replicability and falsification of analysis, brings clarity to linear questions 
of cause and effect – as exemplified in  Figure 9.1 . Recent innovations in disaster 
science have pushed at the boundaries of complexity theory, where cause and effect 
are less clearly connected – with multiple intervening and dynamic variables. This 
makes scientific work less transparent to non- experts. A  central dilemma facing 
disaster studies is how expert analysis interacts with other knowledge traditions in 
developing more integrated understandings. 
 Where different knowledge traditions are clear about embedded uncertainties 
and open to a reinterpretation of positions, together with evidence- based science, 
there is scope for a nuanced confrontation of uncertainty. Where science or other 
knowledge traditions reject each other’s assumptions, value positions and findings, 
uncertainty is likely to be ignored and improved outcomes are more difficult to 
anticipate. 
 Uncertainty has become more visible as research has expanded its knowledge 
base through interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary work and the increasing inclu-
sion of local/ traditional knowledge. There is much debate on how to best do 
this, from weather forecasting in a daily news bulletin to flagging future climate 
scenarios integrated with specific economic futures. The latter places less emphasis 
on describing uncertainty as a qualifier on analysis and rather works in a constant 
state of contestation where few complex concepts like poverty, vulnerability, resili-
ence or development have a concrete meaning or material expression. 
 The remainder of this chapter explores these two traditions from particular 
viewpoints, reflected in the authorship of this chapter. The next section, emerging 
from a social science perspective, examines the social construction of uncertainty 
and certitude within studies of social vulnerability and resilience in Africa, while the 
following section, taking a more physical science perspective, takes us from weather 
and climate science to an exploration of risk and uncertainty and the implications 
for earthquake science and modelling. Both sections reflect on a common set of 
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themes outlined in  Box 9.1 , to which we return again in conclusion to tease out 
similarities and differences between these two traditions of disaster risk research. 
 BOX 9.1  FOUR AREAS OF QUESTIONING TO EXPLORE THE 
POSITION OF UNCERTAINTY IN DIFFERENT KNOWLEDGE 
PRODUCTION CONTEXTS 
 Knowledge : Where does uncertainty or ambiguity sit? Is it inherent within 
the methodologies deployed, inherited from external inputs or consequential 
through the use others make of knowledge and data that have been produced? 
 Communication: How, if at all, is uncertainty communicated? Is this a major 
or minor aspect? Is the balance right or are disciplinary norms and expectations 
for the communication of uncertainty in need of revision? 
 Response: If we accept that uncertainties are always present in science and 
decision- making then are there progressive or productive uses to which uncer-
tainty can be put? What kinds of actors or discourses tend to dominate when 
the level of uncertainty is high? Can such actors be enabled to open space for 
more inclusive processes of knowledge production and progressive outcomes 
for knowledge application in decision- making? 
 Ethics: What are the ethical implications for researchers in managing uncer-
tainty and its communication? Is the existing ethical approach right for the 
complexities we face in integrating physical and social science with local or 
indigenous knowledge? 
 A social science perspective: uncertainty as a challenge for 
disaster risk management in Africa 
 Uncertainty presents a serious challenge for disaster risk management because 
it impedes pre- emption. As a consequence, precaution becomes imperative but 
difficult to achieve. Disaster prevention and management require the reduc-
tion of uncertainty  – or, more precisely, the translation of forms of uncer-
tainty and ignorance into calculable probabilities (i.e. risk). But what if this is 
not possible? What if disaster risk management cannot avoid knowledge gaps 
and unpredictable events? Embracing uncertainty first and foremost requires 
an understanding of its causes and consequences. Situations characterised by 
uncertainty may originate from lack of knowledge and experience, unprece-
dented events or new and unpredictable conditions. Climate change is a major 
driver of newly emerging uncertainties, especially in poor countries. This 
section of the chapter focuses on the social construction of uncertainty in the 
context of climate change and natural disasters in Africa. The African continent 
is often portrayed as the continent that is most seriously affected by climate 
change due to its exposure to extreme events, high vulnerability and limited 
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coping capacities (IPCC AR- 5  2014 ). This raises a number of questions: How 
is uncertainty socially constructed and communicated? In which way are real 
and constructed uncertainties related? And how does this matter for disaster 
risk management? These themes are explored in the four sub- sections below, 
linking to the questions posed in  Box 9.1 . 
 Uncertainty, just like risk, can be viewed from a realist and from a construct-
ivist perspective. The realist perspective claims to build upon scientifically produced 
‘facts’. It acknowledges that some aspects of the future are simply not predictable, 
such as events related to tipping points, complex human– environment relations 
and unforeseeable system changes. The constructivist perspective, on the other 
hand, embraces people ́ s perceptions, imaginations and feelings of unknown futures 
(Cooper and Pratten  2015 ). It refers to the ways in which individuals or societies 
live with uncertainty, how they get  along with insufficient knowledge and how 
they navigate their future without a clear vision of what to expect. From a con-
structivist view, the shapes and contents of both knowledge and uncertainty are 
partly constituted not just by ‘the facts’ (as highlighted in the realist view), but by 
social orders acting on the processes of knowledge production. In other words: to a 
realist, knowledge (and uncertainty) are effectively shaped solely by the conditions 
of the focal objects; to a constructivist they are also shaped by the conditions of the 
subjects of knowledge. 
 The distinction between realist and constructivist concepts is important because 
human behaviour does not so much respond to the world as it is, but rather as it is 
perceived. In practice, however, ‘real’ and ‘socially constructed’ uncertainties are dif-
ficult to differentiate, as can be seen in the context of climate change. 
 Climate- related uncertainties in Africa can be traced back to diverse origins 
(IPCC AR- 5  2014 ; Niang  et al.  2014 ). First, the future effects of climate change on 
the continent are expected to be highly heterogeneous in space. As a consequence, 
place- specific predictions are often quite inaccurate. While most of the continent is 
likely to receive less rainfall, eastern Africa will probably receive more – but highly 
erratic – rains. Second, model- based forecasts of future climate change in Africa are 
less refined than in other parts of the world due to a relatively weak data base and 
short time of observation. Third, environmental change is caused not by climate 
alone but by complex human– environment interactions that cannot be predicted. 
Fourth, societal transformations play an essential role in future disaster risks and 
coping capacities in Africa, but they are not predictable. And, finally, cross- scalar 
influences and power relations are decisive for local agency and the struggle for 
control. 
 A recent IPCC special report mentions the impact of climate change on 
growing disparities and social disintegration in Africa (IPCC  2019 ). It leaves no 
doubt that there has been an increased frequency of droughts in African drylands 
over the past few decades, which, together with population pressure, exacerbates 
land degradation. This is affecting the productivity of land use systems in large parts 
of the continent, leading to a deterioration of food security and local livelihoods. 
The report, in turn, draws attention to regional heterogeneity, cascading risks, 
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telecoupling 1 and socially differentiated effects on women, the elderly and the 
poor (IPCC  2019 : 17).  
 To give an example, the Afar pastoralists in Ethiopia have a long experience of 
living with multiple risks, including highly variable rainfall, recurring droughts and 
famines, sudden outbursts of violent clashes and disruptions of trade connections 
and markets due to changing international relations between Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Djibouti and Somalia (M ü ller- Mahn  et  al.  2010 ). The overlapping livelihood 
challenges are today further enhanced by newly emerging uncertainties. Rainfall 
anomalies are occurring more frequently. The expansion of irrigated farms and 
new infrastructure reduces access to pasture lands, while the uncontrollable inva-
sion of alien species undermines rangeland quality. Under these conditions, the Afar 
feel that they are surrounded by enemies. They experience uncertainty not only in 
terms of unpredictability, but – worse than that – as a situation in which they are 
losing control over what is happening, and the capacity to cope. 
 The social construction of uncertainty is based on communication among actors 
about shared future visions. In situations where the outcome of ongoing processes 
cannot be foreseen, and where future conditions remain concealed, decision- 
making lacks clear reference points. People are therefore searching for collective 
orientations. They rely on each other in order to obtain clues for decision- making. 
Communication over uncertainties may lead to ‘fictional expectations’ (Beckert 
 2016 ): in other words, shared imaginations regarding what is going to happen in 
the future. These joint expectations are essential for making people act collectively. 
By sharing visions of the future, people come to an understanding about what may 
be expected, or feared, and how to prepare for it. 
 Experts and lay people frame uncertainty differently, which has consequences 
for how uncertainties are responded to. While experts encounter uncertainty as 
a limitation of scientific methods, forecasts and planning, others instead view it as 
a quotidian experience, something they cannot influence – and thus have to take 
for granted. Against this backdrop, communication among and between experts 
and lay people becomes important in order to find common understandings and 
orientations. 
 To give another example, a case study in C ô te d’Ivoire revealed how farming 
communities respond to climate- related uncertainties that go beyond the ‘normal’ 
rainfall variability of previous years (M ü ller- Mahn  et al.  2020 ). Over the past two 
decades many farmers adopted new crop varieties that are more resilient to dry 
spells, or they shifted cultivation to areas with better water supplies. But today the 
increasingly unpredictable onset of the rainy season makes it extremely difficult for 
farmers to decide when to start cultivation. They cannot fully rely on traditional 
experience, nor do they trust the weather forecasts. While people are waiting for 
the beginning of the rainy season, the feeling of uncertainty among community 
members passes through stages of unrest, hope and despair. People communicate 
intensively over their assessment of the situation, with the effect that some simply 
follow the practices they know, while others feel more inclined towards new strat-
egies to secure household incomes outside of agriculture. 
Disasters, humanitarianism and emergencies 133
 How can the uncertainties of drought and famine be responded to in practice? 
Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance have developed a number 
of instruments for that purpose, which aim at strengthening local resilience against 
drought, or improving external assistance to alleviate its consequences. An example 
of a resilience- building approach is the drought cycle management model. It 
provides a disaster risk management strategy that uses the periods between droughts 
to prepare for the next one by better linking activities of development, relief and 
rehabilitation. The approach is based on an analysis of the underlying causes of vul-
nerability at household levels and the dynamic pressures that enhance vulnerability 
further, and an assessment of coping capacities and disaster preparedness (Br ü ntrup 
and Tsegai  2017 ). 
 An example of improved external assistance is the Famine Early Warning 
Systems Network that is used for the organisation of famine relief. FEWSNET is an 
information platform that provides data on current and expected food insecurities 
at country and regional levels for most parts of the world, including all of Africa 
(see:   https:// fews.net/ ). It was established by the US Agency for International 
Development in 1985, and it has since helped to manage food crises more effect-
ively by analysing data on rainfalls, yields, markets, prices and regional food stocks. 
These data are combined with observations on local livelihoods, trade and the polit-
ical environment. FEWSNET publishes monthly bulletins that classify the observed 
state of food insecurity, from stress to emergency and famine. Such early warning 
systems use scenarios that link the observation of present food security assessments 
with informed assumptions about future events. Based on these assumptions and 
future scenarios, it is possible to prepare for emerging crises, for example by con-
centrating food stocks in regions that are expected to be most seriously affected. 
 However, critical voices point out that the combination of drought cycle man-
agement and famine early warning is insufficient to overcome the challenges of 
uncertainty. Managing the uncertainties of drought and famine in Africa more 
effectively would require a better integration between short- term humanitarian 
assistance, long- term development and political activities to support peace and 
human security. This is often lacking, especially in areas affected by violent conflicts, 
such as Somalia (Medinilla  et al.  2019 ). 
 In designing responses to climate uncertainty, ethical implications arise 
concerning the acknowledgement of local knowledge, felt needs and local 
perspectives. Uncertainty does not only present a challenge for the future, it also 
represents an opportunity:  can uncertainty open up new spaces for alternative 
developments, innovation and desirable futures? 
 Uncertainty in Africa, like anywhere else, may concern all aspects of life, with 
negative as well as positive connotations (Cooper and Pratten  2015 ). This raises 
the question whether there is anything special about uncertainty in Africa. The 
understanding of uncertainty in Africa is embedded in the historical relations 
between the global North and South. This relationship has stimulated controversial 
debates about the dynamics of contemporary world society, and about uncertainty 
as a distinguishing characteristic of societies in the global North and South. Current 
134 Mark Pelling et al.
debates on the concepts of ‘risk society’ (Beck  1992 ) and ‘imagined futures’ (Beckert 
 2016 ) are informed by the historical experience of the industrialised North, where 
technological risks are seen as unavoidable side- effects of modernity. It would, how-
ever, be misleading to view the global South simply in juxtaposition to this, as the 
realm of uncertainty, where future changes in nature and society cannot be properly 
predicted and managed (Bloemertz  et al.  2012 ). 
 A physical science perspective: the challenges of forecasting 
earthquakes 
 On 28 March 2005 the magnitude 8.7 Nias earthquake ruptured the Sunda 
megathrust fault where the Indo- Australian plate is being forced under the Eurasian 
plate. The earthquake, at the time the fourth biggest ever instrumentally recorded, 
produced strong shaking in the islands of the Sumatran forearc and along the 
densely populated west Sumatran coastline, causing significant damage and more 
than 1,000 deaths (Hsu  et al.  2005 ). While the impact of such a large earthquake was 
not surprising, and perhaps less severe than might have been expected, this earth-
quake was unique in that its approximate location and energy release had been fore-
cast in a paper that was published in an international peer- reviewed science journal 
only 11 days previously (McCloskey  et al.  2008 ). On the one hand, this forecast 
could be viewed as a confirmation of the physical understanding of crustal physics 
that enabled it, but, on the other, for many – including its authors – it confirmed 
the fundamental intractability of earthquake prediction: a step change in precision 
from forecasting where, when and how big future events might be. 
 Earthquakes communicate by stress transfer. A  large earthquake deforms the 
earth’s crust around it, changing the stress field on neighbouring earthquake faults 
(Stein  1999 ; King  et  al.  1994 ), bringing some closer to failure and triggering 
aftershocks, some of which can be very large. In the decade before the Nias 
event, physical scientists had developed techniques for calculating this so- called 
Coulomb stress and identifying particular faults that were made more dangerous by 
the occurrence of any large earthquake (Hubert- Ferrari  et al.  2000 ; Nalbant  et al. 
 1998 ). Statistical assessments of aftershock sequences had repeatedly demonstrated 
that these calculations had the ability to explain the distributions of triggered events 
(e.g. Toda  et al.  2011 ). Estimation of the Coulomb stress from the great Sumatra- 
Andaman earthquake, which produced the Indian Ocean tsunami, resolved onto 
neighbouring active fault segments, combined with considerations of their seismic 
history, allowed researchers to suggest an increased risk that was confirmed by the 
Nias event. 
 Remarkably, the causative stress change was less than 0.1 megaPascal (Nalbant 
 et al.  2005 ), which is less than the stress caused by a handshake. The precise mech-
anism whereby this geologically imperceptible perturbation broke the grip holding 
some small part of the opposing sides of the fault together is not properly under-
stood, but the resulting non- linear amplification of the rupture process eventu-
ally broke an area of 50,000km 2 , displacing the fault by as much as 15 metres 
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and releasing energy equivalent to 1,000 times the bomb dropped by the US on 
Hiroshima. This avalanche of energy release was probably initiated 20km below the 
seafloor. The following paragraphs draw on this case, and other earthquake events, 
to explore the set of questions outlined earlier, from a physical science perspective. 
 Geophysical scientists frequently distinguish two sources of uncertainty. Aleatory, 
or statistical, uncertainty results from lack of knowledge of the time- varying state of 
a system – here, the precise distribution of the stress on, and the strength of, the Nias 
fault segment, the precise distribution of slip on the Sumatran- Andaman earth-
quake, and the precise history of tectonic stress accumulation on the plate interface. 
Epistemic – or systematic – uncertainty, by contrast, emerges from an insufficient 
understanding of the physical processes that govern the earthquake event. In this 
case, tectonic convergence of the plates increases their mutual stress for hundreds of 
years and interactions with neighbouring earthquakes increase it rapidly and locally. 
Thus, the forecast of the Nias event was successful because the epistemic uncer-
tainty in the problem was relatively small, the seismic and tectonic history were 
reasonably well understood, and the physical link between cause (the Sumatra- 
Andaman earthquake) and effect (the Nias earthquake) was well enough described 
by the equations governing the Coulomb stress calculations. 
 Perhaps more importantly, the problem was sufficiently well posed to promote 
the epistemic clarity of the physical process above the aleatory uncertainty in the 
initial conditions. While uncertainty in the precise initial conditions precluded spe-
cification of the exact hypocentral location, and lack of knowledge of the loading 
history precluded specification of the event origin time, the large area of inter-
action identified, and the lack of specificity in the forecast, cast the net wide enough 
that many different futures were consistent with a successful forecast. This does not 
imply any duplicity. Rather, it reflects a careful consideration of the physical process 
(through accurate calculation of the Coulomb stress resolved on large areas of appro-
priate active structures with a known seismic and tectonic history) maximising the 
chances of an accurate forecast over an unspecified time into the future. 
 While the location and size of a magnitude 8.7 earthquake being deterministic-
ally forecast 11 days before it happened might be considered a success of physical 
science, this success came at a very high price. Firstly, this case demonstrates that 
large earthquakes can be triggered by almost infinitesimally small perturbations, and 
that, despite the underpinning determinism of the process, this – paradoxically – 
probably precludes deterministic forecasting of particular events. The precision with 
which the initial conditions are required to be known 20km below the ocean 
floor makes such prediction of this, or any other, rupture initiation an impossibility. 
Secondly, the non- linear amplification of the initial rupture required to produce a 
massive failure is controlled by the detail of the stress on the Nias fault segment and 
recent observations expose the fractal complexity of earthquake slip, and suggest 
that slip, even after rupture initiation, is also inherently unpredictable. The earth-
quake is one possible outcome of a game of tectonic bagatelle and successive events 
on the same fault are completely different (Lindsay  et al.  2016 ; Nic Bhloscaidh  et al. 
 2015 ; Philibosian  et al.  2014 ). 
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 This – now rarely disputed – observation provides the final blow to hopes of 
useful deterministic earthquake forecasting. If it were possible to identify segments 
of active faults with a high likelihood of rupture in the near future, and if, as in the 
Nias case, previous history made it possible to estimate the likely magnitude of the 
impending earthquake, even then we would be unlikely to make useful forecasts. 
Consider, for example, how tsunamis are generated by megathrust earthquakes. 
Strain, accumulated over hundreds of years, depresses the near- shore sea floor by 
metres and large earthquakes rupture the plate interface, allowing this century- scale 
strain energy to be released in seconds, forcing the seafloor upward over a vast area 
and producing a 10 billion tonne bulge in the sea surface. The collapse of this bulge 
generates a tsunami, the impact of which might be expected to be related simply to 
the earthquake magnitude. However, several studies (McCloskey  et al.  2008 ; Geist 
 2002 ) have shown that this is not the case. Again, the non- linear amplification, this 
time of small differences in the relationship between water depth and earthquake 
slip, result in very different impacts when viewed, for example, from the coastal city 
of Padang in western Sumatra. Almost identical earthquakes on the same segment 
of the off- shore fault might produce a 50cm wave for the city or a 5m wave – 
killing no one or possibly hundreds of thousands (Borrero  et  al.  2006 ). Similar 
numerical experiments examining the shaking produced by possible earthquake 
scenarios for Istanbul show similar divergence, both in wave amplitude measured at 
particular places and in estimated fatalities. 
 These observations have important philosophical as well as practical implications 
for the application of physical science to earthquake risk management. Despite 
undeniable advances in the understanding of the physical processes underlying large 
earthquakes, several seismic butterfly effects ensure that the outcome will always 
be a surprise (cf. Lay  2012 ). Consider a world in which earthquake physics was 
completely known and where Laplacian determinism 2 would only require accurate 
assessment of the initial conditions fully to constrain the future (and the past). 
Even then, the hope that these initial conditions might be estimated with sufficient 
accuracy to yield actionable forecasts by the techniques of geology and geophysics 
are dashed by Lorenzian exponential 3 (or even super- exponential) divergence of 
dynamical trajectories. The immutable aleatory uncertainty in our observations, 
no matter how good our epistemic understanding, forbids useful prediction of the 
outcome. In this world, conservative estimates of impact might wildly underesti-
mate the consequences of particular decisions and unfulfilled forecasts of the worst 
impacts would leave physical scientists exposed to accusations of crying wolf, fun-
damentally undermining their collective credibility. 
 What are the implications of this perspective for physical science in earth-
quake risk management? Many physical scientists now recoil from traditional 
pronouncements made with certainty and clarity that effectively made science 
and engineering the decision- makers in many development environments (cf. 
Chiarabba  et al.  2009 ). For some, this is a cause for celebration but, spurious as this 
over- confidence might have been, the potential vacuum thus created is unlikely 
to be filled by better assessments of risk. Allowing this, the challenge becomes a 
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reassessment of what can be learned by scientific risk estimation, and finding a more 
nuanced, and perhaps a more modest, role for its insights. 
 In the Global Challenges Research Fund Urban Disaster Risk Hub ( www.
tomorrowscities.org ), attempts are being made to use the enduring convening 
power of physical science simulation, rather than its certainty. In this approach, 
simulations of the consequences of particular development choices are used to con-
vene multidisciplinary teams of decision- makers who provide multiple perspectives 
to illuminate complex development decisions. Rather than usurping decision 
authority, science now becomes a tool for decision support. Rather than scientists 
providing definitive forecasts, they relegate the consequences of immutable alea-
tory uncertainty and promote the epistemic certainty of well- constrained physical 
principles to a supporting role in a multidisciplinary process. Time will tell if this is 
a more effective, sustainable role for geophysical science. 
 Conclusion 
 Responding to the questions posed in  Box 9.1 , the accounts of uncertainty 
presented here, from quite different perspectives and in very different contexts, 
agree on four fundamental properties of knowledge production in the context of 
disaster risk management and international development: 
 Uncertainty is prevalent throughout disaster research . Uncertainty is a product of 
the complexities of physical and social processes and their interactions. There are 
some areas that are more predictable than others:  flood risk as a consequence of 
upstream river catchment rainfall and river level rise is highly predictable when all 
catchment characteristics are known in detail. However, anticipating the probabil-
ities of outcomes becomes difficult where non- linear physical or social processes 
distance observable phenomena from potential outcomes – in time, space and scale. 
It is much harder to predict flooding accurately in urban catchments due to the 
complexity and dynamism of land use, or to predict earthquakes based on observ-
able changes in crustal stress. 
 As knowledge has grown, so has awareness of the uncertainties that constrain this know-
ledge. Researchers have been very successful in their mission to resolve knowledge 
gaps in the understanding and predictability of social and physical systems behav-
iour. However, the history of disaster studies shows that greater depth of know-
ledge, while offering specific insights, tends then to reveal further the complexity, 
context- specificity and ambiguity of revealed knowledge. 
 Uncertainties are likely to continue into the future and so must be embraced. Research 
that seeks to push forward the frontiers of knowledge is key to scientific endeavour 
and its social contribution. It is tempting for researchers to claim to have reduced 
uncertainty through their work. For research findings to be useful to society it is 
important also to recognise that uncertainties remain even as knowledge grows. 
The pressures on academics to publish results that emphasise comprehensiveness 
and certainty does not allow broader uncertainties embedded in question framing, 
methodology and interpretation to be fully expressed. This is compounded in 
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aggregate reviews and integrated assessments, where uncertainties may be system-
atically overlooked. This challenge is especially important for disaster risk studies, 
which are often interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary. With knowledge crossing 
domains of expertise it becomes more difficult for researchers to bring expert 
judgement to questions of uncertainty embedded in research processes and yet not 
made explicit through publication or other formal reporting. 
 Managing the presentation of uncertainty is a challenge for scientists working with 
policy- makers and the public, who look to science to reduce uncertainty. The case of 
L’Aquila in Italy, where seven public officials were tried for having allegedly 
given out misleading and incorrect information to the public before the 6 
April 2009 earthquake, has highlighted how exposed scientific comment (and 
scientists) can be when knowledge is taken into politicised and emotive contexts 
(Alexander  2014 ). There remains a popular assumption that the role of science is 
to make the world more understandable, not to reveal its uncertainties. Indeed, 
the public legitimacy of scientists as ‘speakers of truth through evidence’ rests 
on this. As science moves more deeply into researching the behaviour of non- 
linear systems and processes of production of risks and uncertainties, so the gap 
between popular (and political) expectations of science, and the actual practice 
of science, grows. 
 These four fundamentals of uncertainty within the context of disaster studies 
reveal an increasing tendency for science to move from providing society with 
increased certainty and having its legitimacy built on bringing clarity, towards 
a situation where natural, physical and social science is one arbiter among 
other arbiters of diverse knowledges that are always partial and contingent. This 
challenge matches the movement of science from providing linear to providing 
non- linear conceptualisations of nature and society. The value of natural and 
physical science in offering a transparent and robust way into the uncertainty of 
non- linear systems, and a key challenge for the future, is to continue to commu-
nicate the value of the contribution of a broader interdisciplinary science. This 
does not mean that only the formal natural- physical scientific methodology is 
legitimate – but it does emphasise the importance of a particular type of quan-
titative rigour in the presentation of underlying conceptual and methodological 
frameworks, and the ability to communicate these in non- specialist language to 
allow such contributions to grow into the interdisciplinary spaces demanded of 
complex and non- linear phenomena. 
 At the same time, there is a danger that the technical expertise needed to 
understand such cutting-edge research could push this type of science into elite 
spaces – with only experts being seen as having the analytical tools to make sense 
of uncertainty; or that the burden for decision- making under uncertainty is unrea-
sonably placed into the hands of local actors with constrained access to appropriate 
interpretive tools. Instead, researchers have a responsibility to work with uncer-
tainty in disaster management as a mechanism for the levelling of formal expertise. 
Realising this opportunity is perhaps the greatest challenge facing contemporary 
research that aims to make a difference in the world. 
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 Notes 
 1  Telecoupling refers to interactions between distant social-ecological systems (Hull and Liu 
2018). 
 2  The mathematician Pierre Simon Laplace argued, in 1814, that if we knew the precise 
location and momentum of every atom in the universe, the entire past and future could 
be calculated from the laws of classical mechanics. Thus, if we knew the physical law per-
fectly (no epistemic uncertainty), knowledge of the precise state of the fault would allow 
the perfect description of all past and future events. 
 3  Ed Lorenz was the meteorologist who, in his paper of 1963, first described the butterfly 
effect. Tiny changes in initial conditions are amplified through dynamics to render the 
future extremely unpredictable. 
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 INTERTWINING THE POLITICS 
OF UNCERTAINTY, MOBILITY 
AND IMMOBILITY 
 Dorte Thorsen 
 Introduction 
 The idea of uncertainty lingers beneath mobilities involving the search for work, 
better fortunes and different lives. This is regardless of whether these mobilities 
involve short- term circular labour migration or have no temporal limits, or whether 
they traverse regional or transnational spaces. But the conception of how uncer-
tainty and mobility are linked, and with what outcome, varies. 
 From one perspective, the combination of uncertainty and risk in the so- called 
sending countries instigates mobility. People are forced to leave their home areas 
to counter poverty and deficiencies in opportunity – what is often spoken about 
as the root causes of mobility. From the perspective of the so- called host countries, 
the influx of (certain types of) migrants is perceived potentially to unsettle the 
existing state- of- affairs. Strategies to mitigate this risk attempt to deter migrants 
by informing potential migrants about the dangers encountered when crossing 
borders undocumented, and by creating an hostile environment in which migrants 
are unable to achieve their goals or the costs of trying to do so become too high. 
A third perspective is that of migrants themselves. Although they are not at all a 
homogenous group, and their experiences are differentiated by race, ethnicity, class, 
gender and age, migrants have in common that uncertainty can create barriers and 
be productive at the same time. At the individual level, uncertainty can be ‘a social 
resource [that] can be used to negotiate insecurity, conduct and create relationships, 
and act as a source for imagining the future with the hopes and fears that entails’ 
(Cooper and Pratten  2015 : 2). 
 The way that risk and uncertainty are conceptualised in these three perspectives 
is inherently social and political, and it is important to recognise that institutions 
of different types are central in producing  and resisting uncertainty. On the one 
hand, we have a global political economy of deep structural inequality that permits 
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the angst of publics and policy- makers to set the agenda for how mobilities are 
understood. This perspective undergirds restrictive regimes of mobility and 
hardened border controls. And it denies legal mobilities to an increasing propor-
tion of populations in the global South, cutting them off from ways of achieving 
a better life for themselves and their families (Kleist  2016 ). On the other hand, we 
have informal institutions – such as families, marriage, social networks – that do 
not figure prominently in policy discussions of uncertainty, despite the fact that 
these informal institutions are just as central in shaping the distribution of risk, 
uncertainty and opportunity (Thorsen  2017 ). Being very diverse, and inherently 
socio- cultural, these institutions contribute to the contours of uncertainty in quite 
a different manner. 
 This chapter is the outcome of a roundtable discussion exploring how the pol-
itics of preventing (irregular) migration and migrants’ subtle practices of contesting 
the power of states intersect with the fundamental sentiments of contemporary 
mobilities: hope, anticipation, precarity and disappointment. The contributors 1 to 
the roundtable discussion study mobilities, immobilities and migration in Africa to 
illuminate the larger issues of social change, political economy and material cultures. 
Reflecting long- term and deep engagements with the field, this chapter leans on 
phenomenological approaches to explore a lived politics of uncertainty in migrants’ 
life- worlds. 
 The chapter starts by reflecting on how migration policies produce a mobility 
paradox for many Africans, who project their ideas about the good life onto other 
places, and how this paradox spills over into the capacity to hope. The following 
section examines the disconnect between information campaigns to prevent 
irregular mobilities and the persistent actions among irregular migrants to realise 
the hoped- for future. Then, with a focus on gender, the chapter discusses the influ-
ence of the state and informal institutions on individuals’ agency. 
 Contours of uncertainty and hope in African mobilities 
 Policies and interventions surrounding mobility have become increasingly centred 
on management, prevention and crisis control over the past few decades. Although 
labour markets globally thrive on the circulation of workers, the dominant rhetoric 
intimates an uncontrolled over- supply of labour, often of the wrong type, which 
in turn nourishes discursive distinctions between wanted and unwanted migrants 
(Fassin  2011 ; Squire  2011 ). In this language, mobility is associated with risk and 
uncertainty in countries and regions perceived to be at the receiving end of migra-
tory flows, and this discourse sanctions a technocratic approach that seeks to stem 
the influx of unwanted migrants. 
 Although the dominant rhetoric is a product of politics in the global North, 
it is not foreign in the African context. For decades, foreign nationals have been 
labelled as irregular migrants, their local mobility has been curbed and expulsions of 
migrants have been articulated as part of national security concerns during conflict 
or crisis, or as part of broader efforts to curb migration (Adepoju  2005 ; Bredeloup 
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and Zongo  2005 ). Migrants across Africa have experienced a hostile environment – 
their identity papers and residence cards are inspected at random by state authorities 
and others, who regularly demand levies whether the papers are incomplete or not 
(Bredeloup  2012 ; Landau and Freemantle  2010 ; Whitehouse  2009 ). ‘Irregularity’ 
and ‘illegality’ in these cases is a political construction that is used to criminalise and 
exclude certain groups of migrants (Bredeloup  2012 ; Inda  2011 ). 
 However, the rhetoric that has mushroomed in regional and local discourses 
on cross- border mobilities in sub- Saharan Africa is not about expulsion. Since 
2000, strategic advocacy by Northern states and agreements such as the Cotonou 
Agreement and the Rabat Process, which focus on the relationships between 
the EU and Africa, have tied the patrol of European borders into development 
assistance (Mazzella and Perrin  2019 ; Aguillon  2018 ). These compacts impel African 
countries to formulate national migration strategies and legislate about permissible 
and non- permissible mobilities of their citizens (Glick Schiller and Salazar  2013 ). 
Through controlling its subjects, the state becomes actively implied in the distri-
bution of hope, by facilitating some types of mobilities but not others and, in some 
countries, by regulating the costs of regular migration. 
 The tightening of borders has happened at a time when rising inequalities glo-
bally and locally have paved the way for new uncertainties and disenchantment 
with the  status quo . Yearning for a different type of life relates to aspirations to 
acquire purchasing power and upward social mobility, but there is also a more exist-
ential side to mobility: discovering other places and other life conditions (Awedoba 
and Hahn  2014 ; Bredeloup  2014 ). The shrinking of legal mobility opportunities 
and the rising popularity of projecting ideas of what constitutes ‘the good life’ onto 
Europe, the Middle East or elsewhere amounts to a mobility paradox for many 
African migrants (Kleist and Thorsen  2016 ). 
 And yet, the preference in the global labour market for temporary legal mobilities 
to plug labour gaps offers opportunities, often to new categories of migrants with 
the desired skills, gender and age. As national regimes of mobility target several 
types of mobilities, including that of their own citizens, this shift is premised on 
states allowing their subjects to accept overseas opportunities. Moreover, since new 
mobilities generate wide and deep repercussions in regard to the social fabric of 
migrants’ home communities, a shift also requires that the gatekeepers of informal 
institutions accept that normative boundaries for what hitherto has been seen as 
appropriate behaviour are pushed (e.g. in Ethiopia – Thorsen  et al .  forthcoming ; 
Fernandez  2020 ). Additional dimensions are thus added to uncertainty and the 
mobility paradox, in as much as the outcome of mobility often varies between 
different categories of migrants. 
 For many people in Africa, and especially those from resource- poor backgrounds, 
mobility for work is an important model of realising a different and better life. 
It is premised on hope. According to Ernst Bloch ( 1972 ) hope is an horizon of 
opportunity and limitation. In other words, hope encompasses the potentiality of 
a future elsewhere, along with a degree of uncertainty because both the future 
and the qualities of elsewhere are unknown. For migrants and their families, the 
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potentiality of mobility is within the realm of the imaginable. Hope inspires action, 
but entails waiting. It requires migrants and their relatives to cope with difficulties 
and journeys that have high costs, in anticipation of the future. However, hope can 
be disappointed. The inherent uncertainty means that hope always has a grain of 
doubt about achieving the hoped- for future, or having the capacity to achieve it 
(Bachelet  2016 ; Kleist  2016 ; Mar  2005 ). 
 In the contexts of West Africa and the Horn of Africa, migratory projects are 
rooted in a shared expectation of mobility being a means of economic security 
and social mobility after some time of waiting. Hope vested in both regular and 
irregular mobility is individual and at the same time collective. Adding an extra 
layer to the idea of hope, I  return to the point made above about the role of 
formal and informal institutions in producing and resisting uncertainty and poten-
tial. In Ghassan Hage’s conceptualisation, a collective form of hope, societal hope, is 
produced in societies or (transnational) networks in a specific social and historical 
context. The core content of what constitutes societal hope is shared, but hope is 
not distributed equally. Institutions like the state, society or a transnational network 
provide a mechanism for evaluating who belongs to the distributional network, in 
which way and to what degree (Hage and Papadopoulos  2004 ; Hage  2003 ). 
 In exploring a politics of uncertainty in migrants’ life- worlds, we need to bear 
in mind that their horizons of societal hope result from an amalgam of sources. 
While migrants and prospective migrants may feel the lightness of being able to 
access opportunities or the pressure of obstacles to mobility issued by the state, it is 
important to explore which state. Migrants are subjected to multiple state author-
ities:  from their homeland, to their current and possibly to their future place of 
abode. Likewise, they draw on diverse informal distributors of dominant forms of 
societal hope: the family and social networks of different kinds, stretching trans-
nationally and relaying different experiences. In combination, we begin to see the 
complex intertwining of several dominant forms of societal hope, which may gen-
erate or be a response to uncertainties. 
 The following sections explore how this intertwining materialises in the mobility 
paradox, and how it shapes the distribution among migrants and their families of 
potentialities and uncertainties across race, gender and age. 
 Politics of uncertainty in the mobility paradox 
 Contemporary mobilities are increasingly inscribed in restrictive regimes of mobility 
and much effort is spent on deterring so- called irregular migrants. The dominant 
idea that has lingered among policy- makers and practitioners for quite some time 
is that such prospective migrants are ignorant. Thus, information campaigns that 
highlight the risks, dangers and uncertainties in irregular mobilities are believed to 
dampen the interest in going. This is a fundamental misunderstanding. It is based 
on an assumption that many prospective migrants are unaware of the risks incurred 
along the overland and sea routes travelled. This way of thinking also makes implicit 
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links to a conceptualisation of migrants as individual actors deceived by criminal 
smugglers. 
 Evidence from West Africa and the Horn of Africa reveals that many of the 
migrants taking these irregular paths have migrated several times and they know 
that the journey can be uncertain and dangerous, even if they cannot foresee or 
imagine in detail what they might experience. Those who are travelling along a 
particular route for the first time seek information and advice from other migrants 
at home, at different points along the way and elsewhere (Darkwah  et  al .  2019 ; 
Kleist  2017 ). Many also prepare for their journeys spiritually and devote consider-
able sums of money to diviners and sacrifices (Tine and Thorsen  2019 ). However, 
as roundtable contributor Hans Peter Hahn stressed, prevention and information 
campaigns are more effective in controlling how imminent departures are handled 
than in deterring them. In Senegal, like elsewhere, routes have changed in response 
to border patrols, but a more significant change is the way that the planning of a 
journey has been moved out of the public realm and into the private. Secrecy now 
surrounds departures, in order to avoid detection and to avoid shame if the journey 
does not work out. 
 Roundtable contributor Nauja Kleist drew attention to how a video produced 
by the International Organization for Migration illustrates the disconnect between 
the way in which practitioners and migrants conceptualise uncertainty and poten-
tiality. The video zooms in on people narrating their experiences as irregular 
migrants, as this is assumed to provide effective and authentic evidence of the risks 
incurred on irregular journeys. One individual in the video describes his adven-
ture as playing the lotto. For IOM, the reference to a lotto is meant as a deterrent, 
in the belief that others will not dare or be willing to play the lotto with their life. 
However, in the discussion Nauja Kleist argued that for migrants the reference to 
lotto is read differently. For them, it is an uncertainty  and a potentiality because it 
is possible to win. The potentiality, in turn, fuels notions of luck and chance. These 
differences in the understanding of what uncertainty means are important and they 
shed light on the ambivalences and arbitrariness in the distribution of hope. 
 In contrast to the institutions that seek to deter irregular migration through legis-
lation or information campaigns, S é bastien Bachelet’s work with young stranded 
migrants from Cameroon and C ô te d’Ivoire in Morocco teases out that for them 
uncertainty is not an all- consuming state of life, marked by fear or doom, but 
also a ground for action (Bachelet  2016 ). Their self- identification as adventurers – 
an important trope among young male migrants from West and Central Africa, 
and increasingly also among young female migrants – signifies that, although they 
are ‘looking for their lives’ – a common phrase used in West and Central Africa 
that suggests the search for better opportunities and well- being in mobility – their 
journeys are not just endeavours for an economic end, but are also about physical 
and existential mobility. The social hope they share with migrants in similar situ-
ations has a significant element of chance – of being in the hands of God. The out-
come of their actions, then, is beyond them. They cannot influence how long they 
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have to wait because that falls under the jurisdiction of God, but they can increase 
the likelihood of being in the right place when their time comes ( ibid .). 
 In the Moroccan context, they seek to do exactly that on the border. Time after 
time, they board inflatable boats to cross the Mediterranean or participate in what 
they call ‘massive attacks’ on the border fences of the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and 
Melilla. 2 Both types of attempted border crossing are high- risk and require what 
the young men describe as the essential characteristics of an adventurer: courage, 
and mental and physical strength. Migrants ‘attacking’ the sea and land borders 
never know if they will succeed; the only way to find out is to try. They will realise 
that the right time has come only when they have physically crossed the border and 
registered with the authorities. 
 The logic among adventurers of linking the unknowable – the chance – with 
the active and persistent pursuit of the hoped- for, but unpredictable, future is a way 
of coping. They navigate complex terrains, locally and transnationally. Regardless 
of whether they inhabit the forests, coastal cities, Rabat or Casablanca, the social 
terrain in Morocco is constantly in flux, with border patrols waxing and waning 
both temporally and spatially. Random controls of papers in the street can, in a 
space of months, turn into systematic screening of the neighbourhoods where 
many migrants live, or to military campaigns to evict the forest dwellers. Authorities 
may leave migrants to work in construction sites or trade in the streets and then, a 
few months later, carry out mass deportations to the border region of Algeria, or 
mass relocations to remote areas in the south of the country. Similar fluxes happen 
within migrants’ transnational social networks, stretching across several countries. At 
one moment they receive assistance from a relative who is already abroad, or occa-
sionally from home, at another moment they are requested to contribute money to 
solve an emergency. Young adventurers thus contend with a social environment in 
which uncertainties, burdens and potentialities unfold and change (Thorsen  2017 ). 
 Uncertainty and unpredictability in their everyday lives spill into the decisions 
they make and, as Bachelet noted, every decision, small or large, may be decisive for 
the outcome of their project – and yet they are acutely aware of the limitations on 
their agency (Bachelet  2016 : 226). Their aspirations to live the good life of their 
social imaginaries are essential for understanding why they do not give up, as is 
the fact that these are not simply their individual aspirations, but those embedded 
in the societal hope of their families and communities. In research with a wider 
group of sub- Saharan migrants living in Rabat in 2012, I found that societal hope 
surrounding mobility has become vested in individuals’ ability to endure hardship, to 
find ways of circumventing barriers, to maintain hope despite hardship and to wait. 
As long as they are seen actively to pursue a better future, their courage and resist-
ance to restrictive regimes of mobility and structural violence in the border zones is 
applauded by their relatives. However, if they are perceived not to do enough or not 
to have the mental strength to endure, they are subject to critique (Thorsen  2017 ). 
 The self- representation of young migrant men as adventurers, as well as the 
expectations families have of them, is thus premised on having considerable agency 
to turn uncertainty into a social resource. 
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 The question of agency and uncertainty 
 In order to identify where the power to embrace uncertainty comes from, it is 
useful to return to those ideas that underpin the mobility paradox. The assumption 
that African migrants engage in irregular migration due to a lack of information 
implicitly implies that they have made this choice from a position of relative priv-
ilege and that different choices could have been made. Drawing on her research in 
Ethiopia, Lebanon and Kuwait with migrant domestic workers, roundtable con-
tributor Bina Fernandez noted that for the majority of people in Ethiopia, both 
men and women, the decision to migrate is based on a realistic assessment of their 
limited prospects. In short, there is no viable alternative to migration. The sources of 
uncertainty and vulnerability in Ethiopia are differentiated by class, gender and age. 
The demographic youth bulge puts pressure on land availability and on the pos-
sibility of land- based livelihoods in rural Ethiopia in particular. Although primary 
education and some degree of secondary education has expanded, most youth do 
not complete secondary education. As a result, there is a large group of young men 
and women who have enough education to produce aspirations for a better job, 
but not enough to secure a decent job. Thus, employment opportunities are limited 
and, for young women, there is almost certainty that they will be unemployed, 
whereas young men might find work in Ethiopia, albeit often casual in nature and 
low- paid (Fernandez  2020 ). 
 Young men and women are not simply individual rational actors. Their decisions 
to migrate are firmly embedded in family livelihood strategies and driven by the 
fundamental inability of families in Ethiopia to reproduce and sustain their life given 
economic and political instability. At the same time, the global labour market adds 
new dimensions to the differentiation of uncertainty and vulnerability in Ethiopia. 
Due to their skills in domestic work, young women have a comparative advan-
tage over young men in the migrant labour market in the Gulf States. Hence, they 
mostly become regular migrants, whereas young men are more likely to become 
irregular migrants in a broader range of countries and experience uncertainties akin 
to those encountered by young West African adventurers. Labour market demands 
have thus facilitated an upset in the traditional gender hierarchy, in that young 
women working in the Gulf States earn more than their male counterparts. This 
has longer- term effects in that young men do not have the resource base that 
consolidated men’s privileged social positions in the past. In families where choices 
have to be made due to a tight economy, parents may choose to support a daughter’s 
mobility rather than a son’s, thereby exacerbating the differential earning power of 
young men and women. Young female migrants anticipate that their achievements 
abroad have a positive effect on their statuses at home, and bestow on them a new 
and less subordinate position in the household (Thorsen  et al .  forthcoming ). 
 The potentiality of mobility for young Ethiopian women does not lie in the 
move away from vulnerability and inequality in the social terrain at home but 
in their return. This is not the focus of the Ethiopian state, however. Given the 
global rhetoric focused on stemming unwanted mobilities and the intersection of 
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mobility regimes, the Ethiopian state has produced a whole range of regulations, 
which, under the guise of protecting migrants, seek to control the mobilities of its 
subjects. In reality, however, some of the regulations produce conditions that lead to 
greater precarity and greater uncertainty. However, the state is operating in a con-
text where it has few enforcement capabilities and many other actors continuously 
facilitate escape from the state’s control. The role of the state is similar in the Gulf 
States. There, migrants are regulated by the Kafala system, which is a mechanism of 
control whereby their work permit is attached to the employer. Inherent instabil-
ities in this system give migrants the possibility to escape, to exit from that form 
of contract and live as irregular migrants. So, in both situations, mobility can be a 
way to escape controls imposed by states through a formal structure of certainty 
(Fernandez  2020 ). 
 Although states seek to control the distribution of societal hope through 
regulations and by communicating potential risks, they can only do so in a partial 
way. In a context where informal institutions have a much stronger influence on 
people’s everyday lives, they are likely to overrule the distributional forces of distant 
formal institutions. Even if the state sets out the contours of what people can hope 
for, societal hope embedded in informal institutions is often recognised by migrants 
as more relevant, due to the proximity of those institutions. Thus, at the micro level 
in rural Ethiopia, young women’s labour migration to the Middle East is in the pro-
cess of generating a redistribution of societal hope in the form of changing gender 
relations within families. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter set out to explore how different conceptions of the uncertainty– 
mobility nexus intersect in the formal politics of migration management, and 
how this results in contestations of the power of states and in sentiments of hope, 
anticipation, precarity and disappointment that are fundamental in contemporary 
mobilities. 
 Especially in formal policy debates, the production and outcomes of uncertainty 
are often conceived in a narrow spatial sense, focusing on either the place of origin 
or the place of residence. Within this focus, migrants are presented as social actors, 
whose life- worlds are circumscribed by the risky conditions of where they are. The 
state, in turn, is capable of regulating living conditions and mobilities, or at least is 
able to make life uncertain for those who are not seen as legitimate. 
 If we extend the analytical scope across multiple spaces and include a focus 
on informal institutions it becomes clear that migrants and their families con-
struct uncertainty and risk very differently. From this perspective, the potentiality 
of mobility outweighs the inherent uncertainty, and migrants seek to mitigate risks 
and uncertainties through social networks, as well as through faith, courage and 
patience. 
 As the chapter has shown, migratory projects are highly gendered and the 
risks and uncertainties that young men and women encounter are different. At 
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the intersection of formal and informal distributors of societal hope, the avail-
ability of legal mobilities into domestic work in the Middle East for young 
women, for example, situates them in a context with little societal hope due to 
the Kafala system. However, a focus on informal institutions reveals that these 
mobilities are in the process of expanding societal hope for women in the com-
munity of origin by gradually changing gender relations within families towards 
greater equality. 
 In conclusion, therefore, a politics of uncertainty needs to grapple with the com-
plexity of the intertwining factors that fuel hope and that make potentialities suf-
ficiently imaginable for migrants and their families to contend with uncertainties. 
 Notes 
 1  The roundtable discussion was chaired by the author and involved S é bastien Bachelet from 
Manchester University, Bina Fernandez from Melbourne University, Hans Peter Hahn 
from Frankfurt University and Nauja Kleist from the Danish Institute of International 
Studies. 
 2  Massive attacks consist of several hundred young men ‘attacking’ the six- metre high 
border fences in the depth of the night, using makeshift ladders to get across. Their sheer 
numbers sufficiently diffuse the efforts of the Moroccan and Spanish border guards to let 
a small proportion of the migrants, usually in the region of 40– 60 persons, proceed to the 
safety of the reception centre, where registration decreases the risk of informal expulsion 
to Morocco. 
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 DISPUTING SECURITY AND RISK 
 The convoluted politics of uncertainty 
 Helena Farrand Carrapico, Narzanin Massoumi, 
William McGowan and Gabe Mythen 
 Introduction 
 Uncertainty has become a prevalent, but arguably oblique, signifier in recent years, 
with economic crisis, climate emergency and the threat of terrorism contributing 
to a tangible – yet simultaneously free- floating – sense of incertitude. To speak in 
the abstract about ‘uncertainty’ in such politically charged times is thus problem-
atic. In this chapter, we argue for a grounded, context- specific account of uncer-
tainty, drawing on vignettes that enable us to think practically about the nature of 
uncertainty and to explore the ways in which incertitude connects to other polit-
ical, cultural and economic processes and forces. We will grapple with the impacts 
of discourses of uncertainty in three areas: cyber security, counter- terrorism and 
coping mechanisms in the aftermath of structural violence. It is our intention not 
only to engage with, but moreover to problematise, dominant understandings of 
‘risk’ and ‘security’ in each of these domains. Elucidating salient problems and issues, 
our intention is to be forthright in challenging settled assumptions around the 
nature of uncertainty, and also its pervasiveness. Counselling against conceptual 
overreach, we contend that the explanatory power of more traditional sociological 
frames of analysis – such as power, ideology and social control – should not be 
marginalised by the omnipresence of debates about uncertainty. 
 In order to tease out the political dimensions of uncertainty, as they intersect 
with issues of risk and security, we turn first to the case of cyber security, with a 
specific emphasis on the implications of the UK’s exit from the European Union 
for the regulation of future UK– EU security relations. From here, we explore fur-
ther the mobilisation of uncertainty as a lever for politics and policy, focusing on 
the deleterious effects of pre- emptive anti- terrorism and counter- radicalisation 
measures in the UK. Finally, we reflect on survivors’ accounts of managing uncer-
tainty in the aftermath of surviving structural violence. 
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 In order to organise our discussion we direct attention to two key themes that 
cut across and cement together research undertaken by the chapter contributors 
in these three areas. These relate, in turn, to governance, power and accountability, 
and the ideological mobilisation of uncertainty. In prioritising these themes we 
highlight some of the ways in which states engage with situations of ‘not- knowing’ 
and illuminate the ways in which political elites are able to harness the politics of 
uncertainty not only as a mode of governance, but also as a means of bolstering 
social control. These topics constitute central problems for modern nation states, 
with efforts to counter them commanding a sizeable amount of political energy, 
large tranches of public expenditure and considerable material resources for the 
police, criminal justice system and intelligence services. The UK government’s 
National Risk Register – which assesses large- scale threats – considers the threat 
of cyber and terrorist attacks as ‘high’, both in terms of likelihood of occurrence 
and severity of impact. In relation to cyber security, the frequency and the scale 
of attacks continues to proliferate. Given enhanced connectivity between digital 
systems, there is a clear possibility of attacks of greater magnitude, with public and 
private sector organisations considered to be ‘at risk’ (see National Risk Register of 
Civil Emergencies  2017 : 63). There is, of course, discernible overlap between cyber 
security and national security – especially given instances of attacks designed to 
destabilise military and intelligence – with both organised groups and lone individ-
uals who are committed to violence seeking to launch cyber- attacks that destabilise 
state security and disrupt processes of capital accumulation. Further, widespread 
concerns have been expressed in political discourse and policy about the emer-
gence of new types of terrorist violence:
 Many of those networks and individuals who are judged to pose a terrorist 
threat share an ambition to cause large numbers of casualties without 
warning. Some have aspirations to use non- conventional weapons such as 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances. Others aspire to 
attack our national infrastructure using both traditional methods and more 
novel methods such as electronic attack (National Risk Register of Civil 
Emergencies  2017 : 26). 
 Given pronounced institutional anxieties, it is unsurprising that the current UK 
threat level for international terrorism – set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre – 
is classified as ‘substantial’, meaning that an attack is ‘highly likely’. While framing 
matters of security in this way may incline us to an understanding of risk and 
uncertainty that is slanted towards institutional regulation determined by expert 
systems, such a proclivity may encourage a somewhat partial view. The state has a 
formal duty to protect citizens from harm through implementing protective pol-
icies and practices, but risk and uncertainty are also lived and experienced by indi-
viduals in the course of everyday life. As we shall argue, risks and uncertainties are 
not naturally occurring, flat and horizontal phenomena; rather, they emerge in spe-
cific locales under particular political, economic and cultural conditions (McGowan 
 2018 ). This is significant, as it infers that uncertainties are both produced by and 
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affect different people to different degrees and in different ways. As Ian Scoones 
( 2019 : 4) reasons, extant forms of stratification – such as gender, class, ethnicity and 
age – are salient factors in understanding the uneven impacts of uncertainty. 
 Governing cyber security: competing narratives 
 The first section of the chapter, led by Helena Farrand Carrapico, explores the gov-
ernance of Brexit uncertainty in the context of cyber security policy. Cyber security 
is considered to be an intensely uncertain field, with ever- increasing levels of attacks 
on information systems and their users being reported (EC  2018 ). Not only is 
cyber insecurity understood as affecting the daily running of societal infrastructures 
and citizens’ lives, it is also construed as having the potential to undermine funda-
mental rights, democracy and the rule of law: ‘malicious cyber activities not only 
threaten our economies and the drive to the Digital Single Market, but also the 
very functioning of our democracies, our freedoms and our values’ (EC  2017 : 2). 
Nowadays, ‘cyber security is about defending our way of life’ (UK National Cyber 
Security Centre  2019 :  1). This potential for harm has been framed as an exist-
ential form of uncertainty that is often associated with societal dependence on 
fast- evolving technology, mass production of personal digital data, anonymity of 
attackers and a lack of technical knowledge and resilience among the public. It is 
also portrayed as a pervasive type of uncertainty, with cyber- attacks presented as 
affecting all levels of society, from large companies to state infrastructure and the 
general public (EC and HREU  2013 ). 
 Given the discursive context, it is easy to understand why the current threat 
level has been flagged as a major concern at international, European and national 
levels (UK National Cyber Security Centre  2019 ), and also why cyber security 
has, in recent years, jumped to the forefront of many political and business 
agendas (Carrapico and Barrinha  2017 ). It is equally unsurprising that EU citi-
zens’ perceptions of cyber security and their attitudes towards internet security 
have changed considerably, with a recent poll indicating that 79 per cent of those 
surveyed believed that the risk of becoming a victim of cyber- crime is increasing 
(EC  2019 ). The framing of cyber security as a deeply uncertain field has enabled 
a wide range of actors, including both state and private actors, to propose and 
apply a range of policies directed towards addressing cyberspace- calculated risks. 
This process has been particularly evident within the EU, with uncertainty being 
used as one of the key justifications for the introduction and development of a joint 
macro- level cyber security policy and strategy (EC and HREU  2013 ). Given the 
borderless nature of cyber- attacks, closer cooperation between EU member states 
has been presented as the logical answer to the uncertainties of cyberspace. 
 The governance of Brexit, following the 2016 EU membership referendum, has 
introduced new forms of complexity in an already uncertain field, with business 
and practitioner concerns being vocally articulated (Harcup  2019 ). The main diffe-
rence between ‘new’ forms of uncertainty and cyber security emanates from the 
idea that Brexit constitutes a step into the complete unknown. Whereas cyber 
security is often couched in terms of risks, which are considered to be calculable 
154 Helena Farrand Carrapico et al.
and insurable, the Brexit process brings considerable uncertainty to the sector. The 
rupture in the relationship between the EU and the UK triggered by Brexit means 
that the full consequences of the process on both the sector and the wider economy 
are unpredictable and largely unknown (see Anan  2019 ). The lack of historical, pol-
itical and legal reference points reinforces uncertainties and serves to render the task 
of imagining post- Brexit futures necessarily speculative. 
 In practice, the governance of Brexit has resulted, above all, in a crisis of know-
ledge, which in turn has led to a crisis in decision- making. More specifically, incer-
titude in this case has both political and operational dimensions. Operationally, 
Brexit is likely to disrupt seriously, if not to interrupt entirely, the flow of cyber 
security- related information regularly exchanged by national authorities respon-
sible for countering online threats (Stevens and O’Brien  2019 ). Regarding the 
explicitly political dimensions, Brexit has the potential to damage the UK’s repu-
tation as a key policy entrepreneur in cyber security. As an EU outlier post- Brexit, 
the UK is likely to have limited or no access to EU institutions and agencies. In 
addition, even if the UK is able to secure a degree of access, it will not be allowed 
to take part in decision- making, including involvement in voting processes. Clearly, 
Brexit has the potential to reduce the levels of trust that the UK– EU relation-
ship has previously benefited from and which has enabled strategic and operational 
cooperation to flow in the field of cyber security (Carrapico  et al.  2019 ). 
 The practitioner- led narratives on uncertainty recounted above have, however, 
not circulated without contest or challenge. As part of the UK government’s process 
of negotiating an exit from the EU, considerable political efforts have been put into 
creating a counter- narrative that emphasises that the UK and the EU will continue 
to exchange cyber security- related intelligence and that the UK will still be able to 
shape EU standards and incident responses, as other formal and informal channels 
can be used to cooperate in cyber security beyond the EU, including the Five Eyes 
framework and NATO:  ‘pretty much everything we do now to help European 
partners, and what you do to help us, on cyber security can, should, and I  am 
confident, will, continue beyond Brexit’ (Martin, cited in Ashford  2019 ). Whatever 
the upshot of Brexit in the domain of cyber security, such narratives and counter- 
narratives demonstrate competing ways in which uncertainty is not only under-
stood but, moreover, is being ideationally massaged to suit particular political and 
economic ends. The fact that this is a nascent – but increasingly vital – policy field 
allows us to observe some of the ways in which discourses of certainty and uncer-
tainty are created and disseminated. In addition, a critical analysis of the cyber risks 
triggered by Brexit enables us to envision how these discourses are co- produced 
and mutually responsive, as each jostles to become the dominant and commonly 
accepted security narrative. 
 Counter- terrorism: the strategic exploitation of uncertainties 
 In this section, Narzanin Massoumi discusses the strategic exploitation of uncer-
tainties through the UK government’s counter- radicalisation strategy, Prevent, 
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focusing primarily on the relationship between government and two sets of non- 
governmental actors that played a significant role in delivering and developing 
anti- terrorism initiatives. The first set of actors are state- supported civil society 
organisations that rely on government support through funding, institutional access 
and other resources. In the first iteration of Prevent, such organisations were overtly 
linked to the government and included agencies like the Quilliam Foundation 
(now Quilliam). Following a shift in strategy from 2011 onwards, the government 
adopted a set of discreet relations with a new set of state- supported organisations 
in order to compensate for previous failures in gaining legitimacy. The second 
key group of actors are neo- conservative think tanks – such as the Henry Jackson 
Society – which have successfully lobbied for changes in government policy in this 
area. As we shall see, these non- governmental organisations have played a significant 
role in supporting and enacting Prevent. The publicly autonomous nature of these 
organisations means that they are not subjected to official forms of scrutiny, raising 
to the fore issues of power and accountability. 
 The Prevent strategy was devised in 2003 under the presiding Labour govern-
ment, but was formally launched in 2007 following the ‘7/ 7’ London bombings. 
The strategy is underpinned by the presumption that the roots of politically and 
religiously motivated violence lie in the propagation of ‘extremist’ ideas – in other 
words, that a continuum operates that stretches from initial adoption of radical 
ideas through to committing acts of terrorism. Prevent is based on pre- emptive 
principles and serves as a ‘pre- crime’ measure, designed to promote early interven-
tion to avert later occurrence of harm. While the Prevent strategy seeks to model 
future threats by identifying indicators of vulnerability to extremist ideology and 
‘drivers’ of violent behaviour, its design, implementation and impacts have been 
widely criticised since its inception (Mythen  et al .  2017 ; Kundnani  2009 ;  2015 ; 
Dodd  2009 ). In the first iteration of the Prevent strategy, the stated objective was to 
‘work with Muslim communities to isolate, prevent and defeat violent extremism’ 
(DCLG  2007 ). As a result, there was a concerted drive to fund Muslim civil society 
organisations – via the Department for Communities and Local Government – 
that would work directly on tackling ‘violent extremism’. This saw the largest 
ever injection of funding into Muslim civil society in the UK, with  £ 60 million 
being directed to ‘third sector’ agencies to counter extremism (O’Toole  et  al . 
 2013 ). At the same time, Prevent funding was controversially allocated to local 
authorities on the basis of the proportion of Muslims living in the locale (Mythen 
 et al .  2017 ; Kundnani  2009 ). While ‘capacity building’ initiatives were focused on 
empowering Muslim minority communities, the government’s drive to recruit 
partners to assist in the counter- terrorism agenda proved difficult. The Prevent 
programme faced widespread criticism from human rights groups, academics and 
activists for being selective in its engagement with Muslim groups and excluding 
those critical of UK foreign policy or domestic counter- terrorism measures. The 
strategy was also criticised for its heavy policing of civil society organisations and 
its surveillant ambitions in gathering data for intelligence purposes (Kundnani 
 2015 ; Dodd  2009 ). 
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 Following a review conducted by the then independent reviewer of terrorism 
legislation, David Anderson QC, the Conservative/ Liberal Democrat coalition gov-
ernment issued a second iteration of Prevent in 2011 (HM Government  2011 ). The 
revised strategy included significant modifications. First, following lobbying by neo- 
conservative groups, there was a move from exclusively tackling ‘violent extremism’ 
to also combating ‘non- violent extremism’. Second, the revised strategy purported 
to address a wider variety of forms of extremism, including that emanating from the 
far right; although, as we shall see, the policy has always disproportionately targeted 
‘Islamist extremism’. Third, overall responsibility for Prevent was centralised in the 
Home Office, with community cohesion activities remaining with the Department 
for Communities and Local Government. Fourth, and not expressed in the formal 
strategy, a shift towards working covertly with Muslim civil society groups occurred. 
Following the failure of government counter- radicalisation measures to gain legit-
imacy among Muslim civil society, in 2012 the UK government adopted a policy 
of covertly funding Muslim civil society organisations that would politically align 
with state priorities as the statement below by the former British prime minister, 
Theresa May, shows:
 Often it is more effective to be working through groups that are recognized 
as having a voice … rather than it being seen to be government trying to give 
a message. Indeed, it’s always better to be using those people to whom people 
look naturally to hear the message, rather than simply doing it as RICU itself 
(Intelligence and Security Committee  2012 ). 
 The Research Information and Communications Unit, based in the Home Office 
and referred to by Theresa May above, led these covert elements of Prevent, 
employing the services of a public relations company called Breakthrough Media 
to create social media campaigns in order to promote pro- government messaging 
(Massoumi and Miller  2019 ; Massoumi  et al .  2019 ). RICU covertly supported, via 
Breakthrough Media, campaigns purporting to emanate from grassroots Muslim 
civil society groups challenging ‘extremism’ in local communities. One such cam-
paign was fronted by Families Against Stress and Terror, which describes itself as an 
independent organisation that offers ‘support to vulnerable families and individ-
uals’. Yet, in a leaked internal Office for Security and Counter- Terrorism document 
marked ‘not for public disclosure’, FAST’s ‘Families matter’ campaign is described 
as a ‘RICU product’ that has been ‘led and developed’ by FAST but ‘supported 
by … PR and online activity’ (Miller and Massoumi  2016 ). FAST is but one of 
many ostensibly grassroots organisations that play a role in counter- radicalisation 
initiatives, and that have been afforded discreet Home Office support (Hooper 
 2017 ; Cobain  et al.  2016 ). The covert nature of these initiatives creates uncertainty 
throughout Muslim civil society, as people are unaware which initiatives are linked 
to government and which are not. 
 In 2015, the Prevent programme was placed on a statutory footing, following 
the Counter- Terrorism and Security Act 2015. This required public institutions to 
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pay ‘due regard’ to ‘prevent people being drawn into terrorism’. Although Prevent 
in the public sector is supposed to be guided by the Prevent Duty Guidance (HM 
Government  2015a ), in practice there exists uncertainty about if, how and when 
to implement it. This trajectory of the Prevent programme has been heavily 
influenced by neo- conservative think tanks with strongly defined neo- conservative 
viewpoints on issues such as religion, immigration, integration and terrorism. In 
Britain, neo- conservative organisations such as the Henry Jackson Society and 
Policy Exchange routinely lobby government and promote authoritarian, exclu-
sionist polices. Such think tanks have published a series of reports purporting to 
show ‘evidence’ of extremism among British Muslims – calling on government to 
sever links with particular individuals and groups and urging intensified surveil-
lance of Muslims. In addition to being morally dubious and socially retrogressive, 
the evidence presented for such calls is highly questionable. To give but one 
example, a report by the Policy Exchange was withdrawn by the think tank after 
the BBC established that receipts claiming to establish that ‘extremist’ literature 
was being sold in British Mosques had been forged (see Mills  et al .  2011 ). There 
are numerous instances in which the ‘research’ of right- wing think- thanks alleging 
extremist activities by British Muslims has been challenged for being either 
inaccurate or highly exaggerated. The specific examples that have come to light 
signal broader concerns about the integrity of their research practices (Miller  et al . 
 2017 ). Mediating and endorsing Islamophobic discourses in the public sphere and 
attempting to influence security policy are, lamentably, embedded activities for 
many neo- conservative think tanks. For example, the Centre for Social Cohesion – 
later incorporated into the Henry Jackson Society – and Policy Exchange were at 
the forefront of pushing for the revision of the Prevent strategy to include ‘non- 
violent’ extremism. Following these mobilisation efforts, the Prevent policy was 
expanded to include ‘non- violent extremism’, with the Centre for Social Cohesion 
being cited no fewer than six times, indicating its role in influencing the formation 
of the policy. More recently, it was uncovered that the Home Office Extremism 
Analysis Unit – the body created to monitor extremism following the introduc-
tion of the Prevent Duty Guidance ( 2015 ) – was receiving data directly from the 
Henry Jackson Society in its efforts to identify extremists ( Butt v Secretary of State 
for Home Department  2017 ). This demonstrates the extent to which non- accountable 
neo- conservative agencies have not only influenced the direction of the Prevent 
policy but also tangibly shaped its practical implementation. The range of oblique 
activities and practices undertaken by non- governmental actors acting outwith 
democratic protocols and procedures generates palpable concerns with regards to 
responsibility, scrutiny and accountability. The predominant focus of ideational 
activities in the public sphere for right- wing think tanks has been oriented towards 
expanding the nebulous concept of extremism and indexing it to Islam and 
Muslims. Such disingenuous activities have fuelled Islamophobic discourses and 
acted as a lever to lobby government to move ‘security’ policy in increasingly 
authoritarian directions. At the same time, Muslim public figures and legitimate 
civil society organisations have been targeted by deliberate smears, further 
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restricting and discouraging Muslim political participation in public life. This, 
coupled with the official counter- terrorism apparatus – an already powerful and 
largely unaccountable set of institutions  – targeting individuals considered as 
extremists and those apparently radicalised has had serious repercussions. Concepts 
such as extremism and radicalisation are imprecisely defined in official discourse, 
generating widespread uncertainty at the level of identification and intervention. 
The flexible fashion in which these concepts are operationalised in the state bur-
eaucracy, together with the routine practices of the police and other public servants, 
means that many thousands of people in the UK are now regarded as legitimate 
targets for suspicion, surveillance and intelligence- gathering. To this end, there is 
already a wide and deep body of evidence indicating that UK counter- terrorism 
policy has disproportionately affected and discriminated against Muslims (Qurashi 
 2018 ; Massoumi  et al .  2017 ; Kundnani  2015 ). Nested within Prevent – and designed 
to combat radicalisation – ‘Channel’ serves as but one example of this. Channel is 
the UK government’s pre- criminal ‘diversionary’ programme, which ‘provide[s] 
support for people vulnerable to being drawn into any form of terrorism’ (HM 
Government  2015b ). Figures released under the Freedom of Information Act – 
and now routinely published by the Home Office – show that there has been a 
sharp increase in Channel referrals since the introduction of the Counter- 
Terrorism and Security Act and the Prevent Duty Guidance in 2015. Between July 
2015 and June 2016 there were 4,611 referrals – a 75 per cent increase on the 
previous year. Notably, of these cases some 2,311 were children under the age of 
18 (including 352 under nine years old) (Massoumi  et al .  2017 : 11). Subsequently, 
the figures have continued at a similar rate, meaning that on average 12 people a 
day are being referred to the programme. While the revised Prevent strategy 
purports to deal with all forms of terrorism, the large majority of referrals to 
Channel relate to suspicions of Islamist extremism: 65 per cent in 2015/ 16 and 61 
per cent in 2016/ 17. Alarmingly, from 2014 to 2016, young Muslims were 44 
times more likely to be referred to the Channel programme than individuals of 
other religions (Blakeley  et al .  2019 ). Although there was an increase in referrals 
and Channel support decisions for right- wing extremism in 2017/ 18 (Islamist 
extremism referrals reported at 50 per cent, compared to 32 per cent for right- 
wing extremism, with Channel supporting 45 per cent of decisions for Islamist 
extremism and 44 per cent for right- wing extremism), the Prevent programme still 
disproportionately targets Muslims. Yet, despite apparent rising awareness of the 
threat presented by individuals and groups motivated by racism and Islamophobia, 
none of the RICU covert activity described above was directed towards the 
problem of right- wing extremism. Moreover, groups racialised as White are not 
universally implicated in right- wing extremism, in the way that Muslim groups 
have had their cultural beliefs and practices spuriously used as potential indicators 
for extremism or radicalisation. As empirical studies have illustrated, the imple-
mentation of undemocratic counter- terrorism measures has created widespread 
anxiety and uncertainty for young British Muslims, who have been subjected to 
disproportionate forms of policing, harassment and surveillance (Khan and Mythen 
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 2018 ; Qurashi  2018 ; Kundnani  2009 ; Mythen  et al .  2009 ). Examples of how this 
has transpired in practice are abundant. Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 
enabled the police to stop and search any person or vehicle without any require-
ment for ‘reasonable suspicion’. Asians and Blacks were disproportionately targeted 
compared with Whites, with Asians being over six times more likely to be stopped 
and searched, and Black people on average almost eight times more likely 
(Massoumi  et al .  2017 : 8). In January 2010, Section 44 was declared unlawful by 
the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of  Gillan and Quinton v UK . 
The court noted in its judgement that ‘none of the many thousands of searches has 
ever resulted in conviction of a terrorism offence’ ( Gillan and Quinton v UK , 
 2010 : para. 148). Further, Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 sanctions draco-
nian powers which apply to port and airport border controls allowing the detain-
ment of individuals for up to nine hours to conduct searches of their person, 
allowing belongings to be seized for up to seven days. Those detained under 
Schedule 7 have fewer legal rights than criminal suspects: they are not entitled to 
a publicly- funded lawyer, are obliged to answer questions and, if detained at a 
police station, to provide biometric data, including fingerprints and DNA – all 
without a requirement of ‘reasonable suspicion’ (Massoumi  et al .  2017 : 9). While 
the religion of those detained under Schedule 7 is not recorded in official statistics, 
publicly available figures on the ethnicity of those examined or detained indicate 
that individuals of Pakistani ethnicity are over 150 times more likely to be detained 
under Schedule 7 than White British citizens (Massoumi  et al .  2017 : 10). As flagged 
earlier, forms of state control and para- statal involvement in ideational projects of 
regulation and division underscore the ways in which uncertainty connects to 
issues of governance and accountability, and also index to the operation of power 
and the enactment of political priorities. 
 All of this suggests that, when we think about concrete examples where uncer-
tainty seems rife, it is worth asking whether the issues in front of us can be viewed 
through a different lens and/ or interpreted in a different way. Uncertainty is often 
associated with unknowns and futurity, but this often obscures tangible and observ-
able phenomena. For example, how might our understanding of a given situation 
change if we were not to use the optic of uncertainty and risk, but instead to use that 
of harm and injustice? As the long- standing discrimination faced by British Muslims 
in the UK illustrates, history, dominant ideologies and institutionalised prejudice 
matter. To this end, it is vital to stress that, while the state may formally aver that it is 
the guardian of ‘public’ security, in practice the role of state intelligence and surveil-
lance agencies in producing insecurity for certain individuals and groups is evident. 
 Survivors of structural violence: emotion, trust and the politics 
of accountability 
 Historical and temporal factors are also present when thinking about the consequences 
of political and religiously motivated violence, as Will McGowan shows in this final 
part of the chapter. His research focuses on the different treatment – both legal 
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and cultural – received by those living in the aftermath of such violence. In this 
regard, the shooting of innocent protestors by the British Army in 1972 in Ireland 
on ‘Bloody Sunday’ and the coordinated bombing of London’s transport system in 
the 2005 ‘7/ 7’ attacks offer contrasting points of reference. In making sense of these 
various pasts in the present, the two respective ‘survivor groups’ have had both to 
negotiate and traverse life since these tragic events, but in quite different ways. While 
the 7/ 7 attacks were subject to close scrutiny by the state – including profiling of 
the perpetrators, transparent and widely publicised inquests and post- event analysis 
for the emergency and security services – the survivors of Bloody Sunday have 
spent more than four decades seeking justice through successive inquiries. Indeed, 
it was not until 2010 that an official apology was received from the British prime 
minister and, more recently, a case for prosecution belatedly brought against one of 
the British soldiers involved in the incident. The information made available to the 
public following 7/ 7 provided at least a satisfactory ‘completeness’ of knowledge 
about how their loved ones were killed and the contextual factors surrounding the 
event. No such completeness was available to Bloody Sunday survivors. Within the 
Catholic community of Derry, it was not uncertainty that beset efforts to expose 
the abuses and persecution they faced, or to establish what took place at that Civil 
Rights march. Instead, their ability to make public those harms and to ensure an 
accurate and just recording of them has meant that survivors and campaigners have 
had perpetually to look back on events retrospectively, with little chance of ‘moving 
on’ with life as before. 
 Locating uncertainty within these two examples becomes very much a ‘tale of 
two tragedies’: with one in which knowledge enables at least the potential for pro-
spective and future recovery, and the other in which the cultural and legal prece-
dent of remembering history displaces any such hopes for transcending its impacts 
within living memory. Contemporary political conditions have also intermingled 
with these survivors’ sense of collective identity and ontological security differ-
entially, with uncertainty, fears and hypothetical resolutions relating to Brexit and 
the Irish border looming ever larger. The relationship between politics, emotion, 
(non)knowledge and power in such landmark cases is thus contingent upon the 
state’s arbitration of them. Hannah Arendt’s ( 1958 : 237) oft- cited analysis of polit-
ical promises usefully illuminates this relationship further:
 The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, 
is contained in the faculty to make and keep promises … binding oneself 
through promises, serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the 
future is by definition, islands of security without which not even con-
tinuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be possible in the relationships 
between men [ sic ]. 
 In the immediate aftermath of catastrophe or injustice, such events again raise 
pressing questions about accountability and democracy, partly because of the 
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relationship Arendt highlights between those in positions of power and the  demos 
to whom they make promises. When these promises are broken  – as they are 
with alarming frequency  – trust is not only eroded:  it is difficult to win back. 
However, looking beyond specific actions and reactions concerning individuals, 
Arendt’s analysis of uncertainty merits closer attention in relation to the relation-
ship between governance, emotion and trust. Unlike Arendt’s remedy for unpre-
dictability, which provides islands of security, today’s political landscape presents 
us with insecurity as an unceasing and inevitable feature of social, economic and 
political life. Catastrophe, vulnerability and surprise perpetually await us and must 
be embraced; preparation to deal with the jolts and shocks generated by twenty- 
first century turbo- capitalism must be prioritised, and represent something of an 
emotional retraining exercise. As Mark Neocleous ( 2012 : 188) posits, the nature 
of today’s security politics might be epitomised in the maxim: ‘don’t be scared, be 
prepared’. The  actual emotions engendered under such political conditions – the 
preponderance of which are likely to be negative ones, such as fear and anger – may 
encourage an inward- turning and acquiescent citizenry. Whether or not this is the 
case, they provide no basis for long- term stability, or happiness. 
 Four concluding provocations 
 In drawing the chapter to a close, it has been our intention to deploy concrete 
examples of the ways in which problems of uncertainty have an impact upon 
‘security’ in its many guises, from policy and practice to the ontological and 
emotional. Having discussed several problematiques that arise when we seek 
to engage in debates about uncertainty in the context of security, we wish to 
end by offering up four caveats that serve as simultaneous provocations. First, 
it is our contention that, rather than analysing uncertainty as a purely abstract 
concept, we need to situate it in specific contexts of knowledge and grounded 
cultural milieu. The dangers of presentism – through which histories of uncer-
tainty might become masked – are obvious in this regard. Second, having iden-
tified a set of specific practices to focus on, it is important to remain alert to the 
different characteristics of uncertainty, and to speak consistently about particular 
strands across a chosen set of observations. Third, as we have demonstrated, it is 
important to be aware of – and alert to – the pursuit of narrow, sectoral interests 
that may lurk beneath the veil that uncertainty enables. Fourth, and relatedly, 
we would counsel against ‘uncertainty imperialism’, whereby the term becomes 
used as a catch- all  lingua franca that is devoid of specificity. Mirroring academic 
overuse of ‘risk’ as an heuristic device, if we are loose in bandying about the 
discourse of ‘uncertainty’ there is a palpable danger of catachresis. While theor-
etically exploring the constitution of uncertainty adds to the corpus of academic 
knowledge, as we have intimated, overstretching its explanatory potential may 
serve to shroud rather than elucidate more pressing and critical analyses of power 
relations, inequalities and injustices. 
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 UNSETTLING THE APOCALYPSE 
 Uncertainty in spirituality and religion 
 Nathan Oxley 
 Introduction: the end 
 A wave of apocalyptic language has emerged around a heightened sense of crisis in 
climate change and biodiversity loss, and the inadequacy of effective responses to 
it. Among the participants in recent Extinction Rebellion protests are Christians, 
Muslims, Buddhists and others who overtly link their activism to religious and spir-
itual convictions. In May 2019 a UK shadow cabinet minister warned of impacts of 
‘biblical proportions: droughts, pestilence, famine, floods, wildfires, mass migration, 
political instability, war and terrorism’ (Hansard  2019 ). It seems that earthly language 
alone is not sufficient to capture the immensity of the problems that the world faces. 
 The search for religious ways to express fears of catastrophe is not a new phe-
nomenon, even in modern times. In response to the threat of nuclear weapons, 
Sallie McFague ( 1987 ) proposed a change in theological language away from patri-
archy and monarchy towards more caring, ecologically sensitive, nurturing ‘models’ 
of God. Stefan Skrimshire wrote a decade ago about a flurry of apocalyptic rhetoric 
on the climate at the time, as the latest punctuation point in a long story in which 
apocalyptic thought had been ‘stitched’ into foundational ideas about history, pro-
gress and science (Skrimshire  2010 ). In the same volume, Mike Hulme cited ‘pres-
aging apocalypse’ as one of four ways that problems around climate change were 
being framed: as a ‘call to action’, but not one that left much room for discussion 
about what that action should be (Hulme  2010 : 43– 46). 
 Today, there are at least four related things going on in the current outpouring of 
religious terms in response to environmental problems. First, religious stories about 
the ‘end of days’ are a useful shorthand to dramatise and simplify the powerful, 
disruptive or destructive forces being felt in many parts of the world. Second, the 
rhetoric points to the proper meaning of ‘apocalypse’ as a revelation or uncovering – 
with a call to action that emphasises ‘listening’ or ‘paying attention’ to experts, or 
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to the experiences of vulnerable people. Third, the overt religiosity of recent cli-
mate protests, combining and appropriating various traditions and rituals, suggests 
that people are searching for emotional and spiritual responses to feelings of crisis, 
attempting to create spaces for consolation or reflection. Fourth, putting environ-
mental problems in religious terms brings their moral and cultural dimensions to 
the surface – dimensions that are often neglected by dominant approaches based on 
technical or market- based ‘solutions’. 
 Climate change is not the only challenge facing the world, and apocalyptic 
stories are not the only way that religious language can help to explore the emo-
tional and moral dimensions of uncertainty. In a wide variety of contexts – from 
migration to science and technology, disaster response, disease emergence, care of 
nature and the valuation of resources – uncertainties are more than just risks to 
be calculated and overcome. Fears and hopes are not just global: they can be local, 
very specific – personal even. Religious language and practices have long been a 
resource for capitalising on these emotions or helping people deal with them, by 
connecting local, personal struggles to wider institutions, bigger stories and deeper 
histories. Apocalyptic visions may stir strong feelings, but they lead too easily to 
despair, and it is hard to connect them to the myriad everyday struggles that people 
face and the many possible ways things can turn out. Happily, as discussed below, 
other visions and other stories are available. 
 Asking what makes people uncertain across so many areas of life raises some big 
questions. How do we know what is real and true? How do people deal with dis-
agreement and different points of view regarding facts or values? How do people 
interpret why things happen and work out how to respond to them? How do 
people reflect, console, shelter or care for people when the unexpected happens? 
How do people create flexible, resilient structures and practices in the face of unpre-
dictable events? In a world that is often marked by injustice and destruction, how 
can one hope to imagine that things could be different in the future? 
 Looking at religious answers to these questions shows a rich variety of responses – 
often shaped by experiences and wider culture. These responses challenge the 
modern pressure to conform to a single ideal or optimal way of dealing with 
uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance, either by managing them as risk or sweeping 
them under the carpet. They show possibilities for responding to uncertainty with 
humility about what can be known, and creating flexible spaces or practices to 
prepare for when things go wrong. They can also show the dangers of rigid, doc-
trinaire approaches to problems that demand flexibility and humility in the face of 
the unknown or unexpected. 
 Amid pressures to accept dominant narratives about capitalism, single- track 
solutions, global crisis, progress and development, understanding religion may prove 
to be a vital tool, among others, for breaking fixed and predictable visions apart, and 
showing plural ways of seeing and alternative ways of valuing the world and each 
other. This chapter focuses on how religious thought (in particular, drawing from 
my own partial knowledge of Christian traditions, with some tentative comparisons 
with other faiths) can help to foster these qualities of humility, care and sanctuary, 
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and considers their practical implications. The central idea is that religious thought- 
worlds can  unsettle the assumptions that are built into dominant modes of progress 
and development, to reveal and highlight new possibilities for thought and action. 
 Certainty and uncertainty 
 It is a stereotype that religions offer certainty to their adherents. Like many stereo-
types, this is partly based on truth. Religious beliefs and structures can offer a 
kind of security to believers facing uncertain futures or deep questions about the 
nature of consciousness, the origins of the universe or how to know the diffe-
rence between right and wrong. A part of spiritual and mystical experience across 
traditions is a feeling of certainty that can be emotionally overwhelming, even if it 
only lasts a moment. To some, the sense of belonging to a community also offers a 
sense of protection against the unknown. 
 Religious convictions can also provide a space for reaction and entrench-
ment. Fundamentalism is not just a fervent belief in God(s) or doctrines, it aids 
decision- making: non- believers are considered as either satanic enemies or targets 
for conversion; questioning believers are seen as betrayers of the faith and abetters 
of impurity, not just incorrect but evil. In response to these perceived dangers, 
believers are urged to return to sacred texts, authority figures or individual prayer 
to determine the clear path to be taken, often in terms of opposing, dominating, 
expelling or conquering malevolent forces. 
 Authoritarian politics has made good use of these qualities, from Bolivia to 
the United States (Berlet and Sunshine  2019 ) and India (Vanaik  2018 ), and in 
other examples elsewhere and throughout history (for example in the important 
role of theology in justifying Apartheid in South Africa). In these settings, religious 
assertions of certainty are inextricably bound up in party, racial, class and gender pol-
itics, foreign policy, history, borders, security and cultures around food, drink, sexu-
ality, dress and other forms of consumption. Rather than provoking a challenge to 
power or the liberation of the spirit, authoritarian politics uses religious institutions 
and ideas as vehicles for judgement and domination in its demands for conformity 
of behaviour, othering of outgroups and uniformity of thought. 
 But this is not the whole story. Religions also point deliberately towards the 
unknown and unknowable. John Gray ( 2007 : 207) says that rather than aiming for 
consensus and comprehensive knowledge of the world, ‘Religions are not claims 
to knowledge but ways of living with what cannot be known’. Fundamentalism 
acknowledges this lack of control by denying it. In other, perhaps more subtle, ways 
religious thought can serve to unsettle fundamental assumptions that are built into 
logics of risk management, humanitarian efforts, migration policy, technology and 
conservation, alongside other domains of life. These assumptions may themselves 
originate in a moral world that is shaped by religious thought, but in the many 
settings where plural cultures and worldviews are present it is worth examining 
how religious ideas can also expose uncertainties and alternative ways of seeing. 
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 What is unsettled by the religious and spiritual imagination are not just ideas 
about moral choices or values in any simple sense. Religious thinking upsets con-
ventional modern notions of how history and time behave: the logical relationships 
between cause and effect; what is considered to be natural, alive or conscious; where 
truth comes from; how to respond to danger and the threat of death; what freedom 
or emancipation means; the relationships between humans and animals, plants and 
land; and who deserves our attention or care. These are themes that might point the 
way beyond the certain doom implied by apocalyptic visions, on the one hand, and 
controlled – purportedly neutral and unbiased – technical approaches to reducing 
risk and managing security, on the other. 
 For example, what does it mean to see animals, plants, celestial bodies and the 
weather not as resources or threats, but as fellow worshippers of God, as in the 
Benedicite? 1 What does it mean to see the material world as an illusion, or as a good 
creation, or alternatively as evil or corrupted? What does it mean to perceive that 
souls can migrate from humans to animals, and back again; or that there is a sacred 
quality in all living things, or in particular ones? What does it mean to imagine 
that a rock or an artefact is endowed with a spirit or consciousness? What does it 
mean to say that all people are brothers and sisters, or that animals and humans are 
siblings? How do myths about dangerous parts of nature – large animals, storms, 
fire and so on – help people to deal with fears about them and engender respect 
for them? 
 All of these questions affect how people see the building blocks of life, how 
things are perceived to work, how they should work, what connects them and how 
they are able to change. If not simply dismissed as illogical or archaic, these questions 
can shed light on the things that different people prioritise as important, and what 
motivates the decisions they make. In some cases, as in indigenous worldviews 
that are often marginalised in policy, religious stories and concepts are repositories 
of sophisticated knowledge about the natural world – to take one example, the 
rich descriptions of nature– human relations in M ā ori cosmology (Harmsworth and 
Awatere  2013 : 274– 286). Religious myths are often full of descriptions of nature, 
but in contrast to scientific texts, they tend to assign value to it and underline how 
humans are supposed to exist in relation to other parts of nature. 
 The point here is not to aim for a consensus on any of these stories and concepts, 
or treat them as equivalent to each other. Indeed, many people in modern societies 
are exposed (to some extent) to plural accounts. Even within religions themselves, 
accepted truths are maintained and reinforced through storytelling, creeds, educa-
tional institutions and so on; but many religions also have a history of challenge, 
debate and dissension that is visible in texts and doctrines. Looking at the unsettling 
aspects and contradictory claims of religion is a step towards a pluralistic approach 
to uncertainty that recognises the value of different perspectives, not as a way of 
integrating them or adding them to an ever- growing set of data, but in the desire 
to ‘[hold] different ways of knowing as equal’ and value the ‘discontinuities and 
contradictions’ that arise (Nightingale  et al .  2019 : 3). 
168 Nathan Oxley
 ‘Neither light nor darkness, but both together’ 
 Religions do not just provide a way of living with uncertainties about what is out 
there in the world, but, internally, religions can also unsettle themselves. Deeply 
embedded in many religious traditions is a darkness: the idea that the truth itself 
is never fully knowable, that God or gods are hidden or mysterious, or that truth 
is best expressed in terms of paradoxes or contradictions. This idea is present at the 
heart of many religions and spiritual traditions, downplayed in some (for example in 
some evangelical traditions in Christianity) and emphasised in others (for example 
in contemplative and mystical traditions in many faiths 2 ). 
 The assertive claims to ‘truth’ that are sometimes made, and the colonising and 
dominating violence committed in the name of religion, may mask or repress 
this central insight. But an important set of ideas embedded in religious traditions 
maintains that the most significant truths are beyond human comprehension, 
pointed to by revelation. Canonical texts are full of mysteries, myths, poetry and 
parables; images or statues of God are prohibited in some traditions; Zen  k ō ans, 
riddles or puzzles used in certain meditation practices, offer a path to wisdom via 
apparent paradoxes, puns and allusions, not by straightforward assertions. In John 
Henry Newman’s words, applied to Christian notions of truth:
 The religious truth is neither light nor darkness, but both together: it is like 
the dim view of a country seen in the twilight. Revelation, in this way of 
seeing it, is not a revealed system, but consists of a number of detached and 
incomplete truths belonging to a vast system unrevealed (Oakley  2012 : vi). 
 In this view, there may be an objective reality, but it lies outside our comprehen-
sion. Darkness, blinding lights, oceans, clouds, mirrors, nothingness are the operative 
metaphors. 
 This notion of incomprehensible truth is in tension with the constant 
repeated impulse to  experience the divine. The words ‘For now we see only a 
reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I  know in part; 
then I  shall know fully, even as I am fully known’ (1 Corinthians 13:12, NIV) 
imply that it is an inescapable part of the human condition to have only a par-
tial, clouded understanding of the divine:  and yet this is accompanied by the 
hope of a more intimate and perfect knowledge through grace. But this is not as 
much of a contradiction as it seems. The point is that one can experience some-
thing without fully comprehending it. This is more than an intellectual process. 
The unsettling experience of  awe or the  sublime may be approached through 
meditation and fasting, through art or immersion in nature; religious traditions 
provide a framework through which to connect these experiences to people’s 
understanding of the nature of spirit, gods or God. Liturgies and rituals depend 
on bodily and sensual experiences (or the deliberate absence of them, as in 
intentional periods of silence) as part of the process of listening or knowing. 
The ‘knowing’ of Corinthians is not about understanding a collection of facts. 
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Knowledge becomes less about adding information, and more about a process of 
deepening relationships – including between humans, and sometimes in relation 
to other creatures, living and non- living. 
 Shaping responses 
 What does this mean for a politics of uncertainty? If the very core and ground of 
truth is accepted to be mysterious, then assertive statements about what is natural 
or self- evident may be open to challenge. It may also encourage some scepticism 
about claims to power on the part of authorities. It may allow some humility about 
the idea of being able to fully understand or predict mechanisms in the natural 
world and human society. If the deepest kind of knowledge is achieved through a 
relational process, this may serve to highlight the importance of  encounters in produ-
cing and deepening knowledge. 
 These ideas are by no means dominant everywhere in religious contexts, but 
highlighting them can spark an important conversation about how people arrive 
at knowledge and truths. Opening these ideas up could enable religious people to 
take part in a deeper conversation with others about uncertainty in the material 
and social world. 
 Why does this matter? For a politics of uncertainty, it is important not just 
to understand what people do, or even just why they do it, or even just what is 
involved in the process of deciding to do it, but also what it means to them to act 
(or not). If we describe uncertainty as being produced ‘under a particular view’, 
rather than as a ‘condition out there in the world’ (Stirling  2019 ), this means exam-
ining what shapes that view, and what therefore shapes the ongoing response to a 
perceived uncertainty. 
 For example, religious narratives about the dangers of technology may be ‘implicit’ 
and at cross- purposes with other ways of thinking about risk, so ‘proponents of tech-
nology attempting progress at a level of simple risk analysis will simply be talking 
past any voices propelled by … deeply swimming stories of warning’ (McLeish 
 2015 : 193). In responses to migration too there is no unified religious response. 
Concepts that emphasise the brotherhood/ sisterhood of all people, the diaspora of 
believers (in Islam and Judaism, among others), long traditions of asylum (Rowlands 
 2015 ) and scriptural stories about the experience of exile can be brought to bear in 
fostering more caring approaches. 
 For example, a church in The Hague held a service continuously for 96 days to 
shelter a family of asylum seekers. Religious establishments, even temporary ones 
like that in the ‘Jungle’ camp in Calais in 2015, have been important gathering 
points for people on the move. Examples of sanctuary and refuge are a counter-
point to more exclusionary politics, some of which also invoke religion defensively 
against perceived threats. The idea of providing sanctuary, shelter and support also 
applies to disasters such as floods; here, religious institutions are often well- placed 
to provide practical space for people to gather, as well as pastoral support or the 
mobilisation of funds. 
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 These responses may be motivated (at least in part) by religious convictions, but 
the relationship between doctrines and action is complicated. Religious and spir-
itual views are in dialogue with a wider set of identities, politics and worldviews that 
inform a person or group. A ‘perspective’ or ‘worldview’ is rarely a simple thing. 
 Within religions themselves, there are tensions and disagreements about how 
to respond to sources of uncertainty. This plurality means that it is risky to make 
assumptions about how someone will behave just based on a religious (self- )identity. 
It also means that inclusive, flexible approaches to uncertainty need to be reinforced 
and debated within religious communities themselves. An example is the Pope’s 
Lampedusa sermon and Laudato Si’ (see Rowlands  2015 ), which emphasise the 
importance of care for migrants and the challenge of ecological integrity:  these 
have not met with universal approval even from Catholics. In these circumstances, 
advocates of care and solidarity within religious communities need to reach for 
traditions and stories that support their cause. 
 Hope 
 In the Christian tradition, as in others, these kinds of practical responses and 
expressions of mutual aid are seen as being part of a bigger story. Efforts to challenge 
power or to care for vulnerable people are acts of hopeful prefiguration. The ani-
mating vision, that of the Kingdom of Heaven, is not merely a utopian vision of 
the future. The community is meant to see itself as part of the action of making it 
present here and now, even though in sometimes small, imperfect ways. 
 One of the most powerful expressions of this kind of hope is the meaning given 
to the  Magnificat (‘He hath put down the mighty from their seat / And hath exalted 
the humble and meek’) – abundance, mercy or justice, an end to conflict and the 
fading away of earthly riches. Many early Christians expected this to be quite 
imminent, and hope is always somehow looking towards the final end; although 
it is important to note that some traditions within Christianity largely ignore or 
attempt to neutralise the radical potential of these ideas, while others value them 
as an urgent call to participate in revolutionary justice, linked to specific political 
struggles (Cardenal  2008 ). 
 Hope is one of the three things that ‘remain’ or ‘abide’ in earthly experience in 1 
Corinthians 13 (with faith and love), in expectation of fulfilment at the end. Rather 
than an abstract wish for things to be better (‘I hope that the world will not end 
tomorrow’), 3 or necessarily pinned to a particular programme of action, hope is 
found  in God, rather than in human power or authority, and is therefore by nature 
unpredictable and ungovernable. This means that when Christians talk about hope 
they are probably not talking about a vague wish or assurance that somebody else 
will make everything alright, as hope is inseparable from  faith and  love . 
 In other words, hope is in a threefold relation with what might be termed ‘trust 
within a collective search towards God’ (faith), and ‘the active giving of oneself in 
a relation of interdependence’ (love). The obvious danger is that hope on its own 
becomes merely individualised, or a fantasy of justice in the afterlife, permitting 
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great injustices to be tolerated; but linking hope to faith and love may help to bring 
it down from the clouds, for nobody can tolerate for very long the suffering of 
someone they love. 
 This kind of hope does not deny the reality of present suffering or the possibility 
that things will continue to be hard long into the future. It is a hope that emerges 
through accompaniment of those who need it. It rests on the hard truth that the 
future is genuinely not fully known, that there are cracks in the confident stories 
we tell each other about the future, through which alternatives might emerge and 
flourish, if they are nurtured. 
 Giving shape to hope: stories and histories 
 Sometimes the most direct way to tell the truth is to tell a totally implausible story, like 
a myth (Interview with Ursula Le Guin, in Freeman ( 2008 )). 
 Expressions of hope in Christianity, as in other religions, look backwards as well 
as forwards (note the past tense of the  Magnificat ). This may seem strange – how 
do you hope for something that has already happened? But stories give shape to 
hope: they provide patterns and continuities that are always being reinterpreted and 
retold in response to new events. 
 Stories are central to how knowledge is embedded in religions, perhaps even more 
than rituals or institutional structures; indeed, rituals are often a way of dramatising 
or remembering the shape and meaning of a story. Stories come before doctrine. 
Stories may permit uncertainty, confusion, debate and multiple perspectives in a 
way that doctrines cannot easily achieve. Tom McLeish ( 2015 : 193) describes the 
book of Job in the Hebrew Bible as a text that uses the device of legal debate 
to create ‘an area in which different accounts can emerge … six differentiated 
views of human response to the natural world’. The four Christian Gospels have 
resisted efforts to combine them into a single narrative. Ancient stories have been 
reinterpreted and retold by newer religions. And a key part of the colonising influ-
ence of religion has been to try to erase old stories and impose new ones. Stories 
can imprison as well as liberate. 
 Stories also encode knowledge in ways that allow it to be passed on through 
generations. In the Sundarbans, the delta region across the India/ Bangladesh border, 
stories about Bonbibi (the ‘lady of the forest’) shape the way people treat the perils 
of the forest and the aggressive tigers who live there (Jalais  2010 ). These stories 
also unite communities, across religious boundaries, in traditions and rituals that 
reinforce the identity of islanders, in the face of encroachments from conservation 
NGOs and civil authorities. The story of Bonbibi, in bringing together Islamic 
and Hindu elements, reflects the history of migration into the region and the way 
that cultural conflicts were dealt with in the process (Ghosh  et al .  2018 : 10). But, as 
wider economies and environments change rapidly, patterns of worship are chan-
ging too. Prawn seed collectors are increasingly drawn to venerate the goddess Kali, 
a figure associated with more violent and risky behaviours (Jalais  2010 : 119– 120). 
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Here, stories and worship practices are bound up with perceptions about class and 
livelihoods. 
 The challenge for cultures in which religion is a shaping force – which applies 
in many parts of the world – is how these stories and myths might survive the 
accelerating change brought on by new technologies, changes in societies and the 
large- scale destruction of places and habitats. More than just surviving, how might 
religious stories and cultures respond to, challenge or shed new light on these 
processes of change? 
 A broader politics of uncertainty needs to be critically aware of the stories – 
whether spiritual in origin or not – that shape people’s imaginative worlds and 
the practices or structures that enable action or connection. Stories need to be 
recognised for their value without being fossilised. Some lost or forgotten stories 
with emancipatory power might be rediscovered. Some will be rejected or altered 
beyond recognition. Through dialogue with other traditions or encounters with 
new sources of uncertainty, stories can retain their power to move and inspire 
action. Through exchanging stories and noting their differences, people can iden-
tify what makes their own stories more distinctive. In reckoning with the multiple 
perspectives and ways of interpreting the world that exist, rediscovering different 
stories and myths can reveal the values and limitations of these perspectives. 
Together, they can help to navigate through a life that remains full of uncertainty 
and rich with the promise of other possible worlds. 
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 Notes 
 1  www.churchofengland.org/ prayer- and- worship/ worship- texts- and- resources/ common- 
worship/ common- material/ canticles/ benedicite- song- creation . 
 2  e.g. ‘O thou who art hidden in that which is hidden, thou art more than all. All see them-
selves in thee and they see thee in everything. Since thy dwelling is surrounded by guards 
and sentinels how can we come near to thy presence?’ (Attar  1971 : 4); ‘He moves, and he 
moves not. He is far, and he is near. He is within all, and he is outside all … The face of 
truth remains hidden behind a circle of gold’ (Mascaro  2005 : 4)); ‘The godliest knowledge 
of God is that which is known through ignorance’ (Spearing  2001 : 96). 
 3  See also Romans 8:24 (RSV): ‘Now hope that is seen is not hope’. 
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